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Abstract 
Evolutionary approaches have not been as successful in personality psychology as they 
were in other areas of psychology, arguably because of the misfit between modern 
evolutionary psychology’s strong focus on universal adaptations and the study of (mostly 
heritable) individual differences in personality psychology. In this thesis, two alternative 
evolutionary approaches, which appear more suitable for personality psychology, are 
discussed and applied. The evolutionary genetic approach asks why genetic variance in 
personality differences exists. In the first part of this thesis, three evolutionary genetic 
mechanisms that could explain genetic variance in personality differences are assessed: 
selective neutrality, mutation-selection balance, and balancing selection. Based on 
evolutionary genetic theory and empirical results from behavior genetics and personality 
psychology, it is concluded that selective neutrality is largely irrelevant, that mutation-
selection balance seems best at explaining genetic variance in intelligence, and that 
balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity seems best at explaining genetic 
variance in personality traits. A general model of heritable personality differences is 
presented, which conceptualizes intelligence as a fitness component and personality traits as 
individual reaction norms of genotypes across environments, with different fitness 
consequences in different environmental niches. Complementary to the evolutionary genetic 
approach, the life history approach starts with how people allocate their resources to 
evolutionarily relevant life tasks. It asks how individual differences in these allocation 
decisions emerge from the interplay of various developmental components, including 
personality differences. In the second part of this thesis, differences in the allocation to long-
term versus short-term mating tactics (as reflected in the construct of sociosexuality) are 
used as a case to exemplify this approach. Two new measures for the assessment of 
sociosexuality components are presented. While the revised Sociosexual Orientation 
Inventory (SOI-R) is a questionnaire that assesses the facets Behavior, Attitude and Desire, 
the sociosexuality Single-Attribute Implicit Association Test (SA-IAT) is a new methodic 
development aimed to assess implicit sociosexuality indirectly. Both measures showed 
concurrent validity in online studies, but only the SOI-R facets were predictive of mating 
tactics, including observed flirting behavior, as well as for the number of sexual partners and 
changes in romantic relationship status over the following 12 months. Furthermore, distinct 
sex differences, developmental trends, degrees of assortative mating, and effects on a 
romantic partner were found for the three SOI-R facets, indicating their unique roles in the 
development of mating tactics. 
Zusammenfassung 
Evolutionäre Herangehensweisen hatten in der Persönlichkeitspsychologie nicht den 
gleichen Erfolg wie in anderen Bereichen der Psychologie, vermutlich wegen der Fehl-
passung des starken Fokus auf universelle Adaptationen in der modernen 
Evolutionspsychologie mit der Untersuchung (größtenteils erblicher) individueller 
Unterschiede in der Persönlichkeitspsychologie. In dieser Dissertationsschrift werden zwei 
alternative evolutionäre Herangehensweisen diskutiert und angewendet, welche passender 
für die Persönlichkeitspsychologie erscheinen. Die evolutionsgenetische Herangehensweise 
fragt, warum genetische Varianz in Persönlichkeitsunterschieden existiert. Im ersten Teil 
dieser Dissertationsschrift werden verschiedene evolutionsgenetische Mechanismen, die 
genetische Varianz erklären können, verglichen. Auf Grundlage evolutionsgenetischer 
Theorie und empirischen Befunden aus der Verhaltensgenetik und 
Persönlichkeitspsychologie wird geschlussfolgert, dass ein Mutations-Selektions-
Gleichgewicht genetische Varianz in Intelligenzunterschieden gut erklären kann, während 
ausgleichende Selektion durch Umweltheterogenität die plausibelste Erklärung für 
genetische Unterschiede in Persönlichkeitseigenschaften ist. Es wird ein allgemeines Modell 
vorgeschlagen, welches Intelligenz als Fitnesskomponente konzeptualisiert und 
Persönlichkeitseigenschaften als individuelle Reaktionsnormen von Genotypen auffasst, 
welche unterschiedliche Fitnesskonsequenzen in unterschiedlichen Umweltnischen haben. 
Komplementär zur evolutionsgenetischen Herangehensweise beginnt die „Life History“-
Herangehensweise damit, wie Menschen ihre Ressourcen in evolutionär relevante 
Lebensbereiche investieren. Sie fragt, wie Unterschiede in diesen Investitions-
entscheidungen aus dem Zusammenspiel verschiedener Entwicklungsomponenten 
entstehen, einschließlich Persönlichkeitsunterschiede. Im zweiten Teil der Dissertations-
schrift wird diese Herangehensweise am Beispiel von Investitionsunterschieden in Langzeit- 
versus Kurzzeit-Paarungstaktiken (wie im Konstrukt der Soziosexualität abgebildet) erläutert. 
Zwei neue Maße zur Erfassung von Soziosexualitätskomponenten werden vorgestellt. 
Während das revidierte Soziosexuelle Orientierungsinventar (SOI-R) ein Fragebogen zur 
Erfassung der Facetten „bisheriges Verhalten“, „Einstellung“ und „Begehren“ ist, wurde mit 
dem „Single-Attribute“ Impliziten Assoziationstest (SA-IAT) eine neue Methode zur indirekten 
Erfassung impliziter Soziosexualität entwickelt. Beide Maße zeigten konkurrente Validität in 
Onlinestudien, aber nur die SOI-R-Facetten erwiesen sich als prädiktiv für Paarungstaktiken, 
einschließlich beobachtetem Flirtverhalten sowie der Zahl der Sexualpartner und 
Veränderungen im Beziehungsstatus innerhalb der nächsten 12 Monate. Weiterhin wurden 
für die SOI-R-Facetten distinkte Geschlechtsunterschiede, Entwicklungsverläufe, Grade 
selektiver Partnerwahl, und Effekte auf den Beziehungspartner gefunden, was ihre 
spezifischen Rollen in der Entwicklung von Paarungstaktiken unterstreicht. 
8 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, evolutionary approaches had a great deal of success in 
various branches of psychology (e.g. Buss, 2005; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). However, 
personality psychology apparently withstands this general trend. While some notable 
theoretical attempts toward an evolutionary personality psychology have been made as early 
as 1990 (Buss, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), not much has happened since then, and 
the current state must be regarded as unsatisfactory (Miller, 2000; Nettle, 2006). An 
evolutionary account for personality differences is generally acknowledged as a valuable 
goal for personality psychology in the long run (e.g. McAdams & Pals, 2006), but 
evolutionary approaches have clearly not pervaded mainstream personality research. The 
overarching goal of this thesis is to provide and exemplify evolutionary approaches that are 
suitable for personality research. 
One of the main reasons for the low impact that evolutionary psychology had on 
personality research is likely that modern evolutionary psychology has focused very much on 
adaptations. Adaptationistic evolutionary psychology studies domain-specific solutions to 
reoccurring adaptive problems in the universal design of the human species. A defining 
characteristic of these adaptations is that they have been fixed in the human genome, which 
means that they show no genetic variation. They are inherited, but not heritable (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990, 2005). This severely limits the value of the adaptationistic approach to 
personality research: while it can be used to explain sex differences (Mealey, 2000) and 
some individual differences resulting from conditional developmental reactions to 
environmental factors (e.g. attachment styles, e.g. Buss & Greiling, 1999), it is unable to 
explain heritable individual differences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) – and a heritable 
component has been established for virtually all personality differences (Plomin, DeFries, 
McClearn & McGuffin, 2001; Turkheimer, 2000). 
Alternative to the adaptationistic approach, an evolutionary genetic approach can explain 
genetic differences between individuals from an evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary 
genetics studies the effects of processes like mutation, selection, genetic drift, and migration 
on genetic variation between individuals and across populations (Maynard Smith, 1998; Roff, 
1997).In the first part of this thesis, comprised by the theoretical target article “The 
evolutionary genetics of personality” (Penke, Denissen & Miller, in press a), 22 peer 
commentaries, and the author’s reply (Penke, Denissen & Miller, in press b), it is argued that 
evolutionary genetics provides a more suitable approach to personality psychology than 
adaptationism. While some evolutionary genetic mechanisms have already been alluded to 
in earlier evolutionary treatises on personality (Buss, 1990, 1991; MacDonald, 1995; Nettle, 
2006; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), these articles have not exploited the full potential of an 
evolutionary genetic approach. Penke et al. (in press a, b) argue that the degree of 
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elaboration of modern evolutionary genetic models and the wealth of data on human 
personality allows us to infer which evolutionary genetic mechanisms are most plausibly 
responsible for the existence and maintenance of genetic variation in personality differences. 
They conclude that a small set of evolutionarily independent dimensions of genetic 
personality differences exist in humans, of which the one underlying the g factor of 
intelligence is most likely maintained by a balance of new mutation and counteracting 
selection, while those underlying broad personality domains (as for example represented in 
the Five Factor Model of personality) most likely still exist because spatial or temporal 
heterogeneity in our (physical and social) environment causes balanced selection pressures 
on them. Penke et al. (in press a, b) also provide insights into how an evolutionary 
perspective might help to understand the complex interplay between genes and 
environmental factors in producing personality phenotypes. 
Evolutionary genetics thus offers a “bottom-up” approach to an evolutionary personality 
psychology, one where the genetic level is linked to individual differences in abstract 
behavioral dispositions (i.e., personality traits and abilities). However, such dispositions can 
only be evolutionarily relevant if they translate into consequential behaviors. More 
specifically, they have to influence how well people are able to extract resources (ultimately 
energy) from their environments, and how they invest these resources into conflicting life 
domains of evolutionary relevance (i.e., growth, survival, reproduction, and the support of 
genetic relatives). These potentials and allocation decisions, which influence reproductive 
success and ultimately fitness, are studied in evolutionary anthropology and behavioral 
ecology within the framework of life history theory (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). The life 
history approach thus deals with individual differences in highly complex behavioral and 
developmental strategies and tactics for the allocation of resources across the lifespan. Life 
history strategies and tactics can be conceptualized as the final outcome of (1) interacting 
systems of adaptations (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005, 2007; White, Dill & Crawford, 2007), 
which are often sensitive to an individual’s own potential (i.e., condition) and to the 
environment (e.g. Gangestad & Simpson, 2000), and (2) genetic differences within these 
systems (Roff, 2002). However, the step from broad and complex strategies and tactics to 
domain-specific adaptations and genetic differences is a big one - from the very 
“downstream” to the very “upstream” in terms of the watershed model that Penke et al. (in 
press a) adopted from Cannon and Keller (2005). Therefore, it might be worthwhile (if not 
necessary) to take an intermediate step and start with studying the mid-level components of 
life-history strategies and tactics, as well as their interactions with each other and with 
relevant environmental factors across the lifespan. Since these mid-level developmental 
components include personality differences (both heritable and environmental-contingent), 
life history theory offers a “top-down” approach to an evolutionary personality psychology. 
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The life history approach is thus complementary to the evolutionary genetic “bottom-up” 
approach: While the former connects personality to fitness, the latter connects genes to 
personality. 
The second part of this thesis uses the life history trade-off between long-term and short-
term mating tactics as an exemplary case for the life history approach to personality. Long-
term mating tactics include developing and protecting an exclusive and committedromantic 
relationship, usually accompanied by high levels of parental investment in potential offspring. 
In contrast, short-term mating tactics include investing greater efforts in finding and courting 
potential mates, in order to have sexual affairs with either many mates or mates of especially 
high quality. Individual differences along this dimension of mating tactics are often equated 
with sociosexual orientations, which describes individual differences in the willingness to 
have uncommitted sex (Simpson et al., 2004). Both papers in the second part of this thesis 
were aimed to contribute to a dissection of this broad life history trait into its mid-level 
components. 
Penke and Asendorpf (2007) developed a revised version of the Sociosexual Orientation 
Inventory (SOI; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991), a short self-report questionnaire which is the 
most established measure of sociosexuality. The new SOI-R assesses three facets of global 
sociosexuality (desire, attitude, and past behavioral experiences). Penke, Eichstaedt and 
Asendorpf (2006) deviated from the usual reliance on self-reports and attempted to develop 
an indirect measure of implicit sociosexuality. This latter work was inspired by the recent 
trend in social psychology to explain behavior as the outcome of two different cognitive 
systems, distinguished by their reliance on automatic versus reflective information 
processing. It has been argued that the automatic systems is more involved in the generation 
of spontaneous, impulsive behavior, while the reflective system is responsible for deliberate 
behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Since Implicit Association Tests (IATs) are assumed to 
be capable of assessing individual differences in implicit personality self-concepts (Schnabel, 
Greenwald & Asendorpf, in press), and have indeed shown incremental validity over explicit 
self-report measures in the prediction of spontaneous behavior in some studies (e.g. 
Asendorpf, Banse & Mücke, 2002), Penke et al. (2006) developed a variant of the IAT 
procedure, the Single-Attribute IAT (SA-IAT), for the assessment of implicit sociosexuality. 
The rationale here was that if some of the psychological components that influence mating 
tactics operate on the automatic level, they might be better captured by an indirect measure 
like the sociosexuality SA-IAT than by an explicit self-repot measure like the SOI or SOI-R. 
(Note that, while Barrett, Frederick, Haselton and Kurzban, 2006, recently argued that 
evolved psychological mechanisms do not have to operate at the automatic level, it is 
possible that some of them do. Characterizing the level of operation for psychological 
adaptations might help us to understand them better.) 
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Both the SOI-R facets and the sociosexuality SA-IAT showed promising concurrent 
validities in cross-sectional online studies (Penke et al., 2006, Study 2; Penke & Asendorpf, 
2007, Study 1). However, while the SOI-R facets (especially desire and past behavioral 
experiences) predicted future behavioral expressions of mating tactics, including flirting 
behavior towards an opposite-sex stranger, changes in romantic relationship status, and the 
number of sexual partners during the next 12 months (Penke & Asendorpf, 2007, Study 2), 
the SA-IAT showed no significant relationships with any of these criteria (all ps > .10) (Penke 
& Asendorpf, 2006; these SA-IAT results are not reported in the article). Furthermore, while 
Penke and Asendorpf (2007) found a highly differentiated pattern of sex differences, effects 
on romantic partners, personality-relationship transactions, and assortative mating for the 
three SOI-R facets, none of these effects could be established for the SA-IAT (all ps > .10; 
not reported in the article). Thus, while the data suggests that sociosexual desires, attitudes 
and past behavioral experiences (as measured by the SOI-R) belong to the mid-level 
components that interact during development to form a life history pattern of mating tactics, 
no evidence was found for an implicit sociosexuality component. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that there are no implicit aspects of 
sociosexuality that influence mating behavior. Indeed, some lines of evidence suggest that a 
methodological issue of the SA-IAT was at least partly responsible for its failure to predict 
behavioural outcomes: First, the internal consistency of the SA-IAT was much lower in the 
lab study reported in Penke and Asendorpf (2007), where the behavioral criteria were 
assessed, than in the internet study reported in Penke et al. (2006) (Cronbach’s α = .82 vs. 
.66 in the lab and online study, respectively). Second, during the follow-up study of the lab 
sample (see Penke & Asendorpf, 2007), the participants completed an online version of 
exactly the same SA-IAT they completed during the lab session one year earlier (not 
reported in the article). When done at home, the SA-IAT had a higher consistency (α = .74) 
within the same sample of subjects. Furthermore, the participants showed shorter average 
reaction latencies (tBB(217)BB = 5.07, p < .001, d = .22) and made more errors in the central 
classification task (tBB(217)BB = 9.70, p < .001, d = .60) when doing the SA-IAT at home compared 
to the lab (where the SA-IAT was the very first task after an initial “icebreaker” test). Given 
that the SA-IAT procedure is simpler and more transparent than the traditional IAT 
procedure, one interpretation of this pattern of findings is that the SA-IAT is too easy, and 
can be completed as a simple reaction task that is unaffected by implicit associations if 
subjects are very concentrated and motivated to solve the classification task correctly (Penke 
& Asendorpf, 2006). Future studies might be able to develop more robust and reliable 
measures of implicit sociosexuality, and it remains to be seen how these measures fare in 
the prediction of behavioral outcomes before a firm conclusion can be drawn about the 
cognitive level on which sociosexuality-related psychological mechanisms operate. 
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To summarize, evolutionary genetics and life history theory offer complementary 
evolutionary approaches to personality psychology. Both approaches do not suffer from 
mainstream evolutionary psychology’s narrow focus on human universals, but explicitly 
address individual differences. Taken together, they provide a potent framework for an 
evolutionary personality psychology. 
While this thesis sketches and exemplifies how such an evolutionary personality 
psychology might look like, it cannot be considered as a comprehensive treatment of the 
topic. Even for the case of sociosexuality, only first steps are taken. For example, few is 
known about the genetic underpinnings of sociosexuality. The only behavior genetic study 
explicitly concerned with sociosexuality (Bailey, Kirk, Zhu, Dunne & Martin, 2000) used a 
modified version of the SOI, which put a strong accent on the attitudinal component, and thus 
likely changed its focus. Penke and Asendorpf (2007) found that heritable personality traits 
like shyness and sensation seeking are related to various sociosexuality components. They 
thus likely influence the individual development of mating tactics over the lifespan. 
Evolutionary models of human mating have predicted that the same environmental factors 
that affect how people allocate their resources to short-term versus long-term mating tactics 
(like the harshness of living conditions; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000) also exert selection 
pressures on genetic polymorphisms that are related to these personality traits (like the 
DRD4 variants; Harpending & Cochran, 2002). This thesis can only suggest loose links 
between the different levels. It remains a subject for future studies to determine how exactly 
universal adaptations, heritable personality traits, and environmental factors influence which 
life history strategies and tactics individuals develop over their lifespan. 
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Abstract 
Genetic influences on personality differences are ubiquitous, but their nature is not well 
understood. A theoretical framework might help, and can be provided by evolutionary 
genetics. We assess three evolutionary genetic mechanisms that could explain genetic 
variance in personality differences: selective neutrality, mutation-selection balance, and 
balancing selection. Based on evolutionary genetic theory and empirical results from 
behaviour genetics and personality psychology, we conclude that selective neutrality is 
largely irrelevant, that mutation-selection balance seems best at explaining genetic variance 
in intelligence, and that balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity seems best at 
explaining genetic variance in personality traits. We propose a general model of heritable 
personality differences that conceptualises intelligence as a fitness component and 
personality traits as individual reaction norms of genotypes across environments, with 
different fitness consequences in different environmental niches. We also discuss the place 
of mental health in the model. This evolutionary genetic framework highlights the role of 
gene-environment interactions in the study of personality, yields new insight into the person-
situation-debate and the structure of personality, and has practical implications for both 
quantitative and molecular genetic studies of personality. 
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Evolutionary thinking has a long history in psychology (e.g. James, 1890; McDougall, 
1908; Thorndike, 1909). However, the new wave of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Buss, 
1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005) has focused almost exclusively on human universals – the 
complex psychological adaptations that became genetically fixed throughout our species due 
to natural selection (Andrews, Gangestad & Matthews, 2002) and that should therefore show 
zero genetic variation and zero heritability (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). In sharp contrast, one 
of personality psychology’s most important findings in the last three decades has been that 
virtually every aspect of personality is heritable (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn & Mc Guffin, 
2001). This fact is now so well established that Turkheimer (2000; Turkheimer & Gottesman, 
1991) even called it a law. The mismatch between evolutionary psychology’s adaptationist 
focus on human universals and the omnipresence of heritable variance in human personality 
might explain why early approaches towards an evolutionary personality psychology (Buss, 
1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; MacDonald, 1995, 1998) remained rather unsatisfactory 
(see Miller, 2000a; Nettle, 2006a). On the other hand, traditional behaviour genetics did not 
explain the evolutionary origins and persistence of genetic variation in personality, and 
sometimes even viewed genetic variation in traits as evidence of their evolutionary 
irrelevance. Thus, the evolutionary psychology of human universals and the behaviour 
genetics of personality differences share a biological metatheory, but had almost no 
influence on each other (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, 2005; Plomin et al., 2001). 
We believe that this mutual neglect has been unfortunate for both fields, and has 
especially harmed the development of an integrative evolutionary personality psychology. 
Evolutionary studies of species-typical universals and individual differences were already 
successfully merged during the ‘Modern Synthesis’ in the 1930s, when Sir Ronald A. Fisher, 
Sewell Wright, J. B. S. Haldane, and others united the branches of biology that were founded 
by the cousins Charles Darwin (the father of adaptationism) and Sir Francis Galton (the 
father of psychometrics and behaviour genetics) (Mayr, 1993). These 1930s biologists 
created what is now known as ‘evolutionary genetics’, which deals with the origins, 
maintenance, and implications of natural genetic variation in traits across individuals and 
species. Evolutionary genetics mathematically models the effects of mutation, selection, 
migration, and drift on the genetic basis of traits in populations (Roff, 1997, Maynard Smith, 
1998). In the following, we will argue that personality psychology needs an evolutionary 
genetic perspective in order to draw maximal benefits from behaviour genetic findings and 
the evolutionary metatheory. This is important, since understanding the evolutionary 
behaviour genetics of personality is fundamental to the future development of a more unified 
personality psychology (McAdams & Pals, 2006). 
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Overview 
The central topic of this review is how evolutionary genetics can inform our theoretical 
understanding of heritable personality differences and their genetic foundations. We use 
‘personality differences’ in the broad European sense of encompassing individual differences 
in both cognitive abilities and personality traits (e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Cognitive 
abilities reflect an individual’s maximal performance in solving cognitive tasks. It is well-
established that a single continuum of general intelligence (g), ranging from mild mental 
retardation to giftedness, explains a large proportion of the individual differences in cognitive 
abilities across domains (Jensen, 1998), especially on genetic level (Plomin & Spinath, 
2004). Our discussion on cognitive abilities will be focused on this general intelligence 
dimension. Personality traits reflect an individual’s set of typical behavioural tendencies 
exhibited in situations that leave room for diverse adaptive responses. The myriad of 
personality trait dimensions are usually organized in structural models. Broad personality trait 
domains, as in the Five Factor Model of personality (FFM), are generally regarded as stable 
and temperamental in nature (John & Srivastava, 1999). They are what we mean by 
‘personality traits’. 
We argue that the classical distinction between cognitive abilities and personality 
traits is much more than just a historical convention or a methodological matter of different 
measurement approaches (see Cronbach, 1949), and instead reflects different kinds of 
selection pressures that have shaped distinctive genetic architectures for these two classes 
of personality differences. In order to make this argument, we will first give a brief 
introduction to the nature of genetic variation and the major mechanisms that contemporary 
evolutionary genetics proposes for its maintenance in populations. After this, we will critically 
review earlier evolutionary approaches to personality and clarify the role of environmental 
influences within this approach. This will culminate in an integrative model of the evolutionary 
genetics of personality differences, including new, theory-based definitions of cognitive 
abilities and personality traits, as well as a discussion of how common psychopathologies 
(such as schizophrenia and psychopathy) may fit into an evolutionary genetic model of 
personality differences. Finally, we will discuss this model’s implications for an integrated 
evolutionary personality psychology grounded in both behaviour genetics and evolutionary 
genetics. 
 
What is Genetic Variation? Most personality psychologists now accept Turkheimer’s 
(2000) first law of behaviour genetics (‘everything is heritable’). Yet how does systematic 
genetic variation in personality traits arise? A complete understanding of the insights offered 
by evolutionary genetics requires a brief review of some of the basics of genetics and 
evolutionary theory, which we provide in the following. 
22 
The human genome. The human genome consists of about 3.2 billion base pairs that 
are unequally spread across 24 distinct chromosomes. Only about 75 million (2.3%) of these 
base pairs are organized in roughly 25,000 genes (i.e. regions or ‘loci’ translated into actual 
protein structures); the rest (traditionally called ‘junk DNA’) do not code for proteins, but may 
play important roles in gene regulation and expression (Shapiro & von Sternberg, 2005). On 
average, any two same-sex individuals randomly drawn from the total human population are 
99.9% identical with regard to their base pairs (Human Genome Project, 2001), even though 
genomic identity is somewhat further attenuated by copy-number variations (CNVs, individual 
differences in the repetitions of DNA segments) (Redon et al., 2006). This species-typical 
genome contains the universal human heritage that ensures the highly reliable ontogenetic 
reoccurrence of the complex functional human design across generations (‘design 
reincarnation’, Barrett, 2006; Tooby, Cosmides & Barrett, 2005). Adaptationistic evolutionary 
approaches usually care only about this universal part of the genome and its species-typical 
phenotypic products (Andrews et al., 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). 
Mutation. During an individual lifespan, the genome is passed from mother cells to 
daughter cells by self-replication, and if this results in a germline (sperm or egg) cell, half of 
the genome eventually ends up combining with an opposite-sex germline cell during sexual 
reproduction, and is thus passed from parent to offspring. While genomic self-replication is 
astonishingly precise, it is not perfect. Replication errors can occur in the form of point 
mutations (substituting one of the four possible nucleotides in a base pair for another one, 
also referred to as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)), CNVs (duplications or deletions 
of base pair sequences), or rearrangements of larger chromosomal regions (e.g. 
translocations, inversions). All of these copying errors are referred to as mutations, and they 
are ultimately the only possible source of genetic variation between individuals. Recent 
scans of whole human genotypes reported 9.2 million candidate SNPs (International 
HapMap Consortium, 2005) and 1,447 candidate CNV regions (Redon et al., 2006). 
Sexual reproduction endows an individual with a unique mixture of their parents’ 
genotypes. In the short term, this process of sexual recombination is the major cause of 
genetic individuality. In the evolutionary long term, however, sexual recombination is less 
important, since it just reshuffles the parental genetic variation that was once caused by 
mutation. By convention, mutations that continue to be passed on to subsequent generations 
and that reach an arbitrary threshold of more than 1% prevalence in a population are called 
‘alleles’. Since all alleles are mutations, we regard this distinction as hardly helpful. In 
contrast, ‘polymorphism’ is a more neutral term for genetic variants that can be at any 
prevalence. In order to highlight the evolutionary genetic perspective, we will use the terms 
‘mutation’ and ‘polymorphism’ interchangeably. 
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Some mutations are phenotypically neutral, often because they do not affect protein 
structure or gene regulation. Most mutations in protein-coding and genomic regulatory 
regions, however, tend to be harmful to the organism because they randomly disrupt the 
evolved genetic information, thereby eroding the complex phenotypic functional design 
(Ridley, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Only very rarely does a random mutation improve 
the functional efficiency of an existing adaptation in relation to its environment, which is more 
likely if the environment has changed since the adaptation evolved (Brcic-Kostic, 2005). 
Deletions, insertions, and larger rearrangements of base pair sequences tend to have quite 
strong disruptive effects on the phenotype, often leading to prenatal death or severe birth 
defects. Point mutations (SNPs) and duplication-type CNVs (see Hurles, 2004), on the other 
hand, can have phenotypic effects of any strength, including quite mild effects, and it is likely 
that they are the most common source of genetic variation between individuals. 
Behaviour genetics. Quantitative traits, such as intelligence and personality traits, are 
polygenic - they are affected by many mutations at many genetic loci, each of which is called 
a quantitative trait locus (QTL) (Plomin, Owen & McGuffin, 1994). Quantitative behaviour 
genetics basically compares trait similarities across individuals that systemically differ in the 
genetic or environmental influences they have in common (e.g. identical vs. fraternal twins, 
adoptive vs. biological children), to decompose the variation of quantitative traits, and their 
covariances with other traits, into genetic and environmental (co)variance components. It 
also tries to estimate how much of the genetic (co)variance is due to ‘additive effects’ of 
QTLs (which allow traits to ‘breed true’ from parents to offspring) versus interactions between 
alleles at the same genetic locus (‘dominance effects’) or across different genetic loci 
(‘epistatic effects’). Dominance and epistatic effects lead to non-additive genetic variance 
(VNA) between individuals, as opposed to the additive genetic variance (VA) caused by 
additive effects. Together with the environmental variance (VE) and gene-environment (GxE) 
interactions, these components determine the phenotypic variance (VP) that we can observe 
in personality differences. In contrast to quantitative behaviour genetics, molecular behaviour 
genetics uses so-called ‘linkage’ and ‘association’ methods to directly analyse human DNA 
variation in relation to personality variation, to identify the specific QTLs that influence 
particular trait (co)variations (Plomin et al., 2001). 
Natural Selection. Mutations in functional regions of the genome provide half of the 
basic ingredients for biological evolution. The other half is natural selection, which is the 
differential reproduction of the resulting phenotypes (Darwin, 1859). Any mutation that affects 
the phenotype is potentially visible to natural selection, though to varying degrees. Of course, 
those rare mutations that actually increase fitness will tend to spread through the population, 
driving adaptive evolution. Selection is most obvious against mutations that lead to 
premature death or sterility. Such mutations are eliminated from the population within one 
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generation, and can only be reintroduced by new mutations at the same genetic loci. 
Mutations with less severe effects tend to persist in the population for some time; they are 
selected out of the population more quickly when their additive effect reduces the fitness of 
the genotype (i.e., its statistical propensity for successful reproduction) more severely. This 
relationship between the additive phenotypic effect of a genetic variant and its likely 
persistence in a population is described by the fundamental theorem of natural selection 
(Fisher, 1930). 
To summarize, any genetic variation in any human trait is ultimately the result of 
mutational change in functional regions of the species-typical genome. Natural selection 
counteracts disruptive changes by eliminating harmful mutations from the population, at a 
rate proportional to the mutation’s additive genetic reduction in fitness. Only mutations that 
affect the organism’s fitness in a positive or neutral way can spread in the population and will 
reach the 1% prevalence of an ‘allele’. Most psychological traits, including personality 
differences, are complex in design and continuously variable across individuals, indicating 
that many polymorphisms at many loci are responsible for their genetic variation. 
Why is There Genetic Variation in Personality? 
Also else being equal, it seems plausible that natural selection should favour an 
invariant, species-typical genome that codes for a single optimal phenotype with optimal 
fitness. In other words, evolution should eliminate genetic variation in all traits, including all 
aspects of personality. So how can personality differences still be heritable (i.e., genetically 
variable) after all these generations of evolution? To answer this fundamental question, an 
evolutionary genetic approach to personality is needed. 
With the growing acceptance of evolution as a metatheory for psychology, more and more 
personality psychologists are trying to conceptualize personality in an evolutionary 
framework. Unfortunately, these good intentions seldom lead to more than an affirmation that 
certain heritable dimensions are part of our evolved human nature (e.g. McCrae & Costa, 
1996; Ashton & Lee, 2001; McAdams & Pals, 2006). Even worse, some conceptualisations 
of human cognitive abilities ignore genetic variation completely and discuss these heritable, 
variable traits as if they were invariant adaptations (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; 
Kanazawa, 2004). Other authors (Goldberg, 1981; Buss, 1990; Hogan, 1996; Ellis, Simpson 
& Campbell, 2002) take genetic variation in personality differences for granted, and try to 
understand evolved features of our ‘person perception system’ that explain why we 
categorize others along these dimensions. Few have attempted an evolutionary genetic 
approach to explain the persistence of heritable variation in personality itself. 
Evolutionary genetics offers a variety of mechanisms that could explain persistent 
genetic variation in personality differences. These mechanisms include selective neutrality 
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(where mutations are invisible to selection), mutation-selection balance (where selection 
counteracts mutations, but is unable to eliminate all of them), and balancing selection (where 
selection itself maintains genetic variation). Recent theoretical developments make it 
possible to predict how each of these mechanisms would influence certain genetic and 
phenotypic features of traits (see Table 1). Conversely, if these features are known for a 
given trait, it is possible to identify which evolutionary processes likely maintained the genetic 
variants that underlie its heritability. We will now review existing attempts to explain 
personality differences from an evolutionary perspective, and evaluate them in the light of 
modern evolutionary genetics. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Can Selective Neutrality Explain Genetic Variance in Personality? 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990) developed an early and highly influential perspective on the 
evolutionary genetics of personality. They reviewed the state of evolutionary genetics at that 
time, but, as major advocates of an adaptationistic evolutionary psychology, they focused on 
species-typical psychological adaptations and downplayed genetic variation as minor 
evolutionary noise. In their view, one plausible mechanism that could maintain genetic 
variation in psychological differences is selective neutrality (Kimura, 1983). This occurs when 
fitness-neutral mutations (that have no net effect on survival or reproductive success, 
averaged across all relevant environments) accumulate to increase genetic variance in a 
trait. For example, the exact route that the small intestine takes within one’s abdomen may 
have little influence on digestive efficiency, so neutral genetic variation that influences 
patterns of gut-packing could easily accumulate. In the evolutionary short-term, selective 
neutrality allows genetic variance in traits to increase. 
However, what happens in the evolutionary long-term to selectively neutral traits? Since 
neutral mutations are, by definition, unaffected by natural selection, the only evolutionary 
force that can affect neutral genetic variation is genetic drift – and drift always tends to 
decrease genetic variance. Drift is basically the fixation (to 100% prevalence) or elimination 
(to 0% prevalence) of a polymorphism by chance. There is only one factor that is known to 
be important for the efficacy of drift: it is stronger when the ‘effective population size’ (Ne) (the 
average number of reproductively active individuals in a population) is smaller (Lynch & Hill, 
1986). What is really critical for the effect of genetic drift is the minimum Ne during occasional 
harsh conditions (e.g. ice ages, disease pandemics) that created ‘genetic bottlenecks’ 
(especially small effective population sizes). In humans, 10,000 seems to be a good estimate 
for the minimum Ne (Cargill et al., 1999). Mathematical models show that, with such a 
relatively large Ne, drift is fairly weak and selective neutrality could, in principle, account for 
almost all genetic variance in any human trait (Lynch & Hill, 1986). 
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So far, so good: perhaps most genetic variation in human personality is due to 
selective neutrality – maybe there is no average net fitness cost or benefit to being 
extraverted versus introverted, or agreeable versus egoistic. However, the critical 
assumption for selective neutrality is that genetic drift is more important than natural 
selection in affecting a trait’s genetic variance. This is only the case if the selection coefficient 
s is less than about 1/4Ne (Keller & Miller, 2006a). Thus, the larger the effective population 
size, the harder it is for a trait to be selectively neutral. Given the reasonably large estimate 
of minimum human Ne from above (10,000), a typical human trait is selectively neutral only if 
the average net fitness of individuals with a certain polymorphism is between 99.997 and 
100.003% of the average fitness of individuals without that polymorphism (Keller & Miller, 
2006a). For example, an allele that influences extraversion would be truly neutral only if 
extraverts had, not just the same number of 1st-generation offspring as introverts, but 
(almost) exactly the same average number of 15th generation descendants (great13 
grandchildren). In addition, this finely-balanced neutrality must hold across all relevant 
environments: if there are some environments in which outgoing, risk-seeking extraverts do 
better, and other environments in which shy, risk-averse introverts do better (a GxE 
interaction), then extraversion would be under balancing selection (see below), not selective 
neutrality. 
This makes selective neutrality an implausible explanation for heritable personality 
differences, because human personality traits influence outcomes in all areas of life (Ozer & 
Benet-Martinez, 2006), including such obviously fitness-relevant aspects as health 
(Neeleman, Sytema & Wadsworth, 2002), life expectancy (Friedman et al., 1995), mating 
strategies (Nettle, 2005), and reproductive success (Eaves et al., 1990). Indeed, similar non-
neutral relationships between personality and fitness have been observed in various other 
species (Dingemanse & Réale, 2005). The relation between cognitive abilities and fitness 
components has also been impressively demonstrated by Gottfredson (2004, in press), 
Deary (e.g. Deary et al., 2004; Deary & Der, 2005), and Miller (2000b; Prokosch, Yeo & 
Miller, 2005). 
How could we tell if a heritable individual difference was the outcome of selective 
neutrality? Typically, selective neutrality leads to a distinct structure of genetic variation in 
quantitative traits (such as personality differences). If a mutation affects the phenotypic 
expression of a trait, it will first of all have a main effect, which means it will contribute to the 
additive genetic variance (VA) of the trait. Only if the mutation happens to interact with other 
polymorphisms (at the same or other loci, through dominance or epistasis, respectively), will 
it contributes to the non-additive genetic variance (VNA) of the trait. This is exactly the same 
logic that holds for any statistical analysis: ceteris paribus, main effects are much more likely 
than interaction effects. Since all else is equal under selective neutrality by definition, we can 
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expect low absolute values of VNA for any selectively neutral trait (Lynch & Hill, 1986; Merilä 
& Sheldon, 1999), and a very small proportion of non-additive genetic variance (Dα), defined 
by Crnokrak and Roff (1995) as: 
Dα = VNA / (VNA + VA) 
Traits with a recent history of selection, by contrast, should show a significant absolute and 
proportional amount of VNA (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & Sheldon, 1999; Stirling, Réale & 
Roff, 2002). This follows from Fisher’s (1930) fundamental theorem of natural selection: 
since VA is passed directly from parents to offspring, it will be reduced very quickly by natural 
selection for any non-neutral trait. VNA, on the other hand, is affected much more weakly by 
selection, since the interacting genetic components that constitute the VNA are continuously 
broken apart by sexual recombination and thus not passed from parents to offspring. As a 
result, a high proportion of VNA in a trait would argue against the trait’s selective neutrality. 
There is now strong evidence that personality traits show substantial VNA (Eaves et al., 1998; 
Keller et al., 2005) - including some initial molecular evidence for epistatic interactions 
(Strobel et al., 2003) – which suggests they are not selectively neutral. In contrast, cognitive 
abilities seem to show less VNA (Chipuer, Rovine & Plomin, 1990), a point we consider later. 
As summarized in Table 1, genetic variation persists in populations through selective 
neutrality only if its phenotypic consequences are (almost) completely unrelated to fitness in 
any environment. This genetic variation can be expected to be mainly additive. While it is 
possible that this holds for some relatively trivial traits (e.g. gut-packing design), it is highly 
implausible for major personality differences, given their pervasive effects on social, sexual, 
and familial life. 
Can Mutation-Selection Balance Explain Genetic Variance in Personality? 
Mutation rates and mutation load. As stated previously, a truly neutral trait has to 
show a close-to-null relationship to any fitness component in any environment. All traits that 
do not fulfil this very strict requirement are subject to natural selection. As long as the 
direction of selection is relatively constant, Fisher’s (1930) fundamental theorem predicts that 
the additive genetic variance of the trait will be reduced to the point where one genetic 
variant becomes fixed as a universal, species-typical adaptation. The rate of reduction in a 
trait’s genetic variance is influenced by two factors with opposing effects: the mutation rate 
(which increases genetic variance) and the strength of selection (which decreases genetic 
variance). The mutation rate tells us how fast new mutations are introduced into functional 
parts of the genome (i.e., protein-coding genes and their regulatory regions). Comparative 
molecular genetic studies suggest that humans have a comparatively high mutation rate 
(Eyre-Walker & Keightley, 1999), with the best available estimate being an average of about 
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1.67 new mutations per individual per generation (Keightley & Gaffney, 2003). Given 
reasonable assumptions about mutations arising in a Poisson frequency distribution, one can 
calculate that the probability of a human being born without any new mutations is slightly 
lower than one in five (Keller, in press). Importantly, this estimate includes only non-neutral 
mutations (polymorphisms that are visible to selection). As argued above, almost all non-
neutral mutations tend to be harmful, and selection is stronger against more harmful 
mutations. For example, a mutation that reduces number of surviving offspring by 1% will 
persist for an average of ten generations in a large population, passing through the 
genotypes of about 100 individuals during that time. A mutation with a weaker 0.1% fitness 
reduction (which is still ten times stronger than selective neutrality in humans) will persist for 
four generations longer, afflicting about 1,000 individuals (Garcia-Dorado, Caballero & Crow, 
2003). Because harmful mutations with dominant effects are an easier target for selection, 
only recessive mutations are likely to persist for a longer time (Zhang & Hill, 2005). 
It follows that there is a mutation load of older, mildly harmful, and mostly recessive 
mutations in any individual at any point in time. This mutation load is mostly inherited from 
parents to offspring, but a few new mutations arise in each generation. Thus, each particular 
mutation will be eliminated by selection eventually, but at the same time new mutations will 
arise. According to very conservative estimates, the average number of mildly harmful 
mutations carried by humans is about 500 (Fay, Wyckoff & Wu, 2001; Sunyaev et al., 2001) 
and the standard deviation is 22 (or higher, given assortative mating, as we discuss below) 
(Keller & Miller, 2006a). This mutation load may account for a substantial portion of genetic 
variance in many fitness-related traits – perhaps including personality differences. 
Mutational target size. For a long time, Fisher’s fundamental theorem was thought to 
imply that traits that affect fitness more strongly should show less VA (Falconer, 1981). In the 
early 1990s, however, Price and Schluter (1991) and Houle (1992) showed that the reverse 
is true: more fitness-related traits actually tend to have higher VA. The reason that this could 
remain unnoticed for more than half a century was that evolutionary geneticists used to 
standardize additive genetic variance (VA) by the total phenotypic variance (VP) of the trait, 
yielding its narrow-sense heritability (h²): 
h² = VA / VP 
Insofar as heritability was taken as a rough proxy for additive genetic variance, this 
gives profoundly misleading results, because VP contains both the non-additive genetic (VNA) 
and the environmental variance (VE). Even if VA is large, h² can be small when VNA and/or VE 
are even larger. Since VE is especially population- and trait-specific, h² is not very informative 
for comparing genetic variances. Houle (1992) instead proposed to use the ‘coefficient of 
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additive genetic variation’ (CVA) for comparisons across traits, populations, and species. It is 
defined as: 
CVA = [sqrt(VA) / M] * 100 
or, equivalently, 
CVA = [sqrt(VP * h²) / M] * 100 
with M being the phenotypic trait mean and 100 a conventional scaling-factor. The CVA thus 
standardizes VA by the mean of the trait, whereas h² standardizes VA by its total phenotypic 
variance. As long as all traits are measured on a ratio scale and some basic scaling effects 
are taken into account (Stirling et al., 2002), CVAs are directly comparable across traits and 
species, which does not hold for h²s. For many traits across many species, it turned out that 
VA increases with the fitness-relevance of a trait (Houle, 1992; Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995; 
Stirling et al., 2002). Because very high residual variances (VNA + VE) often overshadow 
substantial VAs, low h² values often fail to reflect this pattern (Rowe & Houle, 1996; Merilä & 
Sheldon, 1999; Stirling et al., 2002). 
But how could the traits under strongest selection show the highest VAs? The key 
seems to be the number of genetic loci that could potentially disrupt the trait by mutating, 
which is called the mutational target-size of a trait (Houle, 1998). Since mutations occur with 
random probability at any genetic locus, the number of mutations that affect a trait (i.e., its 
mutation load) increases linearly with the number of genetic loci that affect the trait. Note that 
we are referring to the total number of genetic loci that could potentially affect the trait if they 
became polymorphic due to mutation, not the number of loci that are actually polymorphic at 
a given point in time (i.e., the QTLs), which are only about 10% of the potential loci 
(Pritchard, 2001; Rudan et al., 2003). Fisher’s (1930) fundamental theorem works best for 
traits that are affected by only one genetic locus (Price, 1972; Ewens, 1989). The more 
genetic loci affect a trait, the greater the probability that any of these loci will be hit by a 
mutation, the more mutations will accumulate in the trait, and the harder it will be for 
selection to deplete the VA of this trait. Instead of reaching genetic uniformity, non-neutral 
traits with large mutational target sizes will therefore be stuck in a balanced state of mutation 
and selection. 
The trait with the largest mutational target-size is, of course, fitness itself: it is 
influenced by all selectively non-neutral parts of the genome (Houle et al., 1994). Fitness 
should therefore have a very large CVA, which is in fact the case (Burt, 1995). Similarly, other 
traits closely related to fitness (e.g. so-called ‘life history traits’, such as longevity or total 
offspring number) are usually complex compounds of various heritable traits, leading to high 
mutational target sizes. For example, longevity is potentially influenced by disruptions in any 
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organ system – circulatory, nervous, endocrine, skeletal, etc. – so its mutational target size 
includes the mutational target sizes of all these organ systems. Consistent with this, very 
high CVAs have been reported for life-history traits in various species (Houle, 1992), including 
humans (Miller & Penke, 2007; Hughes & Burleson, 2000). In contrast, low CVAs can be 
found in genetically simpler traits less related to fitness, such as some morphological traits 
(e.g. bristle number in fruit flies or height in humans - Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995; Miller & 
Penke, 2007). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The watershed model. Cannon and Keller (2005; see also Keller & Miller, 2006a) 
introduced the watershed model (Figure 1) as an analogy to illustrate the relation between 
genetic variation and the mutational target size of traits. Its basic point is that ‘downstream’ 
traits, which are closely related to overall fitness, require the adaptive functioning of virtually 
the whole organism – the integrated functioning of many subsidiary ‘upstream’ mechanisms - 
behavioural, physiological, and morphological. Just as many small creeks join to become a 
stream, and several streams join to become a river, many genetic and neurophysiological 
micro-processes (e.g. the regulation of neural migration, axonal myelinization, and 
neurotransmitter levels) might interact to become a specific personality trait. These 
personality traits will interact to influence success in survival, socializing, attracting mates, 
and raising offspring – which in turn determines overall fitness. The upstream micro-
processes, such as the regulation of a particular neurotransmitter, may be influenced by only 
a few genes. The broader middle-level processes, such as reactivity to social stress, are 
influenced by all genes that affect the corresponding upstream processes. The same holds 
true for even broader (i.e., more downstream) domains of organismic functioning – which are 
equivalent to broad components of fitness itself (e.g. sexual attractiveness, social status, 
foraging efficiency) – these depend on all of the genes that affect all of their upstream 
processes. A similar argument holds for environmental influences, which, when affecting 
upstream processes, accumulate in downstream traits. But because selection is much less 
effective in reducing VE, the VE of fitness components tends to be large, which reduces their 
heritability. Merilä and Sheldon (1999) argued that VNA is as robust against selection as VE, 
which would imply a high Dα for traits under mutation-selection balance. However, more 
recent evidence questions the robustness of VNA to selection in downstream traits (Stirling et 
al., 2002). The exact expected size of Dα for traits under mutation-selection balance must 
thus be regarded an unresolved issue, though it is likely in the medium range. 
Developmental stability and the f-factor. As an addition to the watershed model, 
developmental stability theory (Polak, 2003) explains how mutations that are spread across 
the genome influence fitness. It argues that organisms often fail to develop according to the 
evolved blueprint in their genome, since either the blueprint itself or the relevant 
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environmental factors are disrupted. In such a case, the evolved fit between genome and 
environment is disrupted. Whereas the genomic blueprint is disrupted by mutations, the 
organism’s developmental environment can be disrupted by factors such as pathogens and 
toxins. From a fitness perspective, the exact combination of disruptive factors doesn’t matter: 
what counts is the total reduction in phenotypic functionality due to developmental instability. 
Similarly, only the total mutational damage in the genome is what counts for natural 
selection. Which genetic sequences the mutations disrupt are largely unimportant – and 
likely different for each human being. 
An established measure of developmental stability is the bilateral symmetry of body 
parts that show perfect symmetry at the average population level (e.g. ankle breadth or ear 
length), usually aggregated across many body parts. Even though this only taps into 
morphological developmental stability, body symmetry shows relations to all kinds of fitness 
components in various species (Møller, 1997), including humans (Gangestad & Yeo, 1997; 
Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). One well-replicated correlate of body symmetry is general 
intelligence (Prokosch et al., 2005; Luxen & Buunk, 2006; Bates, 2007). Thus, some genetic 
and environmental disruptions can apparently impair both cognitive and morphological 
development. The watershed metaphor breaks down a bit at this point, because it fails to 
reflect the fact that most mutations are pleiotropic in their effects (Marcus, 2004): each 
mutation will tend to disrupt several downstream traits. Those harmful effects will be 
positively intercorrelated in the affected downstream traits (not because the effects are 
positive, but because they are consistently negative). Therefore, pleiotropic mutations should 
lead to a ‘positive manifold’ of intercorrelations among the efficiencies of mid-level processes 
and of fitness components. In addition, intercorrelations between various processes may 
arise through developmental interdependence (van der Maas et al., 2006). According to 
Miller (2000c), this should allow the extraction of a ‘general fitness factor’ or ‘f-factor’ that 
reflects (inverse) overall mutation load. Just as the g-factor of general intelligence (Jensen, 
1998) is at the top of a multi-level hierarchy of intercorrelated cognitive abilities, f is at the top 
of a similar hierarchy of genetically intercorrelated upstream traits and processes. In fact, 
Miller and colleagues (2000c; Prokosch et al., 2005) argued that g is an important subfactor 
of f, reflecting the integrative functioning of the cognitive system. The VA of g may therefore 
reflect the aggregate harmful effects of mutations at any of the thousands of genetic loci that 
affect our brain development and functioning, each of which decreases our cognitive abilities 
a tiny bit. 
Further predictions. Every trait under mutation-selection balance has to be a 
downstream trait, with mutations occurring randomly across all of the loci that contribute to its 
mutational target size. It is very unlikely that any of these harmful mutations will ever reach 
an intermediate prevalence rate in the face of selection working against it (Turelli & Barton, 
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2004). The mutations that cause the VA of more complex downstream traits will thus be 
numerous, but individually rare, evolutionarily transient, and phenotypically mild in their 
effects. As a consequence, they will be extremely hard to detect using standard molecular 
genetic methods (linkage and association studies), and they will be very unlikely to replicate 
across populations (because different evolutionarily transient mutations tend to affect 
different populations). Furthermore, since the sheer number of involved loci will impede 
selection’s ability to deplete VA, the magnitude of Dα for downstream traits will likely be in the 
medium range (Stirling et al., 2002). These predictions (see Table 1) are consistent with what 
is currently known about the genetic structure of g (Plomin, Kennedy & Craig, 2006; Plomin & 
Spinath, 2004). Enormous efforts to identify single genes of major effect underlying 
intelligence led to meagre success at best, and to the conclusion that a huge number of 
pleiotropic polymorphisms must be responsible for its genetic variation (Kovas & Plomin, 
2006). The situation is different for personality traits, however, since good candidates for 
underlying polymorphisms have been identified (Ebstein, 2006), and most of these have 
intermediate prevalence rates (Kidd, 2006). In addition, the amount of VNA found in 
personality traits is often as high as the VA component (Eaves et al., 1998; Keller et al., 
2005), indicating a large Dα of .50 or higher. These characteristics of personality traits cannot 
be explained by mutation-selection balance. 
Since traits with a large mutational target size tend to be most affected by mutations 
that are both rare and recessive, the probability that two copies of the same mutation come 
together in a single individual and unleash their full deleterious potential is much higher when 
both parents are genetically related. This is called inbreeding depression. Its counterpart is 
called heterosis or outbreeding elevation, and occurs when pairings of recessive, deleterious 
mutations are broken up by sexual recombination in offspring of highly unrelated parents 
(e.g. parents from different ethnic groups). Due to the predicted genetic structure of traits 
under mutation-selection balance, we can expect them to show both inbreeding depression 
and heterosis effects (DeRose & Roff, 1999; Lynch & Walsh, 1998). Such evidence exists for 
intelligence (reviewed in Jensen, 1998), but is, to the best of our knowledge, absent for 
personality traits. For example, the offspring of cousin marriages tend to be less intelligent, 
but we do not know of any evidence that they tend to be more or less extraverted, 
conscientious, or agreeable than average. 
Finally, the typically harmful effects of mutations lead to a clear prediction about the 
social perception of their phenotypic effects. Since a high mutation load disrupts an 
organism’s functional integrity and ultimately fitness, it should lead to a less favourable social 
evaluation by those who are looking for a good sexual partner, friend, or ally. The mating 
context is most important here, because about half of a sexual partner’s mutation load will be 
passed along to one’s offspring (Keller, in press). Indeed, virtually all modern evolutionary 
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theories of mate choice argue that any phenotypic trait that reliably signals that a potential 
mate has a low mutation load will be sexually attractive (Keller, in press; Kokko, Brooks, 
Jennions & Morley, 2003; Miller, 2000b, c). In an influential paper, Rowe and Houle (1996) 
argued that sexual selection would drive the evolution of any sexually attractive trait towards 
higher reliability by making its expression more condition-dependent, that is more dependent 
upon (and revealing of) the overall phenotypic condition (e.g. health, vigour) of the organism. 
Condition is a trait with very large mutational target size, near the downstream end of the 
watershed model (Figure 1), and very closely related to fitness (Tomkins, Radwan, Kotiaho & 
Tregenza, 2004). A condition-dependent trait is thus affected by larger parts of the genome – 
it will actually ‘move downstream’, insofar as it becomes sensitive to the efficiency of a larger 
number of upstream processes. This can explain why, across species, morphological traits 
that are preferred in mate choice (e.g. the plumage of finches) tend to have much higher CVA 
than morphological traits that are irrelevant for mate choice (e.g. bristle number in fruitflies) 
(Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995), and almost as high as extreme downstream traits such as 
longevity and fertility. 
Since traits that reliably reveal genetic quality (low mutation load) and general 
phenotypic condition tend to be highly variable within each sex and highly attractive to the 
other sex, mating markets in socially monogamous species (such as humans) tend to be 
competitive. Each individual tries to attract the highest-quality mate who will reciprocate his 
or her interest. Given a period of mutual search in such a competitive mating market, socially 
monogamous couples tend to form that are closely matched on the average attractiveness 
level of their sexually attractive traits (Penke, Todd, Lenton & Fasolo, in press). This 
phenomenon, called assortative mating (Vandenberg, 1972), is a typical population-level 
outcome for traits that are under mutation-selection balance, but it is much less likely for 
traits that are less related to fitness. Mate preferences for higher intelligence, and assortative 
mating with respect to intelligence, are well-established phenomena in humans, as is the 
condition-dependent expression of intelligence (Miller, 2000c; Miller & Penke, 2007). In 
contrast, mate preferences for personality traits tend to be modest in size and variable 
across individuals (Figueredo, Sefcek & Jones, 2006). In addition, there is almost no 
assortative mating for personality traits (e.g. Vandenberg, 1972; Lykken & Tellegen, 1993; 
Eaves et al., 1999). Thus, mate preferences for personality traits show quite a different 
pattern than mate preferences for universally sought traits, such as intelligence, mental 
health, and physical attractiveness– which are all presumably condition-dependent and 
under mutation-selection balance.1 
                                                
1 Another domain of heritable personality differences for which strong assortative mating exists are 
some social attitudes, like conservatism or religiosity (Lykken & Tellegen, 1993; Eaves et al., 1999). 
However, unlike the basic personality traits and abilities we treat in this article, these attitudes must be 
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To summarize, mutation-selection balance is a very plausible mechanism for 
maintaining genetic variation in traits that reflect the overall functional integrity of the 
organism, including general intelligence and general health. This is reflected in the following 
features: high additive genetic variation, an elusive molecular genetic basis, condition-
dependence, inbreeding and outbreeding effects, strong mate preferences, and assortative 
mating (see Table 1). Personality traits do not match these features nearly as well, 
suggesting that mutation-selection balance may not account for much genetic variance in 
personality traits. 
Can Balancing Selection Explain Genetic Variance in Personality? 
In both selective neutrality and mutation-selection balance, genetic variation is 
maintained because selection is unable to deplete it – either because the variation is 
selectively neutral, or because too much new variation is continually reintroduced. A quite 
different mechanism is the maintenance of genetic variation by selection itself. This only 
works if the selective forces that act on a trait are balanced, which occurs when both 
extremes of the same trait dimension are favoured by selection to the same degree under 
different conditions. Such balancing selection can happen in a variety of ways. 
Variants of balancing selection. One form of balancing selection is overdominance 
(also called heterozygous advantage), which occurs when individuals with different alleles at 
the same genetic locus have a higher fitness than individuals with two identical copies. 
Sickle-cell anaemia is a famous textbook case of overdominance, but other examples have 
rarely been found in nature (Endler, 1986) or in animal experiments (Maynard Smith, 1998). 
Also, it is now widely believed that overdominance is evolutionary unstable and thus an 
unlikely candidate for maintaining genetic variation, especially in the long-term (Roff, 1997; 
Keller & Miller, 2006a; Bürger, 2000). 
Another form of balancing selection is antagonistic pleiotropy, which occurs when 
polymorphisms have a positive effect on one fitness-related trait and a negative effect on 
another (Roff, 1997; Hendrick, 1999). A special case is sexually antagonistic co-evolution, 
where genetic variants are under opposing selection pressures in men and women (Rice & 
Chippindale, 2001). Since selection will usually fix the polymorphism with the least total 
                                                                                                                                                     
regarded as complex developmental outcomes of GxE interactions (Eaves et al., 1999, pp. 77-78). 
Another noteworthy difference between attitudes and fitness-related traits like intelligence and 
attractiveness is that there seems to be no universal consensus in either sex on the desired attitudes 
of an ideal mate. It is thus implausible that competitive mating market dynamics cause assortative 
mating for attitudes in a similar way as they do for fitness components. Instead, social homogamy (i.e., 
mate search within the own peer group that tends to share similar attitudes) and later dyadic 
assimilation appear to be more promising explanations. 
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fitness cost, antagonistic pleiotropy could only maintain genetic variation if the fitness costs 
of all alleles at such a locus are exactly equal (averaged across environments). In addition, 
all heterozygous allele combinations have to provide all phenotypic fitness benefits that 
would be provided by both corresponding homozygous combinations (‘reversal of 
dominance’, Curtisinger, Service & Prout, 1994; Hendrick, 1999). Furthermore, independent 
of the number of genetic loci that affect a quantitative trait, antagonistic pleiotropy can 
maintain genetic variation only at one genetic locus (or two in the case of sexually 
antagonistic co-evolution) per trait (Turelli & Barton, 2004). Due to these highly restrictive 
conditions, it is very unlikely that antagonistic pleiotropy plays a major role in maintaining 
genetic variation (Hendrick, 1999) – although the special case of sexually antagonistic co-
evolution might contribute to sex differences in personality and some within-sex personality 
variation (Keller & Miller, 2006b). 
A more likely variant of balancing selection is environmental heterogeneity. When a 
trait’s effect on fitness varies across space or time, significant genetic variation can be 
maintained in populations (Roff, 1997), even in quantitative traits (Bürger, 2000; Turelli & 
Barton, 2004). A necessary requirement for this to happen is that spatial or temporal 
fluctuations in selection pressures must occur such that the trait’s net fitness effects are 
nearly neutral when averaged across all relevant spatiotemporal environments. It is not 
enough for a trait to be neutral in some environments or during some periods, because 
selection is very efficient at favouring polymorphisms with higher average fitness outcomes 
across all relevant environments. Only a fully balanced effect of different alleles across space 
and time will work to maintain genetic variation. 
A related type of balancing selection is called frequency-dependent selection. In this 
case, the spatiotemporal fluctuations in selection pressures usually occur in the social 
environment of the species, rather than the external physical environment. Frequency-
dependent selection can only maintain genetic variations if it is negative, favouring traits as 
long as they are rare in frequency (Maynard Smith, 1998). (Positive frequency-dependence 
will drive polymorphisms to fixation through a runaway, winner-take-all effect.) The ‘social 
environment’ is used in a very broad sense here, and can include the ratio of cooperative 
partners to cheaters (Mealey, 1995), the ratio of males to females (Fisher, 1930), the 
distribution of intra- and interspecific competitors for limited resources in ecological niches, or 
even parasite-host relationships (which occurs when viruses, bacteria or other pathogenes 
are best adapted to exploit the most common host phenotypes - Garrigan & Hedrick, 2003). 
Mathematical models have shown that negative frequency-dependent selection in any of 
these ways is a viable way to maintain genetic variance (Bürger, 2005; Schneider, 2006). 
Thus, environmental heterogeneity and negative frequency-dependent selection are 
good candidates for maintaining genetic variance by balancing selection, whereas 
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overdominance and antagonistic pleiotropy can work only in rare cases that meet very 
restrictive conditions. The bottom line is that balancing selection requires a set of varying 
selection pressures that favour different phenotypes under different conditions. These 
fluctuating selection pressures must be stronger than any other unidirectional selection 
pressures on the same trait that consistently favour a certain optimal trait level in every 
environment (Turelli & Barton, 2004). If this condition is met, balancing selection leads to two 
or more different phenotypes (or a continuum of phenotypes) with identical average fitness 
across environments. Since these phenotypes cannot be further optimized by selection, they 
are called evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) (Maynard Smith, 1982). 
Predictions. Balancing selection leads to some distinctive genetic patterns. 
Reoccurring periods of selection in different directions tend to deplete the VA of affected traits 
and result in higher Dα than found for selectively neutral traits (Roff, 1997). Dα will also be 
higher for traits under balancing selection than for traits under mutation-selection balance, 
since the former maintains polymorphisms at fewer genetic loci than the latter (Kopp & 
Hermisson, 2006), and selection is more effective in depleting the VA from fewer genetic loci 
(van Oers et al., 2005; Stirling et al., 2002). Furthermore, balancing selection can maintain 
alleles in a population at intermediate prevalences, while mutation-selection balance cannot 
(Turelli & Barton, 2004). These characteristics (as summarized in Table 1) make balancing 
selection a likely candidate for maintaining genetic variation in personality traits, although it is 
unlikely to explain persistent genetic variance in cognitive abilities. 
Balancing selection and personality traits. When Tooby and Cosmides (1990) argued 
that heritable personality differences are basically evolutionary noise, they suggested that 
parasite-host co-evolution (Garrigan & Hedrick, 2003), a form of negative frequency-
dependent selection, might explain the striking amount of evolutionary ‘noise’ in human 
behavioural traits better than selective neutrality. Nonetheless, the central message was the 
same for both evolutionary processes: since the heritable aspects of personality are random 
by-products of functionally superficial biochemical differences that exist - at best - to prevent 
our lives from parasites, studying personality differences from an evolutionary perspective is 
a big waste of time. However, as argued above, there is strong evidence that personality 
differences have direct effects on fitness. In addition, Keller and Miller (2006a) noted that, for 
parasite-host co-evolution to explain personality variation as a by-product, there would have 
to be a very high degree of overlap between genetic loci that affect immune system function 
and genetic loci that affect personality differences – which seems unlikely. 
MacDonald (1995, 1998) made an important step away from Tooby and Cosmides’ 
‘neutral personality assumption’ by proposing that five independent behavioural systems 
under balancing selection explain the dimensions of the Five Factor Model of personality 
(FFM). While he regarded both extremes of each dimension as maladaptive, with stabilizing 
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selection working against them, he assumed that the relatively broad middle range of each 
personality dimension reflects equally viable behavioural strategies (i.e., ESSs). MacDonald 
(1998) also argued that the viability of these strategies should vary across environmental 
niches. Following MacDonald (1995, 1998), Nettle (2006a) developed more specific 
hypotheses about the potential fitness costs and benefits associated with each of the FFM 
dimensions. If these evolutionary cost-benefit trade-offs were exactly the same in every 
environment, they could maintain genetic variance only through antagonistic pleiotropy, 
which tends to be evolutionary unstable. However, if the relevant selection pressures 
fluctuate across time or space, favouring different optima on the cost-benefit curves, they 
could maintain the range of viable personality trait levels. For example, Nettle (2006a) 
argued that high extraversion yields fitness benefits by promoting mating success, social 
alliance formation, and environmental exploration, but at the cost of increased physical risks 
and decreased romantic relationship stability. When environments are physically riskier to 
oneself and one’s offspring (who benefit from relationship stability), high extraversion may be 
a net fitness cost; but when conditions are safer, high extraversion may yield a net fitness 
benefit. Environmental fluctuations would thus maintain genetic variation in extraversion. 
The challenge in any such balancing selection argument is to identify the specific 
costs and benefits relevant to each personality trait across different environments. Originally, 
Nettle (2005) also hypothesized that extraverts might conserve energy by investing less 
parental effort in offspring, but failed to find supportive evidence. In fact, Nettle’s list of 
extraversion costs and benefits might still be too long, with some proving to be fitness-
irrelevant by-products. On the other hand, these are only some of the plausible costs and 
benefits. Different ones can be suggested for this and other personality traits (Denissen & 
Penke, 2006). Even if balancing selection proves a good general account of heritable 
personality traits, much more research would be needed to identify each personality trait’s 
relevant fitness costs and benefits across different environments. 
Environmental niches for personality traits. Recently, Camperio Ciani and colleagues 
(Camperio Ciani, Veronese, Capiluppi & Sartori, 2007) reported an interesting natural 
experiment that indirectly supports a role for balancing selection by environmental 
heterogeneity in sustaining the genetic variance of personality traits. They studied average 
personality differences on the FFM dimensions of Italian coast-dwellers compared to Italians 
living off the coast on three small island groups. After matching populations for cultural, 
historical and linguistic background, and controlling for age, sex and education, they found 
that individuals from families that have lived on small islands for at least 20 generations were 
lower in extraversion and openness to experience than both mainlanders and more recent 
immigrants to the island. This pattern makes cultural or developmental explanations for the 
population differences unlikely - it suggests change on the genetic level. Even though 
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individual fitness consequences of these traits were not measured directly, the apparent 
recent evolution of genetic differences between populations in these two traits suggests that 
the fitness payoffs of these two personality traits were historically distinct in these different 
environments. 
In non-human species, recent studies suggest that environmental heterogeneity does 
impose varying selection pressures on personality traits. Dingenmanse, Both, Drent and 
Tinbergen (2004) could directly measure the fitness payoffs of personality differences (on a 
carefully assessed shyness-boldness dimension) in the great tit (parus major), which varied 
with food availability across breeding seasons. Similar evidence of environmental 
heterogeneity favouring personalities exists for some other species (reviewed in 
Dingenmanse & Réale, 2005). 
More direct evidence for the importance of environmental heterogeneity in the 
evolutionary genetics of human personality comes from studies of the global distribution of 
polymorphisms at the DRD4 locus. This gene regulates dopamine receptors in the brain and 
has been associated with personality traits such as novelty seeking and extraversion 
(Ebstein, 2006). The prevalences of different DRD4 alleles differ dramatically across world 
regions. The evolutionarily newer 7R allele, which is more common in risk-prone, response-
ready, extraverted novelty seekers, is much more prevalent in European and American 
populations than in Asian populations (Chang et al., 1996). This allele appears to be 
favoured by selection (1) when benefits can be gained from migrating to new environments 
(Chen et al., 1999; Ding et al., 2002), and (2) under resource-rich environmental conditions 
(Wang et al., 2004). Referring to these findings, Harpending and Cochran (2002) noted that 
under conditions of environmental harshness and resource scarcity (as is common in hunter-
gatherer societies), intensive cooperation, strong family ties, stable pair bonds, and 
biparental investment are necessary for survival and successful reproduction. These 
ancestrally typical conditions would maintain the more risk-averse, ancestral form of the 
DRD4 gene. But under more luxuriant environmental conditions, when children can survive 
without so much paternal support (as in most agricultural and modern societies), the more 
risk-seeking 7R allele should be favoured by selection, as it leads to a personality more 
prone to sexual promiscuity and intrasexual competition (see also Gangestad & Simpson, 
2000; Schmitt, 2005). 
Arguments for frequency-dependent selection. The role of competition demands 
some more attention here. Competition, whether for mates, food, or other limited resources, 
is often a zero-sum game: The winner gains a benefit, but the loser usually pays a cost, at 
least in the form of wasted time and effort. As the competition within a niche becomes more 
intense, selection may eventually favour less competitive individuals who refrain from 
seeking these benefits to avoid the associated costs. This is the logic of the so-called ‘hawk-
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dove game’, the classic example of negative frequency-dependent selection (Maynard Smith, 
1982). In fact, some evolutionary geneticists have argued that most environmental niches are 
actually social in nature, because the fluctuating selection regimes caused by environmental 
heterogeneity are almost always mediated by within-species competition that often takes the 
form of negative frequency-dependent selection (Bürger, 2005; Kassen, 2002). It is 
interesting in this regard that personality differences have been found almost exclusively in 
social species (Figueredo et al., 2005a) and that they tend to have stronger effects on fitness 
over social than non-social paths in most species (Smith & Blumstein, 2007). Personality 
appears to be fundamentally social, perhaps reflecting the diversity of social and sexual 
strategies that can prosper in socially variegated groups that confront fluctuating, 
heterogeneous environments. This might be especially true for human personality after our 
species achieved ‘ecological dominance’ (i.e. reliable mastery of food acquisition and 
protection from predators and other hazards), which somewhat buffered our ancestors from 
spatiotemporal variation in the non-social environment (Alexander, 1989). Explicit arguments 
that negative frequency-dependent selection could maintain genetic variance in specific 
personality traits have been proposed by Gangestad & Simpson (1990) for female 
sociosexuality (i.e., promiscuity) and by Mealey (1995) for psychopathy. 
Another application of negative frequency-dependent selection to explain personality 
has been proposed by Rushton (1985) and extended by Figueredo et al. (2005a, b). They 
argue that virtually all human individual differences, including broad personality factors, 
intelligence, attachment styles, reproductive strategies, growth, longevity, and fecundity, may 
reflect a single underlying ‘life-history’ dimension of variation in the organism’s allocation of 
investment in growth vs. survival vs. reproduction across the life-course. Drawing a parallel 
to a similar, well-established dimension of between-species differences in evolutionary 
ecology, they suggest that this life-history dimension is maintained by negative frequency-
dependent selection within and across human groups. A fortuitous side-effect is that such 
variation reduces within-group and between-group competition by allowing individuals and 
groups to fill different socio-environmental niches. Figueredo et al. (2005a, b) hypothesized 
that if a broad set of physical and psychology traits (e.g. intelligence, personality traits, 
sociosexuality, longevity) are subject to hierarchical factor analysis, a superordinate ‘K-factor’ 
will emerge that reflects variation on this life history dimension (note that this hypothesized K-
factor is distinct from the f-factor discussed above). 
A critical point from an evolutionary genetic perspective is that frequency-dependent 
selection (like any form of balancing selection) is only able to maintain polymorphisms at a 
few major loci (Turelli & Barton, 2004; Kopp & Hermisson, 2006). As a consequence, 
frequency-dependent selection on the K-factor would only be possible if a few 
polymorphisms would function as ‘switches’ that could simultaneously alter the development 
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and expression of all those many traits the K-factor aims to explain, including some of the 
most important emergent traits at the downstream end of the watershed model (Figure 1), 
such as longevity, growth, intelligence, and fecundity. As long as there is no evidence that 
these ‘polymorphisms for almost everything’ exist, future research on life history variation 
should distinguish more carefully between (1) mutation-selection balance for downstream 
traits like longevity, growth, intelligence, and fecundity, (2) the condition- and environment-
dependent adjustment of reproductive strategies (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Penke & 
Denissen, 2007), and (3) balancing selection for various independent personality traits at a 
more upstream level of genetic complexity. 
To summarize, balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity, often mediated 
by negative frequency-dependent selection, seems the most plausible mechanism for 
maintaining genetic variation in personality traits. In contrast, balancing selection is 
implausible for maintaining genetic variation in downstream fitness-related traits, such as 
intelligence. 
The Role of the Environment in Evolutionary Genetics 
Evolutionary adaptationism is often misunderstood as overemphasizing genetic 
influences and neglecting environmental influences on behaviour. In fact, the opposite is 
generally true: evolutionary theory is fundamentally environmentalistic (Crawford & 
Anderson, 1989), because it is about the adaptive fit of an organism to its environment – a 
GxE interaction. 
Phenotypic plasticity. One form of this interaction – selection - has already been 
discussed. Selection acts only upon the complete phenotype, which is at the most 
downstream end of the watershed model (Figure 1), at the level of overall fitness. But GxE 
interactions take place all the way upstream, up to the molecular level, where transcribed 
genes can only produce specific proteins if the required amino acids are present (ultimately a 
nutritional issue). From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that identical genotypes can 
produce very distinct phenotypes. This phenomenon is called phenotypic plasticity, and it is 
probably ubiquitous in nature (West-Eberhard, 2003). The environment thus has two distinct 
roles in evolutionary genetics: It interacts with the genotype in the ontological development of 
the phenotype, and then, as a selective regime, determines the phenotype’s fitness and 
decides its fate. 
Ideally, organisms would fare best if they could fit themselves perfectly and instantly 
to the environmental demands in every situation – morphologically, physiologically and 
behaviourally. Of course, developmental constraints render such an unlimited degree of 
phenotypic plasticity implausible for physical traits (e.g., no drowning mammal can suddenly 
develop gills, no matter how advantageous such a transformation would be). In contrast, 
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unlimited behavioural plasticity has been an attractive scientific vision for a long time, both in 
psychology (i.e., radical behaviourism) and biology (i.e., traditional behavioural ecology; 
Krebs & Davies, 1997). But even in the case of behaviour, unlimited plasticity is impossible to 
achieve adaptively, because the environment does not reliably signal the likely fitness 
payoffs of all possible behavioural strategies (see Miller, in press). In a complex world, 
environmental cues that can guide adaptive behaviour are inherently noisy, often 
contradictory, and unpredictably variable (Brunswick, 1956; Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999). The unreliability of environmental cues means that any behavioural 
plasticity based on trial-and-error learning must take time, because it must depend upon a 
decent sample of action-payoff pairings. Thus, given the complexities of real-world 
environments, organisms cannot instantly discern and implement the optimal behavioural 
strategy, so fitness-maximizing by unlimited behavioural plasticity is an impossible 
ideal.Universal constraints on phenotypic plasticity. Fortunately, evolution constrains 
behavioural plasticity in adaptive directions, just as it constrains physical development. As 
long as environmental features are sufficiently stable and fitness-relevant (e.g. women get 
pregnant but men don’t, rotten food is toxic, children demand more care and protection than 
adults), natural selection will fixate psychological mechanisms such as emotions, 
preferences, and learning preparednesses that adaptively bias our reactions to the 
environment over ontogenetic development. This relieves us from the impossible task of 
learning our most basic behavioural dispositions de novo every generation (Tooby, 
Cosmides & Barrett, 2005; Barrett, 2006; Figueredo et al., 2006). These kinds of GxE 
interactions – interactions between inherited psychological adaptations and ancestral 
adaptive challenges - are the central subject of adaptationistic evolutionary psychology. 
Cervone (2000) argued that they also constitute interesting building blocks for personality 
theories. However, adaptationistic evolutionary psychology deals principally with interactions 
between the universal genetic make-up of our species and fitness-relevant aspects of the 
environment that reoccurred over evolutionary time. Such interactions might explain the non-
genetic variation in some personality domains (e.g. attachment styles - Buss & Greiling, 
1999), but are largely uninformative about heritable personality differences. 
Individual constraints on phenotypic plasticity. When selection cannot deplete all 
genetic variation (for any of those reasons discussed above), different genotypes persist 
simultaneously in the population. Genotypes might differ in their response to the 
environment, leading to the statistical effect that behaviour geneticists refer to as a GxE 
interaction (Moffitt, Caspi & Rutter, 2006). In humans, such interactions have been found, for 
example, between the MAOA polymorphism and childhood maltreatment in the development 
of conduct behaviour (Caspi et al., 2002), and between the 5-HTT polymorphism and 
stressful life events in the development of depressiveness (Caspi et al., 2003). By 
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systematically varying both the genotypes and the environments, evolutionary geneticists 
studying non-human species can determine a typical response function for each individual 
genotype, a so-called reaction norm (Via et al., 1995) (see Figure 2). While a GxE interaction 
is a population statistic, an individual reaction norm can be regarded as a characteristic of an 
individual genotype (Pigliucci, 2005). Reaction norms were originally used to study the 
developmental plasticity of morphological or life-history traits, but when behavioural 
ecologists realized the systematic limits of behavioural flexibility, they began to view heritable 
response styles – known to psychologists as personality traits – as behavioural reaction 
norms. (Sih et al., 2004; van Oers et al., 2005). 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
While behavioural ecologists discovered animal personality only recently (Sih et al., 
2004), their immediate equation of personality traits with individual reaction norms helped 
them to circumvent the ‘person-situation debate’ in personality psychology (Mischel, 2004). 
Instead of looking for personalities that reliably predict behaviour across all possible 
situations, or situations that reliably predict behaviour across all possible personalities, 
behavioural ecologists quickly adopted a reaction-norm view of personality that neatly 
resembles the personality signatures view of Mischel and Shoda (1995). Personality 
signatures describe stable patterns of contingent (if-then) relationships between 
personalities, situations, and behaviours – just as reaction norms describe stable 
contingencies between genotypes, environments, and phenotypic outcomes. These person-
situation contingency profiles turn out to show reasonable consistency (Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Borkenau, Riemann, Spinath & Angleitner, 2006), but it is a different type of 
consistency than the well-known rank-order stabilities of personality traits across situations 
(Mischel, 2004). However, unlike individual reaction norms, personality signatures describe 
environment-behaviour functions for persons, not for genotypes. Although Mischel and 
Shoda (1995) acknowledge the possibility that genes influence personality signatures, their 
Cognitive-Affective Personality Systems model emphasises the importance of learned 
beliefs, appraisals, expectancies, and goals, organized in cognitive-affective units. However, 
personality signatures show substantial heritabilities (Borkenau et al., 2006), so these 
cognitive-affective units are apparently influenced by genetic variation, and a genotype-
oriented reaction-norm view may be appropriate. 
To describe an individual reaction norm does not require a mechanistic model of the 
psychological processes that mediate between environmental contingencies and behaviours. 
Reaction norms simply relate dimensional variations in genotypes and environments to 
variations in behavioural outcomes. Thus, the shapes of individual reaction norms are what 
can be equated with personality traits (van Oers et al., 2005). While reaction norm shapes 
can be simple (e.g. linear) when relating polymorphisms at a single gene locus to the 
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environment (as for example in Caspi et al., 2003), they can become more complex when 
polygenic genotypes (as in the case of personality traits) are related to the environment (de 
Jong, 1990). Furthermore, while the studies by Caspi et al. (2002, 2003) provide examples of 
reaction norms in personality development (i.e., GxE interactions during childhood predict 
adolescent personality), the concept of individual reaction norms is not limited to a 
developmental time frame. Reaction norms can also describe GxE interactions in the 
production of ongoing behaviour, analogous to Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) personality 
signatures. 
Note that reaction norms can be determined for any phenotypic trait, including 
cognitive abilities. However, we believe that reaction norms are much more informative for 
personality traits than for cognitive abilities. Reaction norms provide an elegant tool to 
disentangle the twofold role of the environment for personality traits as both a source of 
phenotypic plasticity within a generation and of fluctuating selection pressures across 
generations. This more nuanced view of environmental influences on behaviour is 
unnecessary for fitness components such as cognitive abilities that are more likely under 
mutation-selection balance, in which case selection pressures push traits in roughly the 
same direction (minimum genetic mutation load, maximum phenotypic efficiency) across all 
kinds of environments. In addition, the phenotypic plasticity of general intelligence apparently 
reflects simple condition-dependency, as g declines with adverse environmental influences 
(e.g. starvation, dehydration, sickness) that decrease general condition (see Miller & Penke, 
2007). Since the genetic variation in g accounts for almost all genetic variation in cognitive 
abilities (Plomin & Spinath, 2004), the reaction-norm view seems less helpful for cognitive 
abilities than for personality traits. 
Individual Reaction Norms and the Hierarchical Structure of Personality Traits 
The hypothesized existence of complex individual reaction norms has an interesting 
implication for the hierarchical structure of personality traits. We illustrate this with an 
example modified from van Oers et al. (2005) (Figure 2): Let two personality traits (say, 
depressiveness and anxiousness) be described by reaction norms to a continuum of 
environmental stress. For depressiveness, we assume the simple reaction norm found by 
Caspi et al. (2003) (Figure 2a): Genotype A shows high depressiveness in highly stressful 
environments (i.e., point Z), medium depressiveness in the less stressful environment Y, and 
no depressiveness in the calm environment X. Genotype B shows the same reaction on a 
lower level (i.e., B’s individual reaction norm has a smaller slope), while C is resilient in all 
environments. Let us now assume a hypothetical, more complex reaction norm for 
anxiousness based on the same three genotypes and environments (Figure 2b). In 
environment Z, the rank order of the anxious reactions is the same as for depressive 
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reactions for the three genotypes (A > B > C), implying a positive genetic correlation between 
the two traits in this environment. (Note that the reaction norm model assumes that all 
relevant environmental influences are captured either in the environmental dimension or in 
confidence intervals around the reaction norm functions, so that we can speak of genetic 
correlations here.) The critical effect of complex reaction norms is revealed at the other two 
points of the environmental dimension: In environment Y, genotypes A and C react with an 
identical degree of anxiety, and genotype B reacts only slightly more strongly. The genetic 
correlation between anxiety and depressiveness in this environment would therefore be close 
to zero. Finally, in environment X, the rank order of the anxious reactions for the three 
genotypes is the inverse of their rank order for depressive reactions in the same 
environment, leading to an apparent negative genetic correlation. In this purely hypothetical 
example, subsuming both traits in a higher order factor (here neuroticism) would not be 
warranted, since their relationship is highly context-dependent. More generally, delineating 
hierarchical personality structures would be impeded by sign changes in the genetic 
correlations among personality traits measured across environments. Therefore, van Oers et 
al. (2005) regard the absence of sign changes in genetic correlations of related facet traits 
across environments as a necessary condition for the existence of superordinate personality 
domains. This leads us to specific requirements concerning how personality-related genes 
must affect multiple personality traits 
Structural pleiotropy. Except for some rare and evolutionarily unstable cases (called 
linkage disequilibria), genetic correlations are always caused by pleiotropy, the effect of 
polymorphisms on multiple traits (Roff, 1997). Pleiotropy has been shown for the hierarchical 
structure of the FFM in twin studies (Yamagata et al., 2006; Jang et al., 1998, 2002; McCrae 
et al., 2001). But as in our hypothetical example, pleiotropy in itself does not prevent sign 
changes in genetic correlations between traits across environments. Sign changes can only 
be prevented by functional, physiological, or developmental links between the effects of 
polymorphisms on one trait and their effects on another trait. Such a condition, called 
structural pleiotropy, poses a developmental constraint on the independent phenotypic 
expression of both traits in all environments (de Jong, 1990). To be sure, structural pleiotropy 
does not mean that complex reaction norms, such as those depicted in Figure 2b, are 
theoretically implausible. Instead, the central point is that, for two traits to be facets of the 
same higher-order factor, the rank order of the phenotypic effects produced by different 
genotypes must not reverse across environments. The traits in Figures 2a and 2b cannot 
belong to the same higher-order factors, but both can, together with other traits, belong to 
different factors. 
An implication of structural pleiotropy is the existence of underlying neurogenetic 
mechanisms (e.g. neurotransmitter or endocrinological systems) that are shared by all facets 
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of a higher-order trait. An advantage of viewing personality traits as individual reaction norms 
is that these mechanisms, which should be closely linked to the genotype, can be explicitly 
separated from the environmental factors with which they interact. In this way, individual 
reaction norms come much closer to the original personality trait definition by Allport (1937) 
as “psychophysical systems that determine [an individual’s] unique adjustment to his 
environments” (p. 48), than to the purely descriptive, empirically derived factors that are 
normally posited in personality psychology, and they also avoid the often-criticized circularity 
of the definition of traits as aggregated instances of behaviour, which are then used to 
predict…behaviour (see Denissen & Penke, 2006). 
A developmental perspective. If broad personality domains exist because of shared 
underlying mechanisms (i.e., because structural pleiotropy preserves the sign of genetic 
correlations between traits across environments), then personality structure likely develops 
top-down, from these mechanisms to higher-order personality domains (e.g. neuroticism) to 
lower-order personality facets (e.g. anxiousness, depressiveness). Over the lifespan, these 
mechanisms might modulate the cognitive and affective experiences that individuals acquire 
through interacting with their environments. Thereby, they might act as forms of ‘prepared 
learning’ (Figueredo et al., 2006) for the acquisition of the cognitive-affective units 
emphasized by Mischel and Shoda (1995), and as ‘experience-producing drives’ (Bouchard 
et al., 1996) that motivate active niche selection (Denissen & Penke, 2006). These shared 
mechanisms would be the ties that bind different facet traits within broader personality 
domains. Together with the influence of unique genetic variation on the level of lower-order 
traits (Jang et al., 1998, 2002), this would result in the hierarchical structure of personality 
traits, down to the level of idiosyncratic habits and behavioural patterns. 
The dimensionality of personality. Note that this theoretical argument makes no 
commitment to any particular number of highest-order mechanisms or their interactions. The 
prominence of the FFM led evolutionary psychologists (MacDonald, 1995, 1998; Nettle, 
2006a), including us (Denissen & Penke, 2006), to hypothesize selection regimes at this 
hierarchical level. However, some of the FFM dimensions may still share some common 
mechanisms that render them not entirely orthogonal (Jang et al., 2006). For example, Jang 
et al. (2001) showed a significant amount of genetic overlap between the domains of 
neuroticism and agreeableness, which was partly explained by the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism. 
It is also possible that several neurogenetic mechanisms interact to form what we observe as 
broad personality dimensions. Jang et al. (2002) showed that two independent source of 
genetic variance were necessary to explain the variation of each of the FFM personality 
domains. If these independent genetic sources reflect independent neurodevelopmental 
mechanisms, environments may exist in which they no longer contribute to the same 
behavioural dispositions (de Jong, 1990), and are no longer under parallel selection 
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pressures (e.g., see Figure 2b). The bottom line is that the genetic architecture of personality 
might not reflect the phenotypic structure of established factor-analytic models, though it 
would be surprising if it was completely different. At any rate, we believe that the reaction 
norms of structurally independent mechanisms constitute a promising level of analysis for an 
evolutionary personality psychology. 
Operationalising Individual Reaction Norms 
The natural approach to the study of reaction norms would be to observe the 
behavioural reactions of different genotypes along a well-quantified environmental 
continuum. However, the standard methods used by evolutionary geneticists to study non-
human species (e.g. inbred strains) are of course not available to human psychologists. 
Identical twins provide a surrogate (Crawford & Anderson, 1989), though a limited one, since 
only two copies of each genotype exist and the environment cannot be varied experimentally. 
One alternative is to relate single polymorphisms to behavioural variations that are 
contingent on certain environmental variables (as done by Caspi et al., 2002, 2003, see also 
Moffitt et al., 2006). While this approach will certainly become common in the near future as 
a consequence of cheaper, faster, and more powerful genotyping methods (e.g. DNA 
microarrays), such studies might still fail to capture the complex polygenic nature of 
personality traits in the near future. 
Another alternative is to assess individual differences directly at the level of 
hypothetical underlying mechanisms. Here, an endophenotype approach appears highly 
promising. Endophenotypes are phenotypic structures and processes (e.g. neurotransmitter 
systems or hormone cascades) that can be quantified directly (e.g. by neuroimaging or blood 
sampling) and that mediate between genes and more complex or abstract traits (Boomsma, 
Anokhin & DeGeus, 1997; Cannon & Keller, 2005). In the watershed model (Figure 1), 
currently measurable endophenotypes tend to be located at a very upstream level. In the 
exemplary case of neuroticism, amygdala reactivity (Hariri et al., 2002, 2005) provides an 
especially good example of a mediating endophenotype, though there are likely several 
others. Sih et al. (2004), for example, highlighted the role of hormonal mechanisms in animal 
personality. 
Of course, all of these approaches are much harder work than using classical 
personality questionnaires, so they will probably remain a minority interest within personality 
psychology. But even questionnaires can be improved to reflect a view of traits as individual 
reaction norms, by explicitly assessing behavioural reactions to specific fitness-relevant 
situations, instead of aggregating across arbitrary modern environments (Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Denissen & Penke, 2006). For example, some people may be socially confident at 
informal parties but not at public speaking, whereas for others, the opposite may apply. To 
47 
class them both as ‘extraverts’ may conflate disparate genotypes that lead to distinct 
endophenotypes, behavioural strategies, reaction norms, and fitness payoffs. Indeed, the 
quest to maximize internal consistencies within personality scales (e.g. by homogenizing the 
environmental circumstances of behaviours) may lead personality psychologists to eliminate 
some of the questionnaire items that are most informative about GxE interactions and 
individual reaction norms. 
An Evolutionary Genetic Model of Personality 
The evolutionary genetics of personality can be summarized in the model depicted in 
Figure 3. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
For natural selection, the structure of individual differences is fairly straightforward 
and simple: all living organisms vary on one major dimension - fitness – which is their 
statistical propensity to pass their genes on to future generations to come. Miller’s (2000c) f-
factor represents this dimension at the very top of any evolutionary hierarchy of heritable 
differences – or at the very downstream end of the watershed model (which is why we put f 
at the bottom in Figure 3). The upstream-downstream dimension is shown on the left. Since 
virtually all psychological differences studied so far show heritability, the central question for 
evolutionary personality psychology is: how do psychological differences relate to the f-
factor? 
All heritable psychological differences begin with a set of genes that influence the 
functioning of neurophysiological mechanisms (detectable as endophenotypes). A 
simplification of the model is that environmental influences are omitted at the genetic and 
endophenotype levels. This seems justifiable, since environmental effects are probably 
smaller (due to developmental canalization) at the upstream levels than at the downstream 
levels. One or several of the mechanisms on the endophenotype level result in the 
behavioural tendencies that we observe as traits and abilities at the dispositional level. In 
relevant situations, these dispositions influence behaviour, and from this point onward, they 
affect the biological fate of the organism: behaviour influences the organism’s adaptive fit to 
the current environment, and thus influences its overall reproductive success. 
Genetic variation in personality differences might be maintained by selective 
neutrality, mutation-selection balance, or balancing selection – each of which would leave 
distinctive footprints in a trait’s genetic architecture. We have argued that selective neutrality 
is implausible for most personality differences, given their pervasive effects on fitness-
relevant life outcomes. Mutation-selection balance requires that (1) a trait is influenced by 
enough genes that new mutations disrupt its efficiency at a steady rate, and (2) selection 
favours trait efficiency strongly enough to eliminate these mutations after some evolutionary 
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time. As a consequence, these traits will be influenced by many interdependent neurogenetic 
mechanisms on the endophenotypic level, and will show substantial additive genetic variation 
that affects trait efficiency and thereby influences fitness. Environmental influences on such 
traits will be mediated mostly by their effects on the organism’s overall condition. In line with 
Miller (2000c; Prokosch et al., 2005), we propose that general intelligence belongs to this 
category of traits under mutation-selection balance. In this case, the upstream ability 
mechanisms I and II in Figure 3 could be, for example, the efficiency of cerebral glucose 
metabolism and the accuracy of prefrontal programmed cell death during adolescence, and 
the downstream ability mechanisms III and IV could be processing speed and working 
memory capacity (see Jensen, 1998). 
An evolutionary genetic conceptualisation of cognitive abilities would thus be: 
individual differences in the functional integrity of broad systems of the adaptive cognitive 
apparatus, caused by an individual’s load of rare, mildly harmful mutations. In short, cognitive 
abilities are cognitive fitness components. For such traits, a low mutation load is always 
beneficial, regardless of the environment. 
By contrast, the phenotypic and genetic characteristics that are typically found in 
studies of personality traits (like those in the FFM) suggest that balancing selection is 
maintaining the genetic variance in most (if not all) personality traits. Balancing selection can 
favour different traits in different social or non-social environments. In addition to this role as 
a varying selection pressure on personality traits, the environment serves a second role 
earlier on, when interacting with the neurophysiological architecture of the trait (i.e., its 
personality mechanism or mechanisms) through a reaction norm to form a behavioural 
tendency. This twofold role may make the environmental influences on personality traits 
under balancing selection much more numerous, complex, and differentiated than those 
affecting traits under mutation-selection balance (which may reflect general phenotypic 
condition rather than specific environmental contingencies). On the other hand, the upstream 
genes and endophenotypes of personality traits under balancing selection will be fewer than 
those of cognitive abilities under mutation-selection balance. 
An evolutionary genetic conceptualisation of personality traits would thus be: individual 
differences in genetic constraints on behavioural plasticity, which lead to behavioural 
tendencies that follow individual reaction norms, and produce different fitness consequences 
in different environments. In short, personality traits are individual reaction norms with 
environment-contingent fitness consequences. 
Where Do Common Psychopathologies Fit Into the Model? 
While this review focuses on personality differences in the normal range, we would like to 
add some remarks on the place of polygenic psychopathologies in our model. In an 
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extensive discussion of the evolutionary genetics of common psychopathologies, Keller and 
Miller (2006a, b) argued that mental disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder 
are best conceptualized as traits under mutation-selection balance. Indeed, they cite 
evidence that these disorders possess all the expected characteristics (Table 1). In our 
model, these disorders are thus fitness components that mark the low end of the f-factor. 
Some common psychopathologies, however, show clear relationships to personality traits in 
the normal range, especially to high neuroticism and low agreeableness (Saulsman & Page, 
2004). These disorders might be viewed as maladaptive extremes of normal personality traits 
- rare genotypes that will sometimes occur in polygenic traits due to sexual recombination. 
For example, extreme extraversion (e.g. impulsive, narcissistic, histrionic, and/or 
promiscuous behaviour) and extreme introversion (e.g. schizoid, avoidant, hermit-like 
withdrawal from all social contact) may both be too extreme to yield fitness benefits in any 
plausible niche (MacDonald, 1995, 1998). But extreme values on normal traits alone are 
usually insufficient for the occurrence of psychopathologies (Saulsman & Page, 2004), and 
even high neuroticism and low agreeableness can be adaptive (though not necessarily 
socially desirable) when the social environment is harsh, risky, and unforgiving, or when it is 
exploitable and gullible, respectively (Nettle, 2006a; Denissen & Penke, 2006). 
An alternative is that modern societies produce mismatches between heritable 
temperaments and available niches. For example, Harpending and Cochran (2002) argue 
that the very same 7R-DRD4 allele that predisposes children to attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) today may have been adaptive if these individuals lived in a violently 
competitive, polygamous society. More generally, genetic variation maintained by 
environmental heterogeneity implies that there are always some individuals for whom an 
optimal niche does not currently exist. Similarly, negative frequency-dependent selection 
implies that there are cases in which an individual’s usual niche is overcrowded and 
competitive. 
In addition, the pathological nature of personality disorders might also result from a 
high mutation load, but receive their characteristic symptoms from an interaction of this load 
with certain personality traits. For example, very high openness to experience might 
overwhelm individuals whose cognitive abilities are compromised by a high mutation load 
and consequently lead to a diagnosed schizotypic personality disorder, while it might appear 
attractive in less mutation-laden individuals, who are able to turn it into exceptional creative 
outputs (see Nettle, 2006b; Nettle & Clegg, 2006; Keller & Miller, 2006b). 
Practical Implications for Behaviour Genetics 
An evolutionary genetic framework for personality psychology has some practical 
implications for behaviour genetic studies: 
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1. Demonstrating that a personality trait is heritable had become scientifically unsurprising by the 
early 1990s (Turkheimer & Gottesman, 1991), and is not very informative about a trait’s nature or 
etiology, since it confounds information about a trait’s evolutionary history, structure, and GxE 
interactions (Stirling et al., 2002). This is especially true for the broad-sense heritabilities that are 
estimated in the classical twin design, since they do not distinguish between VA and VNA (Keller & 
Coventry, 2005), which is very important in evolutionary genetics (Merliä & Sheldon, 1999). We 
therefore concur with Keller and Coventry (2005) that more studies using the extended twin-family 
design (Neale & Maes, 2004), or other designs that unconfound VA and VNA, are highly desirable, 
especially when testing evolutionary genetic hypotheses (cp. Table 1). 
2. Because of the great datasets and twin registries already available, classical twin studies will 
probably remain the most common type of behaviour genetic publications. However, such studies 
would be more informative (or less misleading) about the evolutionary genetics of traits if their 
underlying statistical assumptions were made more explicit. Many personality psychologists seem 
not to appreciate that classical twin studies can yield a wide range of mathematically equivalent 
parameter estimates (e.g. for additive genetic vs. dominance vs. epistatic effects) that have very 
different implications for the evolutionary histories of the traits under investigation (Keller & 
Coventry, 2005; Coventry & Keller, 2005). We therefore suggest that future publications of 
classical twin study results make use of the technique developed by Keller and Coventry (2005) 
and fully disclose the confidence intervals and parameter spaces for their results. 
3. The equation of personality differences with individual reaction norms highlights the fact that GxE 
interactions are ubiquitous in nature. Similarly, balancing selection on personality traits due to 
spatiotemporal heterogeneity of selection pressures suggests that GxE correlations are fairly 
common. Unfortunately, the usual approach in quantitative behaviour genetic studies is additive 
variance decomposition, which hides both GxE interactions and GxE correlations in apparent main 
effects (Purcell, 2002). However, the necessary statistical modelling techniques exist to identify 
such interaction effects (Neale & Cardon, 1992; Purcell, 2002), and evolutionary genetics 
suggests that they should be used more frequently. 
4. For the same reason, the use of personality trait measures (especially self-report questionnaires) 
that aggregate across situations might have reached its limits in clarifying the genetic architecture 
of personality (Ebstein, 2006). Both endophenotype approaches and phenotypic measures that 
aim to keep person and situation separated (Dennisen & Penke, 2006; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) 
provide better alternatives. 
5. Calculating the coefficient of additive genetic variance (CVA) of a trait, which is very informative 
about its evolutionary history (Houle, 1992; Stirling et al., 2002), requires a ratio-scale measure 
(i.e., a measure with a meaningful zero point). Personality questionnaires with rating scales fail to 
reach this standard. It would be very helpful if valid, ratio-scaled personality measures (e.g. based 
on quantitative endophenotypes or behaviours measured with regard to their energy output, 
temporal duration, or act frequency – see Buss & Craik, 1983) could be developed and used in 
quantitative behaviour genetic studies. 
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6.  We predict that ‘gene hunting’ studies will continue to be more successful in revealing the 
molecular genetic architecture of temperamental personality traits than of general cognitive 
abilities or polygenic mental disorders (Ebstein, 2006; Plomin et al., 2006; Keller & Miller, 2006a). 
Evolutionary genetic theory gives a straightforward reason why: while personality traits will be 
influenced by a limited set of high-prevalence alleles (plus maybe several rare ones, see Kopp & 
Hermisson, 2006), general intelligence and psychopathologies like schizophrenia will be 
influenced by rare, recessive, mildly harmful mutations that vary between samples, since they are 
equally likely to occur at thousands of different, otherwise monomorphic loci, and are removed 
fairly quickly by selection once they arise. (Note that this goes beyond Kovas and Plomin’s (2006) 
concept of ‘generalist genes’, which proposes that the same large set of weak-effect 
polymorphisms underlies cognitive functioning in every individual.) While we do not argue that 
molecular behavioural geneticists should refrain from studying g, common psychopathologies, and 
other fitness components, we suggest that they take evolutionary genetic predictions of the likely 
genetic architecture into account when planning studies and interpreting results. A simple first step 
would be to call the underlying polymorphisms what the empirical evidence suggests they are – 
rare mutations. 
7. More generally, evolutionary genetics provides a rich theoretical source of hypotheses that should 
inspire and guide future behaviour genetic studies. For example, factor V (openness to 
experiences/intellect) is the only domain of the FFM that shows reliable correlations with general 
intelligence (e.g. DeYoung et al., 2005). From an evolutionary genetics viewpoint, this puts factor 
V in an ambiguous position: does it reflect an ESS under balancing selection (see Denissen & 
Penke, 2006; Nettle, 2006a), or an important component of the f-factor, which should be under 
mutation-selection balance? If factor V is under balancing selection, its molecular genetic basis 
should be much easier to identify – especially if behaviour genetics researchers statistically control 
for general intelligence when investigating polymorphisms that may influence factor V. Other 
exemplary evolutionary genetic hypotheses can be found in Miller (2000c) and Keller (in press). 
Conclusion 
Evolutionary psychology has made so much progress in the last 15 years by relying 
on an evolutionary adaptationist metatheory that guides the identification of ancestral 
adaptive problems, the likely psychological adaptations that they favoured, and the likely 
design features of those adaptations that can be investigated empirically (Andrews et al., 
2002; Buss, 1995). We have argued that evolutionary genetics can provide a similarly 
powerful approach to the study of heritable individual differences in personality. 
Evolutionary genetics is itself a fast evolving field. While we tried to give an up-to-date 
overview of evolutionary genetic principles that seemed most relevant for personality 
psychology, some of those principles will probably be refined, extended, or challenged in the 
near future. They should thus be viewed as the provisional, current state of the art, not as 
biological commandments carved in stone. Still, they may help personality psychology 
enormously by clarifying what is evolutionarily possible and plausible, and what is not. This 
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way, evolutionary genetics can provide personality psychology with new hypotheses, 
guidance on how to interpret results, and constraints on theory formulation. Ultimately, our 
grandest hope for evolutionary personality psychology is that, given the enormously rich 
phenotypic and behaviour genetic datasets on human personality, it might identify new 
evolutionary genetic principles that also apply to other kinds of traits and other species. 
We reviewed the current answers that evolutionary genetics can give to a question 
that has rarely been asked in psychology: how is the genetic variation that obviously 
underlies most human differences, including personality differences, maintained in the 
population? It turned out that only two answers are sufficiently plausible for personality 
differences: either (1) the trait is dependent on so many genes that a balance between rare, 
mildly harmful mutations and counteracting selection occurs, or (2) variation in the structure 
of the physical or social environment leads to spatiotemporally fluctuating selection for 
different alleles. Both evolutionary genetic mechanisms will lead their affected traits to have 
certain distinctive characteristics and underlying genetic architectures. We concluded that the 
first process (mutation-selection balance) probably maintains genetic variance in cognitive 
abilities, while the second process (balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity) 
probably maintains genetic variance in most personality traits. Thus, cognitive abilities are 
best conceptualised as cognitive fitness components, while personality traits reflect individual 
reaction norms with environment-contingent fitness consequences. 
Important tasks for future studies include delineating the hierarchical structure of 
fitness components (with the f–factor on the top) and identifying the exact fitness-related 
costs and benefits associated with each personality trait, as well as the environmental niches 
that structure those costs and benefits. Social niches with different degrees and forms of 
competition are especially good candidates for the latter. A promising road for process-
oriented personality psychologists is studying the psychological mechanisms that lead to 
active niche selection, including adaptive self-assessments (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; 
Penke & Denissen, 2007; Penke et al., in press) and experience-producing drives (Bouchard 
et al., 1996). 
Finally, we wish to reemphasise that most heritable individual differences are not 
adaptations in their own right. They reflect dimensions in the functional design of a species 
that tolerate some degree of genetic variation. Mutations at too many non-neutral loci will 
lead to a breakdown of adaptive design. Likewise, traits under balancing selection will 
tolerate polymorphisms only at a few specific loci, while all others loci (which affect the 
universal adaptative design of the trait) will be protected from large genetic variation by 
stabilizing selection. Adaptive individual differences exist, but only as conditional strategies 
that are implemented in universal (i.e. zero-heritability) adaptations and evoked by specific 
environmental cues (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Buss, 1991; Buss & Greiling, 1999). An 
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evolutionary personality psychology based on evolutionary genetics does not contradict this 
view. Instead, it complements evolutionary psychology by explaining what happens when 
genetic variation is introduced into systems of interacting adaptations (Gangestad & Yeo, 
1997; Miller, 2000a). Since genetic variation is ubiquitous in personality psychology, 
evolutionary genetics is essential for an evolutionary personality psychology. 
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Figure 1: The watershed model of genetic variation 
Mutations at specific loci (1a, 1b) disrupt narrowly defined mechanisms such as dopaminergic 
regulation in the prefrontal cortex (2b). This and other narrowly defined mechanisms contribute 
noise to more broadly defined mechanisms, such as working memory (3c). Working memory in 
conjunction with several other mechanisms (3a, 3b, 3d) affect phenotypically observable 
phenotypes, such as cognitive ability (4). If enough noise is present in the upstream 
processes, specific behavioural distortions may arise, such as mild mental retardation. All 
tributaries eventually flow into fitness. (Reproduced from Cannon & Keller, 2005, with 
permission from www.annualreviews.org.) 
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Figure 2: Two examples for individual reaction norms 
Both figures show the individual reaction norms of three genotypes (A-C) along a continuous 
environmental dimension. The trait in Figure 2a has simple reaction norms, where all 
genotypes react linearly to environmental changes and differ only in their slope. The trait in 
Figure 2b has complex reaction norms, where genotype C reacts linearly and genotypes A and 
B react non-linearly in different ways. This leads to different rank orders of reaction strength at 
point X, Y, and Z on the environmental dimension, implying the absence of structural 
pleiotropy. (Figure 2b is redrawn after van Oers et al., 2005.) 
68 
 
Figure 3: An integrative model of the evolutionary genetics of personality 
Note: Mut.: mutation, CD: condition-dependency, RN: reaction norm 
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Open Peer Commentary 
Out of the Armchair 
Timothy C. Bates 
Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, UK 
tim.bates@ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) attempt to explain personality and cognition from theory rather 
than empirical study. This overstates the constraints on evolution, while underestimating 
the power of cross-species HapMap data to directly identify our evolutionary history. 
Independent of armchair-speculation, information benefiting human understanding, health, 
and well-being is flowing from exactly the research the target suggests should not be 
pursued. 
The target begins, as does much of evolutionary psychology, from an assumption that 
human evolution is "finished": that we are in an evolutionary steady-state, with directional 
selection and its associated linkage-disequilibrium and departures from Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium long since washed away. This leads directly to models of residual heritability 
for ability as an irreducible legacy of IQ being distributed across thousands of mutable 
genes, and personality as a simpler system with variation retained due to correlations 
between genotype and survival being variable to the point of reversing in sign. This 
commentary focuses on the ability model and conclusions for research. 
The target article ignores evidence from the HapMap (Wang, Kodama, Baldi, & Moyzis, 
2006) and from candidate genes (Evans, Mekel-Bobrov, Vallender, Hudson, & Lahn, 2006) 
suggesting that much of human evolution has a recent history, not just over the last 
500,000 years when brain size doubled, but including the period since some humans left 
Africa, and importantly, the 5-10,000 years since the invention of agriculture. These data 
showing recent and even current selection affecting neuronal function, as well as 
reproductive and immune function, protein and DNA metabolism, and cell-cycle control 
violate the assumptions on which the target article is based. 
Despite there having been only one small genome-wide linkage scan for cognition, one 
pooled association study (with density an order of magnitude lower than believed 
adequate), and exactly zero dense genome-wide association studies for cognition, the 
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authors conclude that searching for genes for cognition is futile: too many to find, too small 
to be of use, and too variable to be easily marked. I suggest that, such data as are 
available support conclusions exactly opposite to those proposed. 
The search for genes is already reaping rewards. The sole linkage scan report found three 
regions related to IQ (Posthuma et al., 2005), the pooled association study 6 regions 
(Butcher et al., 2005) (now replicated), and OMIM contains over 1000 major-effect genes 
for cognition helping elucidate pathways to normal ability. Multiple polymorphism-
combinations suggest substantial normal single-gene effects on ability (Dick et al., 2007). 
Paradoxically, for the personality model of the target article, the success of cognition 
research great exceeds that of the search for personality genes (Willis-Owen & Flint, 
2007). 
The target makes many additional far-ranging claims about human evolution. They note 
that cognitive differences may be almost identical to total mutation load. However, while 
the phenotypic correlation between ability and developmental stability is robust, the sole 
(as yet unpublished) study on the genetic correlation between developmental stability and 
IQ found a genetic correlation of 0! Theory predicts it should be close to 1.0, and this 
represents a massive challenge to the genomic fitness-IQ model, suggesting that the FA-
IQ correlation may be environmentally mediated. 
Even if we accepted that variance in cognition reflects an inability to remove mutation, 
much else is left unexplained: for instance, why is mean IQ not much lower or much 
higher, despite exemplar groups differing by 1 or even 2 SD on mean IQ? This is empirical 
proof that far from being bound by an upper limit imposed by mutation, evolution can move 
human IQ over massive ranges. Tangentially, this raises the use of Houle’s effect-size 
measure (∂2/mean). This standardization was designed to highlight additive variance 
overshadowed by environmental and non-additive noise. In the case of intelligence, 
additive phenotypic effect-sizes are already clear, but it is also unclear that linear division 
by mean trait value is appropriate for ability. Ratio-scaled indices of cognition such as 
brain mass scale with body mass: should this not be first subtracted out? And frontal-lobes 
scale as a power function, invalidating linear transforms such as division. 
The authors emphasize the possible reliance of cognition on many thousands of gene 
effects. However gene count per se is largely irrelevant for selection. Mutation is important 
in edge case such as traits outwith selective pressure, where we will expect equal 
accumulate rates for synonymous and non-synonymous mutations, and traits like human 
aging where the phenotype appears at too great a distance from reproduction to be 
selected on. However even if intelligence is distributed across the entire genome, its 
heritability leaves it highly modifiable, as the coefficient of selection remains dependent on 
selective pressure and selectability (i.e., heritability). Indeed, Stoltenberg (1997) suggested 
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replacing h2 with “selectability” to highlight its meaning. It is worth noting too that the 
proposed pleiotropy of cognition with health and physical-fitness (Rae, Digney, McEwan, & 
Bates, 2003) simply enhances selection for cognition by selecting for higher IQ whenever 
strength or health has a positive effect on survival. This might even explain the paradoxical 
"excess" of human intelligence, despite strong reproductive selection against ability over 
the last century. 
Finally the claim that small average-effects of single genes will hinder gene discovery is 
false. Rare alleles with major effects in these genes are excellent candidates for pedigree-
based analysis and already researchers have discovered some 1000 brain function loci in 
this way (see OMIM). Similarly, the number of genes currently determining expression of a 
cognition does not limit the size of increases effected by single gene-changes. Indeed, the 
massive increase in human brain size over the last 500,000 years is probably due to just a 
handful of genes such as ASPM and MCPH1 (Zhang, 2003). Some of these show 
selection even in the last 5,000 years (Evans, Vallender, & Lahn, 2006), perhaps related to 
cognitive functions such as reading ability, language impairment, and / or social function, 
each of which is highly variable and heritable and every bit as dependent on the basic 
cellular material of the brain as is general ability. But each has shown highly significant 
linkage and association: Dyslexia appears to be controlled by a dozen or so genes (Bates 
et al., 2007), which are rapidly being understood at the level of neuronal development 
(Luciano, Lind, Wright, Martin, & Bates, in press). Human cognitive-genetics seems 
redolent with linkage disequilibrium signals associated with recent evolution, as is most of 
the human genome. 
In summary, to understand how, when, and why cognition evolved requires hard empirical 
work detecting signals of selection, tracking genes over time, and establishing biochemical 
pathways… evolutionary theory per se is of limited utility. 
Personality: Does Selection See It? 
Anne Campbell 
Psychology Department, Durham University, UK 
a.c.campbell@durham.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Selective neutrality offers a parsimonious explanation for personality variation. Bodily 
variations which do not compromise function (e.g. differences in intestine route) require no 
special explanation. Variations of the mind are not in principal different from those of the 
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body. A plausible explanation for such neutrality exists which does not require speculative 
stories about the circumstances of balancing selection. 
Occam’s razor has been loosely translated as “All things being equal, the simplest solution 
tends to be the best one." Principally for this reason, I have more sympathy than the 
authors with the selective neutrality of personality. As they observe, the precise route 
taken by the intestines may vary widely between people. This is an appealing example of 
neutrality because of the invisibility of intestines and their irrelevance to our social world. 
Personality traits seem different. We are struck on a daily basis by the differences between 
people. They form such a central part of social discrimination in our brief lifetimes that it is 
intuitively hard to accept that this wondrous human variety may be of no special 
evolutionary relevance. But would any biologist seriously consider devoting years to the 
study of individual differences in intestine route? 
Personality differences may be no more than ‘spandrels’ of selection for pathogen 
resistance (Tooby, 1982). The evolutionary advantage of sexual reproduction is that 
genetic recombination gives us an edge in the human-pathogen arms race (Hamilton, 
Axelrod, & Tanese, 1990). The uniqueness of each individual—with respect to those 
polymorphisms that have no impact on the overall functioning of the organism---offers a 
moving target to fast-reproducing pathogens. “Pathogens select for protein diversity 
introducing the maximum tolerable quantitative variation and noise into the human 
system….protein variation gives rise to a wealth of quantitative variation in nearly ever 
manifest feature of the psyche; Tastes, reflexes, perceptual abilities, talents, deficits, 
thresholds of activation…” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, p.49). But such variation will not 
survive if it compromises the integratative functioning of the component parts and so 
threatens the complex evolved monomorphic design. In short, sustained variability points 
strongly to functional irrelevance. And if pathogens can explain the evolution of sexual 
reproduction in terms of the creation of genetic diversity, why should that diversity not be 
expressed as much through the mind (personality) as the body (intestines)?  Biology does 
not respect any dividing line between them. Penke et al.’s scepticism about neutrality rests 
on ‘strong evidence that personality differences have direct effects upon fitness’. Yet the 
most striking aspect of Figueredo, Sefcek, Vasquez, Brumbach, King, and Jacobs’s (2005) 
review is the absence of unanimity about relationships between personality and fitness. 
For example, ‘cheerful’ adults have fewer health problems but cheerful children have a 
higher mortality risk across their lifespan. Without a stronger theoretical rationale for trait 
choice, we risk a fishing expedition in which chance associations will be found due to the 
sheer number of computed correlations. Even if some traits can be shown to have 
‘pervasive effects on social, sexual and familial life’, such contemporary proximal effects 
may not translate into different long-term inclusive fitness outcomes. 
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If personality differences reflect adaptations then we would expect to find a multimodal 
distribution. Anisogamy evolved because there was an equal advantage in producing 
numerous small, cheap gametes or fewer large, expensive gametes. Once this cleavage 
began, there was no advantage in producing intermediate-sized ones. Disruptive selection 
should apply equally to individual differences as adaptations. We should expect to see a 
number of human ‘types’ rather than a continuous normal distribution. (Indeed the picture 
is even more complicated since humans vary not just on one trait but on five 
simultaneously, creating a near infinite range of individual differences.)  The normal 
distribution of personality variation suggests not ‘types’ but a ‘continuum’ resulting from 
allelic variation over a number of genetic loci. Personality variations are expected to be 
polygenic in origin and, under selective neutrality, “genetic variation can be expected to be 
mainly additive”. If ten coins (gene loci) are each flipped simultaneously the likely outcome 
is a normal distribution—the probability of ten heads (extreme introversion) or ten tails 
(extreme extraversion) is extremely low. (True, a similar distribution might be seen as a 
‘snapshot’ under balancing selection. But that snapshot would have to be taken at 
precisely the time or place at which the forces favouring the two strategies were 
momentarily in perfect balance.) 
If there is to be a search for function, I agree with the authors that we have been uncritical 
in taking the Big Five as the compass. These traits emerged from people rating 
themselves in terms nominated by another set of people (psychologists). The extent to 
which such traits are significant for molecular genetics or evolution—as opposed to human 
social perception—is debatable. Instead, the authors suggest that the search for adaptive 
significance might begin by identifying endophenotypes (specific biopsychological 
processes). Korte, Koolhaas, Wingfield, and McEwen’s (2005) work provides a recent 
example of this approach. Across a range of species, they have identified two responses 
to stressors. ‘Doves’ show a strong HPA response but a lower SAM response while Hawks 
show the reverse pattern. These differences have been linked ‘upstream’ to genetic 
polymorphisms and neurotransmitter activity, and ‘downstream’ to manifest behaviours 
(fear, aggression, sensitivity to environmental threats). 
Nonetheless I find the case for balancing selection suspicious on two counts. Firstly, as 
the authors note, the chief source of selection operating on humans has been 
conspecifics. While environments may show rapid and fluctuating alterations over time and 
space, this hardly seems to characterise human interactions. Why would there be sexual 
selection for anxiety or introversion at one point in time or history, but preference for the 
opposite qualities at another? Why would anyone at any time or place want an ally that 
was unreliable and duplicitous? Such questions bring me to my second point, the 
ubiquitous Just-So story. The costs and benefits of extraversion, while providing a lively 
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topic for speculation, will not be solved by “much more research” in so far as we lack 
access to the variable social and environmental niches which putatively supported them. In 
place of stories, what Penke et al. (this issue) have very usefully provided is a profile, 
linking behaviour genetic to population genetic parameters, which can guide our search for 
the evolutionary relevance---or irrelevance---of personality. 
An Evolutionary Ecologist’s View 
of How to Study the Persistence of 
Genetic Variation in Personality 
Niels J. Dingemanse 
Centre for Behaviour and Neurosciences, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
n.j.dingemanse@rug.nl 
Abstract 
Personality is commonly regarded to involve either “correlations among behavioural traits” 
or “consistent individual differences in behaviour across contexts”. Any evolutionary 
explanation for the existence of genetic variation in personality must therefore not only 
address why genetic variation in single behavioural traits is maintained but also why 
behavioural traits are correlated, and why individuals show limited behavioural plasticity. 
 
Penke et al. (this issue) propose a framework for studying genetic variation in personality. 
Their framework is important because it outlines why genetic variation in behaviour – a key 
characteristic of personality – might exist, but is, yet, incomplete. In this commentary I 
outline why. 
Although many definitions of personality exist (see Réale, Reader, Sol, McDougall, & 
Dingemanse, 2007, for a recent overview), it is commonly agreed that personality involves 
either “genetic correlations among behavioural traits expressed in different environments” 
(when viewed from a 'character state' perspective; Via & Lande 1985; Via et al., 1995),  or  
“consistent individual differences in behaviour across contexts” (when viewed from a 
'reaction norm' perspective; de Jong, 1995; Via et al., 1995). Viewed from a character 
state perspective (which is not explicitly discussed by Penke et al., this issue), genetic 
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variation in personality therefore does not exist if genetic correlations among behavioural 
traits are all very weak or absent (Figure 1a) but does exist if genetic correlations are tight 
(Figure 1b). Viewed from a reaction norm perspective, genetic variation in personality does 
not exist when both the gene × environment interaction (G×E) between a behaviour 
expressed in different environments is very strong (Figure 1c) and the cross-environment 
genetic correlation  is weak (as illustrated in Figure 1a) but does exist if a trait is both 
heritable in different environments and exhibits no (or very weak) G×E (Figure 1d; 
resulting in a tight cross-environment genetic correlation as shown in Figure 1b). 
Consequently, understanding why genetic variation in personality exists requires insight in 
evolutionary mechanisms that either (i) simultaneously promote persistence of genetic 
variation in single behaviours and genetic covariation between behavioural traits (Figure 
1b) and/or (ii) simultaneously promote persistence of genetic variation in a single 
behaviour and the existence of limited plasticity of the behaviour across contexts  (Figure 
1d). Penke et al.’s framework addresses mechanisms explaining genetic variation in a 
single trait; it does not addresses adaptive explanations for why traits might be correlated 
or why individuals show limited plasticity. 
- insert Fig. 1 here - 
An evolutionary ecologist’s research agenda for studying genetic variation in personality 
would, depending on the chosen approach, thus include the following topics. If one adopts 
the character state approach, a fruitful agenda would start by (i) measuring multiple 
behaviours on individuals with known pedigree relationships, (ii) revealing the genetic 
structure of personality by estimating additive genetic variances (VA) and covariances (so-
called G-matrix) from these data (see Lynch & Walsh, 1998), (iii) measuring the fitness 
consequences of personality where selection pressures favouring correlations among 
traits should explicitly be examined (Dingemanse & Réale, 2005; this crucial step is 
missing from Penke et al.'s framework), and finally (iv) predicting how the G-matrix might 
evolve in response to selection (Steppan, Phillips, & Houle, 2002) – instead of using solely 
verbal arguments. Such data would reveal whether a combination of balancing and 
correlational selection does indeed maintain genetic variation in personality. 
If one adopts the reaction norm approach, the research agenda would start by explicitly 
considering that reaction norms are characterised by slopes and intercepts that might both 
evolve (de Jong 1990). In contrast, Penke et al. seem to regard personality as a collection 
of fixed reaction norms that cannot evolve. A fruitful approach would continue by (i) 
measuring behaviour of the same individuals over multiple contexts (using a set of 
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individuals with known pedigree relationships), (ii) obtaining estimates of intercepts and 
slopes for each individual that would then be used to estimate VA in both parameters 
(Lynch & Walsh 1998), (iii) measuring how the intercept and slope of an individual (and 
potentially their interaction) affect fitness (Van Tienderen 1991; Scheiner & Berrigan 1998), 
and finally (iv) assessing whether the observed selective pressures would indeed maintain 
genetic variation in personality. Evidence for disruptive and/or fluctuating selection on 
intercepts in combination with stabilising selection on slopes would provide evidence in 
favour of Penke et al’s balancing selection hypothesis. 
Penke et al. simply invoke constraints on plasticity as an explanation for consistency of 
behaviour over contexts. Recent studies, however, show that genetic correlations (like 
those that cause personality) are rarely fixed and can easily change sign across 
populations or environments within populations (Sgro & Hoffmann, 2004). Penke et al’s 
constraints view might thus prove invalid. Furthermore, even genetic correlations that are 
highly preserved (i.e. exist in many taxa) can often easily be broken by means of artificial 
selection (Beldade, Koops, & Brakefield, 2002), suggesting that genetic correlations (like 
those that cause personality) might instead have evolved because natural selection 
favoured associations between traits (Bell, 2005; Dingemanse & Réale 2005). The fact 
that individual variation in behaviour exists in a wide range of taxa (Gosling, 2001; Réale et 
al., 2007) should therefore not necessarily be viewed as evidence in favour of the view that 
constraints on behavioural organisation hamper adaptive evolution of behaviour. Instead, 
natural selection may have favoured the evolution of limited behavioural plasticity while 
simultaneously maintaining individual variation (Dall, Houston, & McNamara, 2004; 
McElreath & Strimling, 2006). 
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Consilience is Needed, and 
Consilience Needs Bipartisan 
Expertise 
Harald A. Euler 
Institute of Psychology, Department of Economics, University of Kassel, Germany 
euler@uni-kassel.de 
Abstract 
Despite a common overarching home of biology, evolutionary psychology and behaviour 
genetics have not fostered mutual exchange. The article combines expertise in 
evolutionary genetics and personality theory with didactic skill and makes a strong 
argument for two mechanisms of evolutionary genetics to explain the persistence of 
genetic variation in intelligence and personality, thus contributing considerably to 
interdisciplinary consilience. 
A few years ago the late Linda Mealy (2001) likened evolutionary psychology and 
behaviour genetics to two sisters of about the same age. Both occupy two different niches 
within the family with different interests and optimal resource extraction: What is chaff to 
one sister is wheat to the other. Evolutionary psychology tells stories about human 
universals and trashes individual differences, whereas behaviour genetics cherishes just 
these differences. Sister behaviour genetics has exuberantly been telling an old aunt 
called personality psychology exciting new findings, like that genes are important and that 
the magic of family influence is just an urban legend. The aunt dislikes genes and 
considers it improper to talk about such infamous things in front of others. But the other 
sister also lacks good manners because she retells the kind of stories which the aunt had 
overheard in her childhood from old relatives called Charles and Herbert, and these stories 
were considered off-limits as she had learned when she got a bit older. As all three women 
vie for outside attention to their good looks there is less than complete harmony despite 
the thick-blooded family ties. Godfather Edward Wilson, a big-name salesman for a cure-
all called Consilience, occasionally drops in and recommends his remedy. 
The authors of the target article offer a remedy, one with several active ingredients. There 
is brief but excellent to-the-point primer of genetic variation, optimal for the reader 
78 
interested in personality theories but not an updated expert in evolutionary genetics. 
Secondly, the article reviews the unsatisfactory previous attempts to reconcile Fisher's 
dictum that selection winnows out alleles with highest fitness, thus removing all genetic 
variation in the long run, with the observation of heritabilities galore. The previous 
conclusion by Tooby and Cosmides (1990) that heritable variation signals a lack of 
adaptive significance has been indigestible for most evolutionary psychologists because it 
tried to entice us to ignore individual differences and thus forget about personality as a 
worthwhile subject from an evolutionary perspective. 
Thirdly and most importantly, the authors delve into the evolutionary genetics of 
personality and argue skillfully and persuasively why, of the various possible genetic 
mechanisms, mutation-selection balance is the prime candidate to explain genetic 
variance in general intelligence, and balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity 
the prime candidate to explain variance in personality traits. To bolster these arguments, 
predictions are derived from the theory of evolutionary biology and evolutionary genetics, 
currently available data are mustered, and clear judgements are offered. Suddenly, 
several loose ends in our theorizing might become connectable: different heritability 
estimates and different proportions of non-additive genetic variance for general intelligence 
and personality dimensions; different impact of shared environment on intelligence and on 
personality dimensions; inbreeding depression and outbreeding elevation for intelligence 
but not for personality; generally higher heritability for sexually selected than for naturally 
selected traits. 
Most helpful to evaluate systematically the possible genetic mechanisms in genetic 
variation is Table 1 in Penke et al. (this issue). Admittedly, the entries are ordinal at best 
and vague at worst, but they suffice to navigate the reader through the sometimes 
demanding subject matter and provide a different vantage point, and they suffice to 
evaluate by comparative evidence. The watershed model has its own charm and merits, 
not the least because it may help to reconcile approaches in evolutionary anthropology 
with those in evolutionary psychology. The former insist on fitness measures and settle as 
far downstream as possible. The latter, unless they commit betrayal of their discipline, 
have to find their niches upstream along tributaries. The model makes salient that both 
approaches are working with the same body of water, in fact with the same water. 
In the last decade evolutionary approaches and adaptionistic theorizing have finally gained 
increased acceptance within the psychologies of continental Europe (Euler & Voland, 
2001). The target article exemplifies for personality psychology how promising and gainful 
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an interdisciplinary approach with bipartisan expertise can be and how much it can 
contribute to consilience of estranged disciplines. 
Genetic Variance and Strategic 
Pluralism 
Aurelio José Figueredo & Paul Gladden 
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA 
ajf@u.arizona.edu, pgladden@email.arizona.edu 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) have written a provocative paper on the evolutionary genetics of 
personality, ascribing the maintenance of genetic variation in personality to balancing 
selection and in cognitive abilities to a balance between mutation pressure and directional 
selection. Some of the theory and evidence presented appears supportive, but both the 
theoretical predictions and the supporting empirical evidence remain tentative. 
Penke et al. (this issue) (PDM) have written a provocative paper on the evolutionary 
genetics of personality. The ideas presented are extremely exciting and worth further 
research, but we have certain reservations about some of the conclusions drawn from the 
existing body of theory and evidence. 
After making and evaluating differential predictions about the expected structure of the 
genetic variability in traits that would be maintained by neutral selection, balancing 
selection, and mutation-selection balance, respectively, PDM draw the following three 
major conclusions: (1) that genetic variability in personality traits is maintained by 
balancing selection, (2) that genetic variability in cognitive abilities is maintained through 
mutation-selection balance, and (3) that neutral selection does not adequately explain the 
observed genetic variability in either personality or cognitive ability. While we are inclined 
to agree with them on all three major points, although perhaps for different reasons, we 
found that some of the logical inferences made in PDM’s argument were difficult to follow 
and require further clarification. The problem stems, in part, from ambiguities and 
incomplete equivalences in the terminology used by PDM and in relation to the original 
sources cited. 
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PDM argue that there are high absolute values of additive genetic variance in traits closely 
related to fitness (termed “fitness traits” by Merilä & Sheldon, 1999) because fitness and 
life history traits are potentially affected by mutations at a large number of genetic loci. 
Therefore, even though fitness traits might be under strong directional selection, a large 
absolute value of additive genetic variance can be maintained by the opposing action of 
mutation pressure. Thus far, we agree with them. However, PDM also assume that fitness-
relevant traits are necessarily and exclusively subject to directional selection as opposed 
to balancing selection. In contrast, we argue that any traits under balancing selection must 
also be closely connected to resultant fitness. For example, as PDM note, balancing 
selection has been proposed by ourselves and others as an explanation for the 
maintenance of genetic variability in life history traits. Although life history traits are 
definitely relevant to fitness, alternative reproductive strategies might nonetheless have 
equal fitness payoffs, especially within complex social ecologies. 
PDM equate “downstream” traits with “fitness” traits. Because PDM argue that fitness-
relevant downstream traits are subject to a balance between mutation pressure and 
directional selection, they go further to imply that downstream/fitness traits are also less 
likely to be subject to balancing selection, as indicated by their high levels additive genetic 
variance. We do not understand why this must necessarily be so. The concept of a 
downstream trait with high fitness relevance does not seem useful to us for distinguishing 
between directional and balancing selection. The foundation upon which to make strong 
differential predictions about the structure of genetic variability between mutation-selection 
balance and balancing selection therefore seems fragile. Similarly, it is unclear to us why 
additive genetic variance should tend to be depleted in traits under balancing selection. 
PDM’s multiple conflation of downstream traits, fitness traits, and life-history traits with 
strong and exclusively directional selection is troubling because human life history strategy 
has been shown to be significantly related to personality traits and could therefore be 
partially under the control of balancing selection, as PDM acknowledge (Figueredo et al., 
2005 a,b). They cite us as observing that a “fortuitous side-effect” of variation in life history 
strategy and personality “is that such variation reduces within-group and between-group 
competition by allowing individuals and groups to fill different socio-environmental niches”. 
In fact, the predictions that we made were stronger and more specific: (1) that selection for 
variation in life history strategy may ultimately be the principal driving force behind 
selection for variation in personality, and (2) that partial release from intraspecific 
competition within social groups is the evolved adaptive function of this variation, not 
merely a “fortuitous side-effect”. In a separate twin study (Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, 
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& Schneider, 2004; Figueredo et al., 2006), we have also shown a substantial genetic 
correlation (rg =.78) between a higher-order personality factor and a multivariate composite 
of a wide array of cognitive and behavioral indicators of life history strategy. Furthermore, 
we have reported a substantial broad-sense heritability (h2 =.65) for this general life history 
(K) factor. Unfortunately, the twin study did not contain associated data from other (non-
twin) siblings, so we were not able to estimate the relative proportions of additive and non-
additive genetic variance. 
PDM state that significant absolute and proportional levels of non-additive genetic variance 
indicate that a given trait has had a recent history of selection. We are unclear as to what 
type of selection is meant here, but we suspect that directional selection is implied. PDM 
also state that high levels of non-additive genetic variance (specifically dominance 
variance) are observed in personality traits and that this variability is only explainable by 
balancing selection because dominance variance levels are expected to be in the middle 
range for traits under mutation-selection balance, but higher under balancing selection. 
Since traits with a recent history of selection and traits under balancing selection are both 
predicted to have significant levels of non-additive genetic variance, we are unclear what, 
if any, differential predictions there are about the levels of non-additive variance in traits 
under directional versus balancing selection. 
In sum, although we sympathize with their final position, we are skeptical about the 
apparent certainty with which PDM present their differential predictions as purportedly 
reliable criteria for discriminating between the alternative mechanisms for maintaining 
genetic variability. In the literature cited by PDM (e.g., Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Merilä & 
Sheldon, 1999; Stirling, Réale, & Roff, 2002), these are treated more tentatively as 
working hypotheses, for which the evidence is often equivocal, than as empirically well-
substantiated observations. In their response to these commentaries, PDM should 
therefore: (1) better elucidate the inferential steps they made in reaching their conclusions 
regarding the ultimate causes underlying the maintenance of genetic variability in 
personality and cognitive abilities, and (2) specify the empirical evidence supporting these 
conclusions, explicitly distinguishing empirical data from theoretical conjecture. 
82 
Beyond Just-so Stories towards a 
Psychology of Situations: 
Evolutionary Accounts of 
Individual Differences Require 
Independent Assessment of 
Personality and Situational 
Variables 
David C. Funder 
Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, USA 
funder@ucr.edu 
Abstract 
Evolutionary theory is perhaps better used as a brake on theory than as a source of “just-
so” stories of the origin of characteristics. The target article admirably employs 
evolutionary theory to test competing models of the maintenance of individual differences. 
Areas needing further development include separating personality from situational 
variables, rather than confounding them, and developing a psychology of situations. 
 
Many personality and social psychologists are skeptical about the relevance of 
evolutionary theorizing to psychology. Why?  It is not because they doubt the general truth 
of evolutionary theory. Rather, the skepticism stems from the proliferation within 
evolutionary psychology, especially in its early days, of “just-so” stories reminiscent of the 
tales by Rudyard Kipling that explained how the whale got its throat, how the camel got its 
hump, and so forth. Kipling invented these stories by observing interesting aspects of 
nature and then letting his imagination run wild. Evolutionary psychologists have 
sometimes proceeded the same way, with the result that they seemed ready to explain 
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anything from preference to salty foods to spousal murder. While nearly all the 
evolutionary stories were interesting, and an (unknown) number of them may even be true, 
their sheer number and variety can feed rather than repel skepticism, and help to fuel wide 
ranging critiques (e.g., Gould & Lewontin, 1979). The basic problem with these stories, 
besides their number, is their origin in a strategy of beginning with a known phenomenon 
and reasoning backwards to a cause – not unlike Kipling’s. 
But there is another way to use evolutionary theory. Rather than as a source of limitless 
explanatory theories for the origin of anything, evolutionary psychology can profitably be 
used as a brake on theorizing. If one accepts that the diversity of life, including human 
psychological life, is a product of evolutionary processes, then certain other theoretical 
positions become less tenable. For example, some versions of psychoanalysis posit the 
existence of a built-in drive in all persons towards death and destruction, including self-
destruction. Is this idea plausible from an evolutionary perspective?  For a very different 
example, some psychologists who study thinking and problem-solving argue that the 
human mind is fraught with basic design flaws. The many experiments demonstrating how 
people may systematically and grossly distort certain kinds of information are clever and 
sometimes entertaining, but is the idea of an information processing system flawed at the 
level of its basic design evolutionarily plausible (see Funder, 1987, 2000; Gigerenzer, 
Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999)? 
The target article follows this second approach, evaluating three models of the 
maintenance of individual differences in psychological attributes according to evolutionary 
plausibility. This approach leads the authors to several interesting conclusions, including a 
compelling description of the basic difference between attributes of ability and personality, 
a distinction that has been difficult to make on other grounds. Of particular interest is their 
explanation of how individual differences in personality can be maintained through the 
simultaneous existence of environments in which different levels of different traits are most 
adaptive. For example, exuberant extraversion might be adaptive in an environment that is 
abundant and relatively risk-free, whereas a more restrained introversion might promote 
survival under impoverished or dangerous circumstances. While on the whole their 
analysis is compelling, further development is needed in two respects. 
One is the authors’ touting of “individual reaction norms” as preferable to main-effect 
personality traits. Individual reaction norms are described as similar to Mischel and 
Shoda’s (1995) CAPS model in which each individual’s personality is described in terms of 
his or her if-then connections between situational stimuli and behavioral responses. This 
model has several shortcomings, including its startling resemblance to Watsonian (pre-
Skinner) S-R behaviorism, the general statistical weakness of interactions compared to 
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more robust main effects (which the target article mentions), and the dilemma the model 
presents between characterizing individuals in terms of idiographic patterns (one for every 
living person) or boiling them down into a relatively small number of “types” – a 
problematical approach at best (see Asendorpf, 2002; also Funder, 2006, in press). 
For present purposes the most important difficulty with individual reaction norms, as 
defined, is that they may contradict the purpose for which they are advocated. The authors 
persuasively argue that personality traits can be differentially adaptive under different 
circumstances. Thus, to repeat their most simple example, an extraverted person is well-
suited to take advantage of a safe environment while an introvert may survive better in a 
dangerous one. But notice how this example – and others presented in the paper – 
assumes a main effect of extraversion-introversion, not an interaction with safety-
dangerousness. An individual’s degree of extraversion-introversion is a general or average 
tendency and individuals at both ends of the dimension continue to exist because each 
style is adaptive in different environments. But if instead traits are conceived as built-in 
interactions, why not just evolve a tendency to be extraverted if the situation is safe and 
introverted if dangers are afoot?  The explanation of the survival of individual differences in 
personality traits as a result of their varying adaptive implications in different environments 
only works when the traits are thought of as main effects rather than interactions. More 
generally, the concept of a person-environment interaction is clearer and more analytically 
tractable when the two constituent terms are kept separate (Funder, in press; Reis, 2007). 
A second and related observation is that further research on the interactions between traits 
and/or genotypes on the one hand, and environmental properties on the other, is at 
present sorely handicapped by the lack of means for conceptualizing and measuring 
environments. Situations as presented in expositions of the CAPS model, for example, are 
almost (but not quite) always described hypothetically, as for example, “Situations 1-6” 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995, p. 247). This kind of labeling is presumably promissory to 
someday providing concrete descriptions, and dimensions for description, of situations. 
The description of psychological environments (or situations) is perhaps even more 
important to fulfill the potential of the analysis in the present paper, to describe the 
circumstances under which different traits, or even aspects of incipient psychopathology, 
are more and less adaptive. So far we have a small number of very interesting examples, 
some of which are hypothetical. What we need next are data, and means to gather those 
data. We need new measuring tools, and a psychology of situations (Wagerman & Funder, 
2006). 
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Life History Theory and 
Evolutionary Genetics 
Steven W. Gangestad 
Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, USA 
sgangest@unm.edu 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) argue that evolutionary genetics offers important insights into the 
fundamental nature of personality—how people adaptive adjust to their life circumstances 
in particular ways, as well as failures to adapt. I strongly endorse this enterprise. It is 
particularly promising, I suggest, when embedded within life history theory, a broad 
evolutionary framework for understand selection on organisms. 
Almost a century ago, Fisher (1918) famously showed how, given Mendelian inheritance, 
quantitative variation can be partitioned into forms of genetic and environmental variance, 
thereby laying foundations for both quantitative genetics (e.g., heritability estimation) and 
evolutionary genetics. Whereas, within biology, these topics are intertwined (e.g., Crow, 
1986), most quantitative behaviour geneticists and personality psychologists have shown 
little interest in evolutionary genetics. I applaud Penke et al.’s efforts to remedy this 
neglect. 
Many biologists (e.g., Houle, 1991) contextualize evolutionary genetics in a broad view of 
selection on organisms, life history theory (LHT). LHT has deep roots in evolutionary 
biology (for an overview, see Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005) and now pervades adaptationist 
theoretical analysis (e.g., of sexual selection: e.g., Kokko, Brooks, Jennions, & Morley, 
2003; biological signals: Getty, 2006; immune function: McDade, 2003; patterns of aging: 
e.g., Kirkwood, 1990). My commentary touches on how, jointly, LHT and evolutionary 
genetics can shed light on the adaptive and maladaptive nature of personality variants. 
Life history allocations. Organisms are designed by selection to harvest energy and 
convert it into fitness-enhancing activities. Within lineages and their niches, designs that 
do so most proficiently are selected (e.g., Charnov, 1993). A problem that designs must 
solve is how to efficiently allocate resources to the development and operation of the 
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organism’s many fitness-enhancing features. At optimum performance, the marginal value 
of allocation (effectively, the effect on fitness of the last unit of allocation) to each feature 
should be equal. (Otherwise, reallocation could increase fitness.) Optimal allocation 
changes across the lifecourse and with conditions (e.g., skeletal growth and brain 
development may be particularly important early in life, allocation to reproductive traits 
may anticipate the end of growth, optimal allocation to immune function increases with 
infestation). Selection accordingly shapes organisms’ characteristic life histories. 
Implications for directional and stabilizing selection. Virtually no feature comes for free; a 
feature’s development and maintenance entails opportunity costs. Hence, one can 
overspend even on “good” traits (e.g., brain function supporting IQ, immune function, DNA 
repair). Energy-rich diets in modern cultures don’t overcome the problem, as metabolic 
and developmental processes evolved in leaner conditions impose constraints on 
proficient allocation of resources in real developmental time. Hence, most traits are (at 
least partly) under stabilizing selection; intermediate trait values are favored, whereas 
extremes are disfavored. Consider height. Extreme tallness or shortness may be selected 
against (see Nettle, 2002), partly because really tall people may have overallocated to 
growth, whereas short people may have underallocated to it. 
Mutations typically diminish fitness because they reduce the proficiency with which 
organisms garner and allocate resources, and in at least a couple of ways. Mutations may 
produce inefficiencies in processes that build fitness-enhancing traits. They can also yield 
non-optimal allocation. Some extreme variants on traits under stabilizing selection (e.g., 
extreme tallness and extreme shortness) reflect mutation-induced non-optimal allocation: 
Some mutations lead to overallocation to the trait, others to underallocation (e.g., Houle, 
1991). 
Mutation-selection balance, then, doesn’t only apply to traits under directional selection 
(see Penke et al., this issue); it can also explain genetic variation on traits under stabilizing 
selection (e.g., Crow, 1986). The latter tend to have low additive genetic coefficients of 
variation (CVAs), despite high h2 (Houle, 1992; Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995). The CVA 
of height is generally less than CVAs of fitness traits (e.g., Miller & Penke, 2007). Brain 
size too possesses a low CVA (Miller & Penke, 2007). And some personality variation may 
be maintained by mutation-selection balance under stabilizing selection. 
For some traits under (partial) stabilizing selection, however, the optimum value may be 
higher than the mean because, once again, some mutations (and other fitness-reducing 
events, including environmental ones) may reduce ability to develop fitness-enhancing 
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traits. A classic example is clutch size in birds: Although both small and very large clutch 
sizes are disfavored (the latter because they overstretch parents’ abilities to care for 
offspring), the fittest parents can produce clutches larger than average (see Parker & 
Begon, 1986). Similarly, optimal height may be greater than average (Nettle, 2002). PDM 
imply that IQ has ancestrally been linearly related to fitness, but the low CVA of brain size 
(partly reflecting IQ) suggests it may be like avian clutch size: partly under stabilizing 
selection, with the optimum greater than the mean, but less than the high end of the range 
in IQ. 
Reactive heritability. Selection may design organisms to adjust their developmental and 
behavioral strategies based on their particular circumstances, should those circumstances 
affect the payoffs of strategies. Selection accordingly shapes phenotypic plasticity and 
norms of reaction (Houston & McNamara, 1992). Plasticity explains, however, not only to 
environmental variation in traits. If circumstances themselves reflect genetic variation (e.g., 
compromises in condition due to mutations), so too do outcomes of strategy-adjustment. 
PDM allude to this phenomenon, albeit implicitly, when they discuss the idea that costly, 
sexually attractive signals evolve to reflect genetic variance in condition. When allocating 
optimally, individuals in best condition allocate more resources to these traits than do 
individuals in poorer condition (Rowe & Houle, 1996). 
More generally, in long-lived species such as humans, individuals in poor condition may 
invest proportionately more in survival and less in reproductive traits that entail costs on 
immediate survival (e.g., Ellison, 2003). Accordingly, heritable variation in condition may 
translate, through adaptive adjustment, in differences in patterns of a range of phenotypic 
traits. For example, one life history view of the endocrine systems in which female 
estrogen and male testosterone are involved is that they have been shaped to adaptively 
modulate allocation to reproductive traits (e.g., female estrogen promoting current fertility 
and allocation to gynoid fat deposition; male testosterone promoting traits ancestrally 
important in mating competition, e.g., muscularity; see Ellison, 2001, 2003). Some 
variation in traits affected by reproductive hormones, then, may reflect condition-
dependent strategy choice, not allelic variation in genes directly affecting hormone 
production or receptor densities. (Perhaps relevant is the recent finding that prepubertal 
boys of average IQ tend to have higher testosterone levels than boys of either very low or 
very high IQ; Ostatníková et al., 2007.) 
Sum. By itself, heritability estimation reveals little about core personality, “psychophysical 
systems that determine (an individual’s) unique adjustment to his environments” (Allport; 
cited by Penke et al., this issue). As these authors make clear, identifying the evolutionary 
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forces responsible for variation can yield insights into the nature of adaptation and 
maladaptations represented by personality variants. The enterprise may be particularly 
promising when embedded within a life history framework. 
Behaviour Genetics’ Neglected 
Twin: Gene-Environment 
Correlation 
Kerry L. Jang 
Department of Psychiatry, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
kjang@interchange.ubc.ca 
Abstract 
The target article posits that the driving force behind balancing selection is gene-
environment interaction (GxE) that describes environmental control of genes. It is argued 
that GxE is insufficient to maintain genetic variability and that the concept of gene-
environment correlation or genetic control of the environment leads to different conclusions 
regarding mental illness and hierarchical personality models. 
 
Penke et al. (this issue) make a strong, logical argument that observed individual 
differences in personality are a reflection of genetic variability caused by balancing 
selection. Their argument relies heavily on the behavioural genetic concept of gene-
environment interaction (GxE) and recent empirical research that has shown to exert a 
major influence in personality and psychopathology. GxE occurs when genotypes are 
differentially expressed when exposed to varying environmental conditions. It is argued 
that such genetic variability is maintained in a population because it confers fitness 
advantages by allowing organisms to adaptively react to different environmental conditions 
or – to use their term – niches. 
However, the role of GxE as the primary mechanism for balancing selection is insufficient 
to explain genetic variability. This becomes clear when their arguments are used to try to 
explain mental illness and the genetic basis underlying the hierarchical structure of 
personality. Beginning with mental illness, they argue that mental illness is a consequence 
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of genetic variants no longer fitting environmental conditions so that “…modern societies 
produce mismatches between heritable temperaments and available niches”. 
Explaining Mental Illness. It follows that mental illness exists simply because humans 
cannot reproduce fast enough to keep up with environmental change and these variants 
survive because they have not had a chance to be selected out of the population. 
However, it can also be argued that such genotypes are maintained due to improvements 
to health care and because attitudes toward the mentally ill ensure these individuals 
survive to reproduce. This is a form of gene-environment interplay called gene-
environment correlation (rGE). 
 
Gene-environment correlation refers to the process in which underlying genetic factors 
influence the probability of exposure to specific events – simply put, the genetic control of 
exposure to the environment. Plomin, DeFries, and Loehlin (1977) discussed three general 
types: passive, active, and reactive. Passive genotype-environment correlation occurs 
because children share heredity and environments with members of their family and can 
thus passively inherit environments correlated with their genetic propensities. Reactive 
genotype-environment correlation refers to experiences of the child derived from reactions 
of other people to the child’s genetic propensities. Active genotype-environment correlation 
is known as “niche-building” or “niche picking” (Plomin, DeFries, & McClearn, 1990, p. 
251) and refers to individuals actively selecting or creating environments commensurate 
with their underlying genetic propensities. 
Assuming that some form of rGE exists, its operation maintains genetic variability because 
these genes are operating in an active, passive or reactive manner to create all of the 
varied environments required for expression. This also helps to clarify some evolutionary 
psychological theorizing on mental illness that attempts to identify fitness advantages for 
mental illness. Under this model, mental illness has no fitness advantages and exists as a 
true pathology. In short, rGE creates “stably unstable” environments that would maintain 
genetic variability for psychopathology. It should also be noted that for normal personality 
and behaviour, rGE provides a powerful alternative explanation for genetic variability 
underlying this range of behaviour. 
Hierarchical Structure of Personality. What influence does GxE have on the covariance of 
traits, and by extension, hierarchical models of personality?  The authors suggest that the 
context-dependent nature of two traits can be used to determine if they are in a 
pleiotrophic relationship - indexed by a positive genetic correlation (rG) – that results when 
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both respond within the same general reaction range when exposed to the same 
environments. If they do not share a common genetic basis, then the two traits can react in 
opposite ways – resulting in a negative genetic correlation. Thus, the absence of sign or 
valence changes across environments is a necessary condition for the existence of 
superordinate personality domains. 
This is problematical for two reasons. First, what is important to estimating pleiotrophy – 
that the authors consider the central basis of superordinate traits - is not change in valence 
but rather the magnitude of rG. A zero rG is far more informative regarding the presence of 
shared genes than the change in valence. Moreover, demonstrating no change in the 
valence of rG across environments as a necessary requirement for pleiotrophy is really an 
artificial and ecologically invalid consequence of hypothesized reaction ranges whose 
breadths are not broad enough to encompass zero as the midpoint. 
Second, basing decisions on which traits are included as part of a domain (a version of the 
classic factor definition problem) based on reaction ranges may lead to erroneous 
conclusions for the reasons outlined above and because of potentially unaccounted for rGE  
effects that can be misread as GxE (see Purcell, 2002). Finally, the authors’ theory 
assumes that personality hierarchy is imposed by the action of genes shared across traits. 
Through the mechanism of rGE, however, environments conducive to maintaining a 
particular hierarchy also play a role. 
Recognizing the interdependence of genes and the environment (see Rutter, 2007) and 
the ability to specify mechanisms such as GxE as a driver of balancing selection is a major 
step forward. However, there are other effects, such as rGE, that need to be incorporated 
into the theory that balancing selection maintains the genetic variability that we observe as 
individual differences in behaviour. 
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Don't Count on Structural 
Pleiotropy 
Wendy Johnson 
Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, UK, and 
Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota – Twin Cities, USA 
wendy.johnson@ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) address the evolution of personality, articulating many insightful 
and provocative ideas. They do not, however, give enough attention to the role of G-E 
correlation in the processes they outline. Thus they underestimate the difficulty of 
establishing the existence of structural pleiotropy and overestimate its ability to help us in 
understanding the development of personality. 
In their insightful and provocative paper, Penke et al. (this issue) use the term "GxE 
interaction" to refer to the adaptive fit of an organism to its environment. They describe this 
adaptive process as being comprised of natural selection, or relative reproductive success, 
and phenotypic plasticity, or the potential for a given genotype to produce different 
phenotypes in different environments. They note that phenotypic plasticity is not complete, 
even for behavioral traits: the organism cannot adapt perfectly and instantly to all 
environmental demands because the cues to optimal adaptation provided by the 
environment are too unreliable. They point out that, to the extent that environmental cues 
are reliable, natural selection acts over time to limit phenotypic plasticity, and suggest that 
what phenotypic plasticity remains largely reflects genotypic differences that persist in the 
population. This is, of course, possible, but the very unreliability of environmental cues 
makes it unnecessary. The same genotype could respond differently to different 
environmental circumstances simply because there are enough ways in which the 
environment varies that natural selection cannot operate to remove the phenotypic 
plasticity. 
In population genetics, the term "GxE interaction" has a specific technical definition as 
genetic control of sensitivity to different environments, or, equivalently, environmental 
control of expression of genetic influences (Kendler & Eaves, 1986). The adaptive fit of an 
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animal (human or otherwise) to its environment is always more than this: the animal has 
some choice of exactly what environment it faces. This is captured by another population 
genetics term, "G-E correlation," which refers to genetic control of exposure to different 
environments, or, equivalently, the environmental control of gene frequency (Kendler & 
Eaves, 1986). For example, when food is scarce in one area, animals will expand the 
range over which they search for it. There may be genetically influenced individual 
differences in the extent to which this is true, but the animal that wanders furthest in 
search of food may have the same reproductive success as one that does not wander as 
far but has the metabolic efficiency to survive better on less food. Because adaptation 
involves both GxE interaction and G-E correlation, it would be helpful to use a term that 
encompasses both. "G-E transaction" is one such term. 
G-E correlation can be completely passive, as when parents transmit both genetic 
influences and environmental circumstances to their offspring. But often G-E correlation is 
active: the individual either directly seeks an environment or behaves in a way that elicits 
certain kinds of environmental responses. As with phenotypic plasticity, individuals cannot 
select their environments completely at will. Still, the facts that particular genotypes can 
produce more than one phenotype and that individuals can select their environments to 
some degree mean that GxE interaction and G-E correlation are often closely inter-related. 
This relation takes place because proper measurement of the environment often involves 
recognition of individual differences in response to that environment, individual differences 
that generally show genetic influence. 
For example, measurement of the environment when food is scarce would mean 
recognizing that some animals are more affected by the relative lack of food than others, 
perhaps by measuring individual levels of caloric deprivation. But animals with relatively 
lower levels of metabolic efficiency will be more motivated to expand the range over which 
they search for food, creating at least statistical if not genotypic pleiotropy between 
metabolic efficiency and food-seeking range among those animals. Natural selection will 
tend to have its greatest effects on those who have both low levels of metabolic efficiency 
and low tendencies to explore in search of food. Genetic influences on food-seeking range 
will be expressed most strongly among those with low metabolic efficiency, a GxE 
interaction. The G-E correlation will also be greatest among these animals, because of the 
selection process involved in food-seeking range. The ways in which G-E transactions are 
related are discussed in detail in Johnson (2007). 
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Penke et al. (this issue) correctly point out that phenotypic plasticity is limited because the 
environment does not reliably signal the most adaptive behavioral strategy. It is this 
unreliability of environmental cues in the presence of phenotypic plasticity that implies that 
genetic influences on a trait do not necessarily mean genotypic differences at particular 
loci. This is because, for any one gene in a genotype, the other genes function as part of 
the environment. In combination with the ability of an animal to select its environment, this 
has important implications for the norm of reaction model Penke et al. (this issue) 
articulate. The norm of reaction concept was developed with organisms under controlled 
breeding and environmental conditions, and in naturalistic settings the concept breaks 
down in important ways. For example, in the simplified terms of Penke et al.'s Figure 2b, 
people with genotype A may avoid environment Z completely, and people with genotype B 
may be over-represented there. This implies that genetic correlations observed across the 
environmental range may not reflect similarities and differences in genotype in any 
predetermined, formulaic way even when the correlations do not change sign. 
Penke et al. (this issue) suggest that structural pleiotropy, or functional, physiological, or 
developmental links between genetic influences on different traits that constrain 
independent phenotypic expression of the traits in all environments, may help us to 
understand personality development. The ability to select our own environments makes it 
likely that structural pleiotropy is rare for personality traits, and that it is very hard to be 
sure that we have observed it even when it does exist. This may explain the relative 
weakness of the structural hierarchy of personality traits that depends on structural 
pleiotropy, as indicated by the genetic correlations between factors of the five-factor model 
that are theoretically independent (Jang, Livesley, Angleitner, Riemann, & Vernon, 2002; 
Jang et al., 2001), problems that show up in the phenotypic models of the hierarchy as 
well (e.g., Roberts, Bogg, Walton, Chernyshenko, & Stark, 2004). Though it would be nice 
if we could rely on structural pleiotropy to understand personality and its evolution, it 
seems likely that we will have to make do largely without it. 
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Nascent Field of Evolutionary 
Behavioral Genetics 
Matthew C. Keller 
Virginia Institute for Psychiatric and Behavioral Genetics, Virginia Commonwealth 
University, USA 
matthew.c.keller@gmail.com 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) argue that the genetic variation underlying cognitive abilities is 
probably due to evolutionarily recurrent, deleterious mutations at the thousands of loci that 
could potentially affect cognitive development, whereas the genetic variation underlying 
personality is probably due to balancing selection. This may well be correct, but I argue 
that some of the standards of evidence they forward are not well supported by evolutionary 
genetics theory. It is important at this early stage of evolutionary behavioral genetics to 
critically debate the standards of evidence that will help us distinguish between alternative 
hypotheses. 
I applaud Penke et al.’s (PDM) attempt to understand the evolutionary processes that 
explain the genetic and environmental causes of variation in personality and cognitive 
abilities. Their paper is the most recent in a growing movement to use evolutionary 
genetics to bridge the gaps between behavioral genetics and evolutionary psychology 
(Gangestad & Yeo, 1997; Keller & Miller, 2006; Macdonald, 1995; Mealey, 1995; Miller, 
2000b; Yeo & Gangestad, 1993; Yeo, Gangestad, Edgar, & Thoma, 1999)—an endeavor 
that can be termed “evolutionary behavioral genetics”. In particular, PDM’s framework is 
largely consonant with one that Miller and I recently forwarded regarding the evolutionary 
persistence of genetic variation underlying mental disorders (Keller & Miller, 2006), and so 
it is not surprising that I should mostly agree with their viewpoint. However, expounding 
upon our agreements would be a disservice to the type of critical debate that is important 
to scientific progress; this principle applies doubly to young scientific movements such as 
evolutionary behavioral genetics. Therefore, in this commentary, I endeavor to point out 
concerns I have with PDM’s interpretation of data or theory, and forward alternative 
explanations that I do not feel have necessarily been laid to rest. Nevertheless, my 
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approach should not obscure the fact that, overall, my agreements with this paper far 
outweigh my concerns. 
PDM’s thesis is that cognitive abilities have been under directional (and probably sexual) 
selection over evolutionary time, and that recurrent mutations at a large number of loci 
account for the genetic variation underlying these abilities.  They argue that personality, on 
the other hand, is more likely to have been under some type of balancing selection (and, in 
particular, probably frequency dependent selection), and so differences in personality have 
had fitness costs and benefits that cancel each other out over evolutionary time. This 
conclusion may very well be correct, but I do not think that some of the evidence 
marshaled in favor of this hypothesis is quite as clear-cut as PDM seem to imply. In 
particular, I am unconvinced that the genetic architecture of traits tells us much about the 
evolutionary mechanisms responsible for their variation. 
PDM state that mutation-selection predicts greater additive genetic variation than 
balancing selection, and that the degree of non-additive genetic variation is highest for 
balancing selection, moderate for mutation-selection, and lowest for neutrality (PDM, Table 
1). At the same time, many measures of personality appear to demonstrate high levels of 
non-additive genetic variation (Eaves, Heath, Neale, Hewitt, & Martin, 1998; Keller, 
Coventry, Heath, & Martin, 2005; Lake, Eaves, Maes, Heath, & Martin, 2000) whereas the 
genetic variation underlying cognitive abilities appears to be mostly additive in nature (e.g., 
Rijsdijk, Vernon, & Boomsma, 2002; but see also Pedersen, Plomin, Nesselroade, & 
McClearn, 1992). Do such findings lend support to the hypothesis that balancing selection 
accounts for the variation in personality whereas mutation-selection accounts for the 
variation in cognitive abilities?  I do not think they do. 
Several studies on non-human animals have found that traits most related to fitness tend 
to have high levels of additive genetic variation (as measured using coefficients of 
variation) (Houle, 1992; Price & Schluter, 1991) but even higher levels of non-additive 
genetic variation, resulting in low narrow-sense heritabilities of such traits (Crnokrak & 
Roff, 1995; Falconer, 1989; Roff, 1997). There is also convincing data that mutation-
selection accounts for much of the genetic variation underlying such fitness related traits 
(Charlesworth & Hughes, 1999; Houle, 1992, 1998). Therefore, the evidence does not 
seem to support PDM’s blanket assertion that mutation-selection predicts higher levels of 
additive than non-additive genetic variation—indeed, the opposite is probably true. That 
said, I should add that there is some, albeit imperfect, evidence that sexually selected 
traits in particular show higher levels of additive genetic variation compared to other fitness 
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related traits (Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995), a finding consistent with Miller’s (2000a) and 
PDM’s hypothesis that cognitive abilities have been under sexual selection. This may 
occur because selection favors mating signals that reveal as much additive genetic 
variation as possible (Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995). 
I am also unconvinced that balancing selection generally leads to high levels of non-
additive genetic variation (PDM’s Table 1). Certainly some forms of it do—overdominance 
for fitness for example. But other forms of it—frequency dependent selection and 
temporal/spatial variability in the fitness landscapes, for instance—predict high levels of 
additive genetic variation. Thus, I would argue that the ratio of additive to non-additive 
genetic variation tells us little about the relative merits of mutation-selection versus 
balancing selection. 
Finally, in keeping with the critical spirit of my commentary, I feel impelled to backtrack on 
an assertion that I made previously and one cited by PDM. Contra Keller et al. (2005), I am 
no longer convinced that observations of non-additive genetic variation necessarily make 
neutral explanations unlikely. It is true that traits that are closer to neutral evolutionarily 
(e.g., morphological traits) tend to show higher ratios of additive to non-additive genetic 
variation (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Mousseau & Roff, 1987) whereas traits under more 
intense selection tend to show lower ratios (Crnokrak & Roff, 1995; Falconer, 1989; Roff, 
1997), but the rule is not hard and fast. The reason is that the detection of non-additive 
genetic variation is highly sensitive to scale—it depends on how the trait is measured. For 
example, twin studies find evidence for high levels of non-additive genetic variation 
underlying absolute skin conductance, whereas the genetic variation of “range corrected” 
skin conductance (a mere change in scale) appears to be purely additive in nature 
(Lykken, 2006). Along these lines, how are we to know the true scale along which 
psychological constructs, such as personality, are actually measured, or whether the 
micro-traits (or endophenotypes) underlying psychological constructs combine additively or 
multiplicatively? 
I do not think that the genetic architecture of traits provides a very reliable clue as to the 
mechanism explaining their genetic variation. Fortunately, other pieces of evidence can 
better help us understand the mechanisms responsible for the genetic variation underlying 
a trait. Several of these are described in PDM (see also Keller & Miller, 2006): the 
numbers and allelic spectrums of loci affecting the trait, whether the trait shows inbreeding 
depression (although in addition to mutation-selection, overdominance for fitness can also 
cause inbreeding depression), the degree of assortative mating that occurs on the trait 
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(although assortative mating on deviations from the mean should also be considered if the 
trait could have been under stabilizing selection), and whether its expression depends on 
overall condition. The effects of paternal age, radiation, and trauma on the trait, all 
consistent with mutation-selection, provide additional clues. Furthermore, once an allele 
that affects trait variation has been identified using, for example, association methods, its 
base-pair sequence can provide important information regarding the relative merits of 
ancestral neutrality, mutation-selection, and balancing selection (Bamshad & Wooding, 
2003; Otto, 2000). 
PDM’s paper is insightful and offers us plenty to consider. I find the argument that 
cognitive abilities have been under ancestral sexual selection quite compelling, but remain 
as yet unconvinced by, but open to, PDM’s argument regarding the genetic variation in 
personality. In particular, I find Tooby and Cosmides (1990) hypothesis (personality 
variation is in part a byproduct of genetic variation that exists for reasons unrelated to 
personality), MacDonalds’s (1995) hypothesis (personality is under weak stabilizing 
selection, such that fitness differences within its normal ranges are trivial) and Buss’ 
(2006) hypothesis (personality is under weak directional selection, and its variation is a 
byproduct of mutational noise) all to be viable alternatives. My main disagreement with 
PDM is not in their broad conclusions, however, but rather in some of the standards of 
evidence they bring to bear on the issue. 
The field of evolutionary behavioral genetics is young, and our first steps should be made 
with the circumspection befitting its fledgling nature. Much wasted time and effort can be 
averted if, at this stage, we remain wary of groupthink (Janis, 1972). For the sake of our 
nascent field, it is important to critically debate the standards of evidence that will help us 
distinguish between alternative hypotheses, and to refrain from forming consensus on 
major issues too readily. 
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Humans in Evolutionary 
Transition? 
James J. Lee 
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, USA 
jameslee@wjh.harvard.edu 
Abstract 
One shortcoming in this otherwise excellent article is a neglect of additional hypotheses as 
to the high heritability of behavioral traits that may have been exposed to directional 
selection. I point to some evidence that humans are in the midst of an evolutionary 
transition that may account for the genetic variation in such traits. 
 
The target article urges bringing the power of modern evolutionary biology to bear on the 
variation observed in human behavioral traits. As the inauguration of this ambitious 
undertaking is long overdue, the target article should prove to be an indispensable 
reference for some time. The authors' treatment of non-cognitive behavioral traits is 
particularly cogent. I devote my allotted space to pointing out what I feel are misplaced 
emphases and premature judgments in their treatment of traits that plausibly have been 
under directional selection in our evolutionary past. 
 
Citing Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection (1930) for the proposition that 
directional selection should deplete genetic variation, the authors then argue that a special 
explanation is required for the abundance of genetic variation that is observed in some 
behavioral traits. Their own special explanation bears some resemblance to the 
infinitesimal model: the loci underlying fitness-relevant traits are posited to be so numerous 
and small in effect that selection against deleterious mutants is extremely weak and thus 
ineffective in removing the additive genetic variance. I have two related quibbles with this 
hypothesis. First, the fundamental theorem does not concern itself with the ultimate 
genetic architecture of a trait at all. What the theorem actually says is that the change in 
mean fitness at any time ascribable solely to natural selection acting on allele frequencies 
is equal to the additive genetic variance in fitness at that time. To infer from this statement 
that directional selection should extinguish genetic variation is an extrapolation not entailed 
by the theorem itself. Readers interested in this point are advised to consult Frank and 
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Slatkin (1992), Edwards (1994), Crow (2002), and Grafen (2003). Second, regardless of 
the authority cited for it, the extrapolation does not necessarily follow. There are 
"sufficiently plausible" reasons for any given failure of directional selection to deplete the 
additive genetic variance other than the one given by the authors (e.g., Hill & Keightley, 
1987). I now provide a partial account. 
On the basis of their model, the authors predict the absence or rarity of deleterious alleles 
at intermediate frequency. However, this assertion that the enhancing alleles for fitness-
affecting traits are ancestral and nearly fixed seems to be empirically contradicted by the 
large number of selective sweeps detected by recent genome-wide surveys. In their scan 
for long, high-frequency, derived haplotypes in the human genome, Wang, Kodama, Baldi, 
and Moyzis (2006) found 1,800 sites showing signals of strong and recent selection in or 
near known coding genes. One of the biological categories enriched for such signals is 
neuronal function. As their survey failed to detect selection at some loci where single-gene 
studies have documented selection with a high degree of confidence (e.g., Evans et al., 
2005), these signals probably fail to capture the full extent to which selection has been 
acting in our species. 
This extraordinarily large number of selective sweeps in progress reveals that humans are 
in the midst of an evolutionary transition. Given the absence of selective equilibrium, 
substantial genetic variation in any trait (including fitness) becomes compatible with 
several possible genetic architectures and evolutionary histories other than the one 
envisioned by the authors. This is because such parameters as the additive genetic 
variance depend on the initial distribution of allelic effects and frequencies. As the variance 
of a dichotomous random variable is maximized at p = 0.5, an architecture biased toward 
initially uncommon enhancing variants may show an increase in the genetic variance 
under directional selection. The large number of fitness-enhancing variants at intermediate 
frequencies in the human genome is certainly consistent with a bias of this kind. Such a 
bias may even be traceable to known developments in human evolutionary history. For 
example, Evans et al. (2006) have provided persuasive evidence that an adaptive variant 
of the brain development gene MCPH1 was introgressed into the human gene pool from 
an archaic Homo lineage. Hawks and Cochran (2006) argue that such introgressive events 
have contributed substantially to the evolution of our species, as interbreeding can 
introduce many more adaptive variants within a given time span than mutation alone. 
The authors urge a greater focus in association studies of cognitive abilities on still-rare 
deleterious mutations, perhaps present in a single population. This commentary sets forth 
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reasons to doubt that loci harboring variants of this kind account for nearly the entire 
observed genetic variance in these traits. Resisting the authors' proposal of an ancestral 
genome encoding a Platonic ideal of human adaptation that is inevitably disrupted by new 
and deleterious mutations of small effect (where variability in how much of this "mutational 
noise" is inherited accounts for individual differences in g and other ability factors), I 
suggest in its place a genome undergoing massive recent turnover in response to 
selection pressures that are as yet incompletely characterized. The kinds of variants that 
follow from the authors' proposal are no doubt numerous. But given the tumultuous picture 
of human adaptive changes that emerges from recent work, a more interesting goal with 
respect to the illumination of our evolutionary history may be to look for novel enhancing 
variants across the entire spectrum of frequencies in all populations. The few genes linked 
to IQ in family-based designs robust against the potentially confounding effects of 
population substructure all match one or more aspects of this pattern: enhanced IQ 
associated with derived variants, signs of selection, or intermediate frequencies in one or 
more populations (Comings et al., 2003; Plomin et al., 2004; Blasi et al., 2006; Gosso et 
al., 2006a, 2006b). Given the many ways in which genotype-phenotype association 
studies can fail, I do not take this relative paucity of results to be evidence of absence. In 
fact, I am optimistic that forthcoming empirical evidence will help resolve the main issue 
discussed in this commentary. 
Personality Traits and Adaptive 
Mechanisms 
W. John Livesley 
Department of Psychiatry,  University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
livesley@interchange.ubc.ca 
Abstract 
The issues addressed in this paper are basic to the foundation of a science of personality. 
The integration of behavioral genetic and evolutionary psychology perspectives on 
personality has the potential to contribute to the integrated conceptual foundation that the 
field needs. The task that the authors seek to explicate – the factors contributing to genetic 
variability of personality traits – is an important component of this integration although only 
part of an evolution-informed model of personality. 
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In focusing on selective neutrality, mutation-selection balance, and balancing selection as 
explanations of genetic variability, the authors give short shrift to earlier explanations. 
Genetically based variability is a feature of most biological systems and structures. As 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990) pointed out in a seminal contribution, this variability does not 
appear to disrupt the functioning of these adaptive mechanisms. The genetic variability of 
“mental mechanisms” including traits does not at first glance appear different from that of 
other biological systems. Tooby and Cosmides hypothesize that this variation is due to 
variability at the protein level that does not affect the mechanism’s function but does 
contribute to defence against pathogens. This argument is dismissed largely on the 
grounds that the alleles associated with the immune system are very different from those 
associated with personality systems. However, Tooby and Cosmedes argument is more 
subtle. The argument is not that genetic variability enhances the immune system 
responses but rather that protein variability creates an ever-changing substrate or micro-
environment that makes it more difficult for pathogens to be successful or evolve around 
host defences. In a sense, sexual recombination creates minor “lesions” that produce 
variation independently of function. This parsimonious hypothesis views genetic variability 
in personality as part of overall variability in adaptive mechanisms. In this sense, genetic 
differences in sensation seeking or anxiousness do not differ greatly from genetically 
based differences in the size of a limb or other organ. The authors reject this idea 
asserting simply that the number of alleles involved in personality variation is far greater 
although it is unclear that this is the case with complex anatomical structures and 
physiological systems. 
Penke and colleagues reject the pathogen defence hypothesis as part of their rejection of 
selective neutrality as the mechanism maintaining variability. The pathogen-defence 
mechanism requires that variability is adaptive with regards to the host’s resistance but 
that the normal range of the personality phenotypes are equally adaptive so that no 
selection pressures occur at this level. They argue that the latter is unlikely because of 
non-neutral relationships between personality and fitness although the evidence cited 
refers to the contemporary not ancestral environment. They also maintain that the 
occurrence of a high degree of non-additive genetic variance argues against the selective 
neutrality of a trait. The evidence on this point is mixed and the non-additive effects seem 
to vary across measures. Examination of MZ and DZ correlations from a twin study of 
personality disorder traits, for example, showed modest evidence of non-additivity: these 
effects were noted in 3 of 18 primary traits and 25 of 69 sub-traits. 
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The authors argue to the most plausible mechanism for maintaining genetic variation in 
personality traits is balancing selection. It is difficult to refute their arguments on the 
significance of this process. It is useful to note, however, that not all psychological 
mechanisms or structures are necessarily adaptations. Given the complexity of personality 
and the many different structures and processes involved, this may not be a one 
mechanism fits all situation. 
Although an evolutionary model of personality would potentially shed light on the origins 
and function of personality structures and processes, it is not clear that the level of 
analysis adopted by the authors is optimal for this purpose. Like other accounts of the 
evolution of personality (Buss, 1991, 1997; Figueredo et al., 2005) discussion focuses on 
the higher-order domains of the five-factor model. However, these domains may be too 
broad to serve as the basis for formulating hypotheses about the adaptive origins of 
personality. Although innate mechanisms are complex in design, they are usually specific 
in function with the different components functioning in an integrated way. Evolutionary 
psychologists argue that the mental apparatus comprises a relatively large number of 
these domain specific mechanisms (Simpson, Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2005). It is 
not clear that the secondary domains of the five-factor model have this specificity. Instead, 
each domain is complex not just in the sense that any psychological adaptation such as 
mate selection is complex, but also in the sense that they are multidimensional, each 
consisting of multiple functionally diverse behaviours and potential adaptive mechanisms. 
Neuroticism, for example, encompasses anxiety and stress management, dependency 
and submissiveness, impulsivity and impulse control, and so on. 
A more suitable level of analysis would be the primary traits (or facet traits) that form the 
secondary domains. As the authors note, behavioural genetic research reveals that many 
primary traits are etiologically distinct entities, each being associated with substantial 
genetic variance specific to that trait (Jang et al., 1998; Livesley et al., 1998). The genetic 
architecture to personality appears to be complex and highly specific and primary traits 
appear to be the fundamental building blocks. These studies also furnish evidence of 
substantial pleiotropic influences raising the possibility that secondary domains like 
neuroticism are merely the downstream consequences of pleiotropy. Under these 
circumstances the search for adaptive mechanisms associated with personality traits and 
analyses of reaction ranges and “personality signatures” are likely to be more productive if 
focused on more specific constructs. 
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Personality Theory Evolves: 
Breeding Genetics and Cognitive 
Science 
Gerald Matthews 
Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, USA 
matthegd@email.uc.edu 
Abstract 
Penke et al.’s (this issue) article makes an important contribution to personality theory, 
with ramifications beyond genetic studies. It may significantly enhance prediction of 
behavioral expressions of personality traits from a psychobiological standpoint. Some 
theoretical challenges remain, including the complex nature of both traits and 
environmental modulators. The evolutionary genetic model may usefully complement the 
cognitive-adaptive personality theory developed by Matthews. 
This is an important article that should be read by the whole community of personality 
psychologists, and not just geneticists. Penke et al. (this issue) offer innovative strategies 
for linking genetic models directly to behavioral expressions of traits. In this commentary, I 
will focus on the strengths of the authors’ approach, some challenging issues, and its 
convergence with my own cognitive-adaptive model of personality, a theory based on 
cognitive science rather than genetics (Matthews, in press). 
The foundation for contemporary personality trait theory is the evidence that traits predict 
consequential outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). Complementary evidence comes 
from controlled laboratory studies on the behavioral expressions of traits (Matthews, Deary 
& Whiteman, 2003). To date, psychobiological models have proved frustratingly limited in 
their abilities to predict individual differences in behavior to any degree of precision 
(Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). Much remains to be done to develop the Penke et al. model 
to the point that it makes detailed predictions of behavior. However, it may be uniquely 
promising for the following reasons: 
Focus on individual differences. Penke et al. rightly indicate both the neglect of systematic 
individual differences in personality within current evolutionary psychology, and the 
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limitations of traditional behavior genetic studies. It is encouraging that genetic models 
have advanced to the point that differing evolutionary explanations for personality variation 
can be tested against empirical data – this approach has legs. 
Solving the isomorphism problem. Zuckerman (1991) pointed out that traits do not map 
isomorphically onto individual brain systems; instead, traits appears as higher-order 
emergent properties of multiple systems. The ‘watershed’ metaphor offers a principled 
account of why this should be so. 
Traits as biosocial constructs. Penke et al. correctly emphasize individual differences in 
social problem-solving strategies as a key basis for traits. Handling social threats provides 
adaptive challenges that are much different to those of the spiders, snakes and saber-
tooth tigers that provide the prototypical threats in many psychobiological accounts of 
anxiety (Matthews, 2004). The complexities of handling the subtle challenges of social 
competition – often in parallel with cooperation, as in sibling rivalry – require more 
attention. 
The evolutionary genetic model has much promise, but there are some potential obstacles 
to further development of the theory. 
Imaging over-enthusiasm. The identification of narrowly defined ‘endophenotypes’ 
potentially provides the essential link between polymorphisms and specific, measurable 
behaviors. However, linking specific polymorphisms to individual differences in brain 
activation patterns is of limited explanatory power; most studies fail to demonstrate any 
functional significance to brain activation. Coupled with the somewhat elusive nature of the 
molecular genetics of personality (e.g., Munafo et al., 2003), modern brain-imaging studies 
may recapitulate the limitations of traditional psychophysiology as a means for identifying 
mediating mechanisms that directly govern behavior (see Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). 
Brain-imaging is invaluable for discriminating component processes, but behavioral studies 
are requisite for tracing the adaptive implications, if any, of the process concerned. 
The perennial problem of the environment. Making something of the ‘individual reaction 
norm’ concept requires specification of the environmental factors that control gene 
expression. Interactionism is the dominant framework for contemporary personality 
research, but there is a consensus on the difficulties of coding the key environmental 
modulators of personality. I appreciate the argument is illustrative, but the authors’ 
example of ‘environmental stress’ is a case in point. There are multitude of environmental 
stressors that provoke a variety of behavioral responses which are often moderated by 
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cognitions and context (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000). Interaction of 
anxiety and stress factors depends critically on the person’s appraisals of the stressor, 
blurring the necessary distinction between the individual and the environment. 
The distributed nature of personality. The problem in equating traits with individual reaction 
norms is that the major traits pervade so many distinct adaptive processes. Neuroticism 
can be readily related to selective attention, executive processing, metacognition, emotion 
expression, compensatory effort, as well as to simple emotionality (e.g., Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, in press). We can generate (possibly large) sets of reaction 
norms to describe the trait, but the coherence and unity of the trait may be lost in the 
process. However – similar to Mischel’s behavioral signatures – empirical investigation of 
reaction norms may be a useful descriptive strategy. 
Genetics and the cognitive-adaptive theory of personality. I was struck by the authors’ 
identification of balancing-selection mechanisms as pivotal for understanding personality. 
Their analysis converges closely with the cognitive-adaptive theory of personality 
(Matthews, 1999, 2000, in press; Matthews & Zeidner, 2004). In brief, the theory proposes 
that traits correspond to adaptive specializations to some of the more marginal 
environments that are universal to human societies; e.g., extraversion corresponds to 
social overload, introversion to underload. Each person (consciously or not) must develop 
a strategy for handling social threat. High neurotic persons favor anticipation (requiring 
worry) and avoidance, whereas low neurotics delay response until the threat may be more 
directly confronted. 
Similar to Penke et al.’s model, cognitive-adaptive theory assumes traits confer adaptive 
gains and costs within specific environments, but are adaptively neutral overall. Cognitive-
adaptive theory also states that traits are built on a platform of genetically-influenced basic 
components of the neural and cognitive architectures, which is modified developmentally 
by sociocultural learning and autonomous, self-directed shaping of personality. Penke et 
al.’s theory may add powerfully to understanding the role of genetic antecedents. 
Conversely, cognitive-adaptive theory may help to tackle some of the issues facing the 
evolutionary genetic model. The theory places acquired skills at the forefront of adaptation 
(cf., Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson 2006); skill acquisition is biased but not directly 
determined by heritable component processes (corresponding to endophenotypes). The 
theory also explicitly conceptualizes traits as distributed across multiple mechanisms and 
processes, understood at different levels of abstraction from neural processes (cf., the 
classical theory of cognitive science: Matthews, 2000). The trait gains unity not from any 
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specific process but from the common functionality of multiple processes in supporting a 
specific adaptive strategy. It is critical to explore trait consequences across a range of 
environments to determine its adaptive significance; perhaps evolutionary personality 
theory needs a little less Mendel and a little more Darwin. 
Do We Know Enough to Infer the 
Evolutionary Origins of Individual 
Differences? 
Robert R. McCrae 
Gerontology Research Center, National Institute on Aging, USA 
mccraej@grc.nih.nih.gov 
Abstract 
Psychologists do not yet understand the role of non-additive genetic influences on 
personality traits or the number of QTLs for individual traits. Traits vary in their desirability 
in mates and in their assortative mating. Thus, it is premature to conclude that individual 
differences in all or any personality traits have evolved by balancing selection. 
From my sporadic reading of the literature on the evolutionary psychology of personality 
traits, the target article appears to represent a notable advance in sophistication. It 
incorporates new thinking on a number of evolutionary principles and makes an effort to 
compare rival hypotheses about the origins of individual differences using quantitative 
estimates of relevant parameters (such as the number of new mutations per individual). I 
was struck, however, by the frank admission that one of the classical inferences about the 
relation between fitness and additive genetic variance had been wrong, and the error 
remained "unnoticed for half a century". There is a moral here, I think: These issues are 
extremely complex, and it is likely to be some time before we can be fully confident that we 
understand what is really going on. 
The article compares three models of the origins of individual differences, and attempts to 
rule out two of them—selective neutrality and mutation-selection balance—with regard to 
personality traits. I will focus on the mutation-selection balance principle, which the authors 
believe is applicable to intelligence, but not to personality traits. If we assume that their 
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reasoning is correct, then the conclusion hinges on the factual accuracy of the claims that 
personality traits fail to show "high additive genetic variation, an elusive molecular genetic 
basis, condition-dependence, inbreeding and outbreeding effects, strong mate 
preferences, and assortative mating". These are empirical assertions, and several of them 
are questionable. 
In behavior genetic studies, it is customary to compare models that include additive and 
non-additive genetic effects and shared and non-shared environmental effects. There is 
consistent evidence that shared environmental effects are negligible, but a good deal of 
variation in whether non-additive variance is included in the chosen model. For example, 
twin studies of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) 
in Canada and Japan concluded that all factors and facets could be suitably described by 
an additive model (Yamagata et al., 2006). In contrast, Keller, Coventry, Heath, and Martin 
(2005), using a twin-plus-sibling design, argued that non-additive effects were pervasive in 
personality measures. Additional evidence for non-additive effects comes from a study of 
extended family members in Sardinia (Pilia et al., 2006). In that study, broad heritabilities 
(which include non-additive effects) were much closer in magnitude to the heritabilities 
seen in twin studies than were narrow heritabilities (additive effects only). As Keller and 
colleagues point out, the accurate estimation of non-additive effects is difficult, because 
additive and non-additive effects are strongly inversely related, introducing problems akin 
to multicolinearity in regression. The data seem to show that there are non-additive effects 
for some personality traits, but whether the additive effects should be characterized as 
"large" or "medium" (see Table 1 in the target article) is unclear. 
No one who has followed the field would dispute that, to date, the molecular genetic basis 
of traits has been elusive. After a promising start (Benjamin et al., 1996), attempts to link 
the D4 domapine receptor gene to personality stalled in a series of failures to replicate 
(Gebhardt et al., 2000; Vandenbergh, Zonderman, Wang, Uhl, & Costa, 1997). Meta-
analyses of the literature on the 5HTTLPR seretonin transporter gene polymorphism 
(Schinka, Busch, & Robichaux-Keene, 2004) have reached only ambiguous conclusions, 
with some but not all measures of Neuroticism showing associations. 
These studies examined candidate genes, and what may have eluded researchers was 
perhaps only the right candidates. A more comprehensive approach seeks replicable 
findings from a whole genome scan; such studies are currently underway (e.g., Costa et 
al., in press), but have not yet reported findings. It thus remains to be seen whether the 
number of quantitative trait loci (QTLs) for personality traits is large or small. 
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Are there strong mate preferences for personality traits? Buss and Barnes (1986) gave 
respondents a list of 76 characteristics they sought in a mate, including kind, intelligent, 
church-goer, good cook, likes children, wealthy, and healthy. Personality traits like 
considerate, honest, interesting to talk to, and affectionate were among the top ten 
desiderata; early riser, tall, and wealthy were not considered desirable. It is, of course, 
possible that people's true preferences differ from what they claim: It is socially 
undesirable to admit to seeking wealth in a mate. Still, the available evidence suggests 
that people put a high value on personality traits. 
Assortative mating is more complex than the authors appear to realize. There is a 
widespread perception that assortment for personality traits is negligible (about .10) 
whereas that for intelligence is notably higher (about .40; see Plomin, 1999). Most studies 
have involved Extraversion and Neuroticism, and the .10 value is reasonable for those 
factors. But higher values (.20-.30) have been reported for Openness and 
Conscientiousness (McCrae, 1996), and much higher values for traits related to 
liberalism/conservatism, which is a facet of Openness. One might argue that assortment 
for liberal attitudes proceeds from social causes that have little to do with evolutionary 
processes. But one might make that same argument for intelligence: Intelligent people 
may prefer intelligent mates, not because they are higher in fitness, but because they are 
more interesting to talk to. 
In sum, we do not seem to have sufficient information at present about personality traits to 
distinguish among the options of mutation-selection balance and balancing selection. Until 
we have such information, we ought to avoid the assumption that all personality traits 
share a single mechanism of evolutionary origin. Traits are all roughly equally heritable 
(e.g., Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998) but we have no way of 
knowing whether they all have similar numbers of QTLs, and we already know that they 
differ in assortative mating effects. For the time being, it may be wisest to consider 
evolution one facet at a time. 
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Abstract 
An evolutionary genetic approach to personality in animals and humans necessarily 
assumes a link between personality traits and fitness. Evolutionary personality 
psychologists have mainly focused on an a priori conception of this link to build up 
evolutionary scenarios. Although this approach has added to our understanding of the 
variance of personality traits, it needs to be accompanied by an empirical examination of 
the link between these traits and fitness. Several tools developed by evolutionary 
biologists could therefore be useful in evolutionary personality studies. 
Evolutionary ecologists have become interested in personality traits only very recently 
(Réale et al., 2007), and many felt that, despite a shared interest for similar traits, 
personality psychologists did not have much in common with them. Using fitness as the 
currency for their study traits, evolutionary ecologists have mainly been interested in the 
adaptive function of personality and the ecological role of personality variation. Personality 
psychologists, on the other hand, seemed to have focused mainly on the social desirability 
of personalities and the social implications of extreme expressions of personality traits. 
Penke et al.’s (this issue) thorough review suggests that an interesting convergence may 
be occurring between the two fields (see also Ellis, Jackson, & Boyce, 2006; Nettle, 2006). 
Such convergence will promote new ways of looking at personality traits for members of 
both fields, and should improve our understanding of heritable personality variation. 
This said, several points raised in this review may be subject to debate, while other 
aspects important for the evolutionary study of personality traits are missing. The authors 
are a bit too quick to reject the role of some factors on personality variation. For example, 
in a human metapopulation system (Harding & McVean, 2004) genetic drift probably plays 
a more important role than expected, whereas antagonistic pleiotropy is still one of the 
main explanations for the maintenance of variation in life-history traits (Roff, 2002). Neither 
of these explanations is totally incompatible with the hypothesis of fluctuating selection, 
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and both should be examined more thoroughly prior to being rejected. Rather than giving a 
detailed listing of such points, I will focus on one major aspect that I think deserves more 
attention: the link between fitness and personality traits is central to an evolutionary 
genetic approach to personality, but the way the authors propose to examine this link is 
somewhat vague. In many instances they mention potential relationships between 
personality or cognitive abilities and fitness, and the importance of the selection regime for 
the maintenance of genetic variance, but what do we really know about selection on 
personality? The study of phenotypic selection, an approach that permits us to examine 
how quantitative traits are shaped by natural or sexual selection, has experienced strong 
conceptual and methodological developments since the 80s (Lande & Arnold, 1983; 
Arnold & Wade, 1984; Endler, 1986; Brodie, Moore, & Janzen, 1995; Hersh & Philips, 
2004). However, these developments have been ignored by Penke and co-workers. 
Below, I show how they can help the development of evolutionary personality studies. 
The phenotypic selection study involves evaluating direct and indirect selection acting on 
traits during a single episode of selection. A directional selection differential (S) represents 
the change in the mean phenotypic value of a trait resulting from both direct and indirect 
selection pressures, and is measured as the covariance between the standardized trait 
and relative fitness. A directional selection gradient (β, i.e. partial regression coefficient in 
a multiple regression) reflects the change in the mean phenotypic value of a trait resulting 
from direct selection on this trait, while holding the effects of other traits constant (Lande & 
Arnold, 1983; Arnold & Wade, 1984). Quadratic terms and interactions between traits can 
be added to the model to estimate the strength of stabilising/disruptive selection acting on 
each trait, and correlational selection, respectively. These statistics can be combined with 
information on the genetic variance/covariance matrix (G) to predict the evolutionary 
response of the traits to selection. Penke et al. (this issue) assume that cognitive abilities 
are directly and invariably related to fitness, and that personality traits should be under 
weaker fluctuating selection. Their assumptions, however, are based on an a priori 
conception of how selection acts on these traits. Selection differentials and gradients are 
standardized statistics. They therefore permit us to compare the strength of selection 
between different traits or for the same trait between years, environmental conditions or 
populations (Kingsolver et al., 2001). Using this approach it is thus possible to determine 
whether personality and intelligence are under different selection regimes, or to test for the 
presence of fluctuating selection in space and time. The authors also discuss the 
possibility that variance in personality traits is maintained as a by-product of selection on 
other traits (see also Nettle, 2006), a hypothesis that can be tested with the phenotypic 
selection approach. 
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Phenotypic selection has rarely been used in personality studies in animals (but see Réale 
& Festa-Bianchet, 2003; Dingemanse & Réale, 2005). In humans a few studies have 
proposed an equivalent approach (Eaves, Martin, Heath, Hewitt, & Neale, 1990; Nettle, 
2005), but to my knowledge none have used the full potential of phenotypic selection 
analysis. Although, in principle, such approach could be applied to humans, its use may be 
limited by a few constraints that would need to be examined further. Firstly, the low power 
of selection studies requires large sample sizes to detect significant selection gradients 
within the range generally observed in wild populations (i.e. several hundred individuals: 
Hersch & Phillips, 2004; Kingsolver et al., 2004;). This is especially important if one is 
interested in detecting weak and invariant selection pressures. Sample size does not seem 
to be a constraint in studies on humans (e.g. Eaves et al., 1990; Nettle, 2005) and 
therefore should not be limiting. Secondly, estimates of individual fitness have to be 
chosen carefully. Penke et al. propose the f-factor, a general index of fitness, but never 
mentioned explicitly how to use this factor. Lifetime reproductive success is generally 
considered the most appropriate estimate of fitness, although related indices are available 
(Brommer, Gustafsson, Pietiaïnen, & Merilä, 2004; Coulson et al., 2006). Other fitness 
components, like survival, fecundity, or the number of sexual partners can be used, but 
should be considered with caution because they are potentially involved in evolutionary 
trade-offs (Roff, 2002). Although the use of such fitness components can be informative for 
someone interested in decomposing the links between personality and fitness, it can 
provide an incomplete portrait of selection acting on a trait. Evidence for selection on 
personality traits in humans using indices more remotely related to fitness should be 
evaluated with these potential drawbacks in mind. 
The evolutionary genetic approach proposed by Penke et al. will certainly provide new 
sources of inspiration for personality psychologists and evolutionary ecologists. This, and 
other recent papers (e.g. Ellis et al., 2006; Nettle, 2006), should generate testable 
predictions that could benefit from methods commonly used in evolutionary biology. We 
may therefore be witnessing the first steps towards a more integrated evolutionary study of 
personality in humans and animals. 
Acknowledgements 
DR is funded by a Discovery Grant from Natural Science and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada, by the Canada Research Chairs and by the Canadian Foundation for 
Innovation. Thanks to Carolyn Hall for her comments on a first draft. 
112 
Personality: Possible Effects of 
Inbreeding Depression on 
Sensation Seeking 
Irene Rebollo & Dorret I. Boomsma 
Department of Biological Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
i.rebollo@psy.vu.nl, Di.boomsma@psy.vu.nl 
Abstract 
Penke et al. (this issue) state that there are no studies of inbreeding depression on 
personality. In this response to their paper, we look at the effect of parents being born in 
the same geographical region on personality in themselves and in their offspring. Results 
show that when parents come from the same region, both they and their offspring score 
lower on sensation seeking than when parents come from different regions. These results 
may suggest effects of inbreeding depression on personality. 
Studies of inbreeding depression on intelligence (Jensen, 1998) show evidence for 
inbreeding depression, but - as stated by Penke et al. (this issue) -  there are no studies of 
inbreeding depression on personality. However, Camperio Ciani, Capiluppi, Veronese, and 
Sartori (2007) reported an interesting comparison of personality traits in Italian coast 
dwellers and Italians from 3 small island groups. Subjects whose families had lived on the 
islands for at least 20 generations were lower in extraversion and openness to experience. 
Penke et al. discuss this finding in the context of “environmental niches” for personality 
traits, but an alternative explanation might also be possible: the islanders might form a 
genetically more related group (a genetic isolate) whose offspring shows an effect of 
inbreeding depression. 
To test this hypothesis in an alternative dataset, we took personality data collected in 
Dutch families consisting of parents and their twin offspring. The families take part in 
longitudinal survey studies. In 1991 and in 1993 the parents were asked if they had been 
born in the same geographical region (anwers “yes”, “no” and “don’t know”). We formed 2 
groups of families: those whose parents were born in the same geographical region and 
those whose parents were born in different regions. Please note that same or different 
region can be a rural or non-rural part of The Netherlands, the question was only about 
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proximity. We then examined if there were personality differences between the two groups. 
Personality scores were compared between the two groups in the parental and in the 
offspring generation. We looked at personality traits related to neuroticism, extraversion, 
and sensation seeking. We hypothesize that if parents were born in the same geographical 
region, they may genetically be more related than when they come from different areas of 
the country, and use this test as an indirect way of looking at inbreeding depression (or its 
opposite “hybrid vigor”). 
Participants. This study is part of an ongoing study on personality, health and lifestyle in 
twin families registered with the Netherlands Twin Register (NTR; Boomsma et al., 2006). 
Surveys were mailed to twin families every two to three years. For the present study data 
from the 1991 and 1993 surveys were used. In total, there were 2905 families. There were 
1940 families who took part once (in 1991 or 1993) and 965 who took part at both 
occasions. Average age of the parents was 46.67 years in 1991 and 47.04 in 1993; 
average age of their offspring was 17.73 years in 1991 and 20.18 in 1993. 
Measures. In both surveys parents of the twins were asked if they had been born in the 
same region. Data from the two surveys were combined into one yes/no measure. The 
following 10 personality measures were analyzed: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Somatic 
Anxiety and Test Attitude (ABV; Wilde, 1970); Thrill And Adventure Seeking, Boredom 
Susceptibility, Disinhibition and Experience Seeking (Feij & Van Zuilen, 1984; Zuckerman, 
1971); trait anger and anxiety were measured using the Dutch adaptation of Spielberger’s 
State-trait Anger Scale (STAS; Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983; van der 
Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1982) and State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Personality measures were averaged over occasions if 
subjects participated more than once. 
Data analyses. We first looked at personality differences between parents being born in 
the same geographical region and parents being born in different geographical regions, 
separately for fathers and mothers. In the offspring generation, the same comparisons 
were carried out separately for first and second born twins to avoid dependency of 
observations. Data analyses were carried out with SPSS. We employed MANOVA to study 
group differences. The use of MANOVA prevents the inflation of overall type I error that 
derives from the use of multiple univariate tests on a group of correlated variables. In the 
offspring generation sex was introduced as a covariate. 
Results. For fathers there was a significant effect of same region on two Sensation 
Seeking Scales, i.e. Boredom Susceptibility, Experience Seeking. In addition an effect was 
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seen for Test Attitude. For mothers, Experience Seeking and Test Attitude were also 
significantly different between groups. In mothers, a significant effect was also observed 
for Thrill And Adventure Seeking, which also is one of the Sensation Seeking Scales, and 
Somatic Anxiety (see Table 1). Subjects who were born in the same region as their spouse 
score higher in Test Attitude, which assesses the tendency to give socially desirable 
replies. Subjects who were born in the same region as their spouse score lower on 
Sensation Seeking Scales. Mothers who were born in the same region as their partner 
show lower Somatic Anxiety. The largest effect size was for Experience Seeking. 
- insert Table 1 here - 
In the offspring generation there was no effect on Test Attitude. However, Experience 
Seeking, Boredom Susceptibility, Thrill And Adventure Seeking and Somatic Anxiety also 
reached significance in first and second born twins. The direction of the differences was 
the same as in the parental generation (see Table 2). Experience Seeking again shows 
the largest effect size, and it is the trait that shows significant differences in both parents 
and both twins. 
- insert Table 2 here - 
The reappearance of personality differences between parents who were born in the same 
region and parents who were born in different regions in the offspring generation suggests 
the presence of inbreeding depression in personality. This is especially true for sensation 
seeking traits. These results agree with those of Camperio Ciani et al. (2007) who found 
that subjects whose families had lived on islands for at least 20 generations were lower in 
openness to experience. Alternative explanations are also possible, e.g. sensation seekers 
tend to move around more, and their children inherit their sensation seeking tendencies. 
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Abstract 
A consilient and complete evolutionary-based theory of personality must explain the 
adaptive mechanisms that maintain personality variance at four distinct “environmental” 
levels: (1) the environment of evolutionary adaptedness; (2) the environment as defined by 
a given local niche; (3) the ontogenetic environment; (4) the situational environment 
germane to the person-situation debate in personality theory. 
I recently completed a project with one of my graduate students (Richard Sejean) wherein 
we contrasted the decision-making styles of monozygotic and dizygotic twins and found 
that these possessed a genetic underpinning. The paper by Penke et al. (this issue) (PDM) 
is à propos as it provides us with a parsimonious set of evolutionary mechanisms capable 
of maintaining genetic variance in decision-making styles. I suppose that the next 
challenge is to identify the one-to-one “optimal” mapping between a given decision-making 
style and a particular environment that would yield such heterogeneity in cognitive 
proclivities. PDM recognize the importance of this point when they state, “The 
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challenge…is to identify the specific costs and benefits relevant to each personality trait 
across different environments.” Implicit in addressing this difficult problem is providing an 
operational definition of the term environment in the current context, a point to which I turn 
to next. 
One can speak of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness that is central to the 
adaptationist framework. Hence, universal sex differences in sensation seeking and/or risk 
taking can be construed as sex-specific adaptations shaped by sexual selection. 
Alternatively, one can talk about the environment in the sense of a local niche in which 
case personality traits that differ recurrently across populations can be interpreted as 
adaptations to idiosyncratic milieus (as per Camperio Ciani, Capiluppi, Veronese, & Sartori 
2007; see also Dall, Houston, & McNamara, 2004). The ontogenetic environment is yet a 
third type of environment that might shape one’s personality via an evolutionary-based 
mechanism. For example, Sulloway (1995, 1996) has proposed the Darwinian Niche 
Partitioning Hypothesis as a driver of one’s personality. Specifically, he argued that one’s 
birth order yields unique challenges for a given child in its quest to maximize the parental 
investment that it seeks to receive. Specifically, a child seeks to fill an unoccupied niche as 
a means of securing maximal parental investment. If a firstborn has already occupied the “I 
am the obedient good boy” niche then his younger male sibling must identify alternate 
niches to fill out. As one goes down the birth order the number of unfilled niches is fewer, 
which Sulloway argues drives laterborns’ higher scores on openness to experience. 
Alternatively, in wishing to maintain their privileged position within the sibship, firstborns 
are much more likely to score high on conscientiousness. Finally, a fourth type of 
environment is the immediate situational one that is central to the person-situation debate 
in personality research. In this case, one can talk about the malleability of one’s 
personality as a function of situational demands. Personality traits such as self-monitoring 
or Machiavellianism might be particularly relevant here as they both recognize an 
individual’s ability to adapt to the situation at hand. The malleable nature of one’s 
personality is akin to the inherent plasticity of our immune system. Specifically, the 
immune system has evolved the species-level adaptation of being adaptable to 
idiosyncratic challenges faced by any given organism. This is necessary in order for the 
immune system to maintain a maximal number of degrees of freedom in its ability to mount 
defenses against as of yet unforeseen and unknowable attacks. Malleable personality 
traits in a sense are similar in that they recognize that the social environment is the source 
of a wide range of environmental challenges and as such must allow for situational 
plasticity. Wilson, Near, and Miller (1996) applied this exact principle in exploring 
Machiavellianism from an evolutionary perspective as did Saad (2007, chapter 2). Recent 
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papers by MacDonald (2005) and Michalski and Shackelford (in press) discuss related 
multi-level taxonomies for understanding the evolutionary forces that can maintain 
individual variations in personality (see also Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001, for an evolutionary-
based behavioral genetic account of personality). 
An evolutionary account of personality must explain G x E interactions across all of the 
relevant multi-layered levels of analyses. This is easier said than done as most scholars 
including evolutionists oftentimes create rigid binary categories in defining their research 
approaches, which can lead to epistemological myopia (e.g., adaptationist versus 
behavioral ecological approaches; domain-specific versus domain-general view of the 
human mind; human universals versus individual differences). Although most evolutionists 
recognize the complementarity of these approaches (cf. Laland & Brown, 2002), they 
seldom conduct research across multiple levels of analyses. This is precisely where I 
believe the paper by PDM is most insightful namely it posits distinct forms of balancing 
selection that “target” several layers of a Darwinian meta-theory of personality. For 
example, PDM propose that sexually antagonistic co-evolution might be a viable 
mechanism by which sex differences in personality are maintained whilst arguing that 
environmental heterogeneity and frequency-dependent selection are likely mechanisms for 
explaining cross-cultural differences in personality types. This ability to map various 
sources of personality variance to specific evolutionary mechanisms (at the genetic level) 
is a necessity if we are to create a truly consilient evolutionary-based theory of personality. 
The “multi-layered” meanings of environment as described here are congruent with 
Universal Selection Theory (UST; cf. Cziko, 1995, 2000), which recognizes that 
evolutionary processes operate across a wide range of levels. For example, while most 
evolutionists study between-organism selection, UST recognizes that Darwinian processes 
operate within-organisms as well (e.g., Neural Darwinism as per Edelman, 1987; see also 
Hull, Langman, & Glenn, 2001, for a broad discussion of selection processes).  Finally, 
while I do not wish to rekindle here the individual versus group selection debate, there is 
evidence to suggest that for some group decision-making tasks, personality heterogeneity 
of the group members can at times yield superior outcomes (Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 
2000; Bradley & Hebert, 1997; Mohammed & Angell, 2003). Hence, an intriguing 
possibility might be that individual differences in personality are maintained in part 
because they yield superior group decisions and related outcomes (note that group 
decision-making is a common decisional context for a social species such as ours). 
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To conclude, one of the most challenging problems for evolutionary personality theorists 
will be to identify which form of adaptive process drives a given personality variance, a 
task tackled admirably by PDM. 
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Abstract 
Behavioral ecologists have recently begun emphasizing behavioral syndromes, an analog 
of personality. This new area offers several insights for the evolutionary genetics of human 
personality. In particular, it suggests that human personality research could benefit from 
emphasizing: the evolution of reaction norms, correlational selection, indirect genetic 
effects, G x E correlations, social situation and partner choice, and social networks. 
We study behavioral syndromes, an analog of animal personalities (Sih, Bell, & Johnson, 
2004; Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004). While many studies on animal personalities 
focus on the Big Five (Gosling, 2001), the emphasis for behavioral syndromes is typically 
on ecologically-important behavioral tendencies that have a long history of study by 
behavioral ecologists, e.g., boldness or aggressiveness. We ask if these behavioral 
tendencies carry over across contexts. If they do, we expect that sometimes, these 
carryovers might result in suboptimal behavior. For example, is an animal that is more 
aggressive than others in competitive contests also inappropriately aggressive with mates 
or offspring?  We also ask if different, but intuitively similar tendencies are positively 
correlated. Are individuals that are more bold with predators also more aggressive with 
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conspecifics?  Studies have shown that behavioral types (BTs) can be heritable (van Oers, 
de Jong, van Noordwijk, Kempenaers, & Drent, 2005), have neuroendocrine correlates 
(Koolhaas et al., 1999) and affect fitness (Dingemanse & Reale, 2005). Many fundamental 
questions, however, remain unanswered. Why do BTs (or personalities) exist?  If a 
tendency to be aggressive spills over to cause inappropriate aggressiveness in some 
contexts (psychopathologies?), why has this spillover not been eliminated by natural 
selection?  What explains the structure of the BS?  Why are boldness and aggressiveness 
sometimes, but not always correlated?  When and why are BTs and BS stable over time? 
Answering the above questions requires a better understanding of the evolutionary 
genetics of behavioral syndromes. We were thus quite excited to read Penke et al.’s (this 
issue) comprehensive review of the evolutionary genetics of human personalities. We 
applaud, in particular, the authors’ enthusiasm for adopting a G x E, reaction norm view on 
the genetics of personality. Our commentary will focus on areas of excitement in the study 
of behavioral syndromes that might also prove insightful for building an integrative, 
evolutionary theory of personality for humans and other animals. 
The first challenge is to find a suitable model that can explain the maintenance of genetic 
variation in personality. Most of the models considered by the authors examine the 
maintenance of genetic variation in non-plastic traits. Behavior, however, is by definition, 
plastic, in that it involves a response to the environment. The most appropriate models 
should thus be models which consider the maintenance of genetic variation in reaction 
norms. While the second half of the paper by Penke et al. champions the importance of 
the reaction norm view, surprisingly, those insights were not applied to the first half of the 
paper, which reviewed models on the maintenance of genetic variation. 
The theoretical literature on the maintenance of genetic variation in reaction norms is small 
(but see de Jong & Gavrilets, 2000; Zhang 2005, 2006) but the few models suggest that 
plasticity can produce some counter-intuitive patterns. For example, in standard models of 
non-plastic traits, environmental variation and balancing selection tend to facilitate the 
maintenance of genetic variation (Turelli & Barton, 2004). In contrast, depending on 
specific scenarios modeled, with reaction norms, greater environmental variation can 
either increase or decrease the maintenance of genetic variation. The logic on why 
environmental variation can decrease genetic variation appears to be that with greater 
environmental variation, plastic genotypes are exposed to stronger overall selection across 
the range of environments. In any case, the study of both human personality and animal 
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behavioral syndromes could benefit from further development of models on the 
maintenance of genetic variation in reaction norms. 
Another evolutionary process that deserves attention here is correlational selection, where 
the fitness of one personality trait depends on how it is combined (correlated) with another 
behavioral trait. Unlike models that examine environmental heterogeneity and balancing 
selection which typically assume stabilizing selection with different optima in different 
environments, evolution via correlational selection is explicitly combinatorial. As the 
authors note, very high openness to experience combined with high IQ might result in 
exceptional creativity whereas very high openness combined with low IQ might be viewed 
as a schizotypic personality disorder. In stickleback fish, boldness and aggressiveness are 
positively correlated in high predation regimes, but uncorrelated in low predation regimes 
(Bell, 2005). Experimental exposure to actual predation showed that this correlation is 
generated by a combination of selection and behavioral plasticity (Bell & Sih, unpublished 
data). A greater emphasis on correlational selection should be crucial for both theoretical 
and empirical analyses of the evolution of personalities. 
Evolutionary theory can also contribute to human personality genetics by providing a 
theoretical framework for studying the genetics of social interactions. Social interactions 
introduce an exciting twist to evolutionary genetics, the possibility of important indirect 
genetic effects, IGEs (Wolf, Brodie, Cheverud, Moore, & Wade, 1998). IGEs occur when 
an individual’s phenotype (e.g., its aggressiveness) depends not just on its genotype but 
on its social environment (e.g., the aggressiveness of others). Since the behavior of other 
individuals has a genetic component, the social environment has a genetic component. 
This, in effect, decouples the standard genotype-phenotype relationship. The behavior of 
each individual depends not just on its own genotype, but on the genes of all interacting 
individuals in its social network. IGEs can have major impacts on evolutionary dynamics. 
To our knowledge, however, the effects of IGEs on the maintenance of genetic variation 
has not been quantified. 
Standard evolutionary models, models of IGEs and game models all start with the 
assumption that individuals experience available environments and the mix of genotypes 
in their social environment in proportion to their relative frequency. In fact, individuals often 
exercise situation choice – habitat choice, social situation choice, and partner choice. If 
different personalities have a genetic tendency to choose different situations, this produces 
a G x E correlation. In the context of partner choice, different personalities might occupy 
different positions in the social network (which could be quantified using social network 
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metrics). Unlike habitat choice, social situation and partner choice feature the fascinating 
complication that individuals cannot independently dictate their own social environment. 
Social structure and each individual’s social partners depend also on the interplay of 
choices by other individuals. Integrating this reality into evolutionary genetic models should 
also prove insightful. 
Using Newer Behavioural Genetic 
Models and Evolutionary 
Considerations to Elucidate 
Personality Dynamics 
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Abstract 
We expand on the theme of transactions between persons and situations, and genes and 
environments. Newer models for twin data can handle genotype-environment transaction 
effects explicitly, and such models can be used to better articulate the origins of variation 
in personality. 
Penke et al. (this issue) are to be commended on a deep and fascinating contribution to 
the personality literature. As Penke et al. note, newer techniques in modeling twin data 
offer ways of more explicitly articulating genotype-environment transactions. We agree 
with Penke et al. that these newer techniques are central to advancing inquiry in 
personality genetics, and that interpretation of findings generated by these models will be 
enhanced by evolutionary thinking. 
Traditionally, behavior genetic inquiry has focused on twins because twins are plentiful and 
studying them provides a way of cleanly separating the different impacts of genotypes and 
environments on human individual differences. In particular, behavior genetic studies of 
personality traditionally focused on dividing up the variation in personality traits into the 
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contributions of genetic (most often additive genetic, or A factors), shared or “common” 
environmental factors (C, those environments that make people the same because they 
grew up in the same family), and non-shared environmental factors (E, those 
environments that make people different in spite of growing up in the same family). Such 
research consistently finds that A is a substantial proportion of the total variance of a trait 
(often 40-50%), with the rest of the variation attributable to E (Krueger, Johnson, Plomin, & 
Caspi, in press). As Penke et al. note, these findings are no longer surprising to many, but 
they continue to be of central importance for at least two reasons. First, they clearly 
invalidate models of human individual differences that assume that people are “blank 
slates” – models that have been historically influential in academic psychology (e.g.,  
classical behaviorist accounts of personality). Second, these findings continue to confound 
both theoretical and empirical inquiry in personality psychology. If genes are so important 
to personality, why are specific genetic polymorphisms connected with personality so hard 
to find (Ebstein, 2006)? And if the non-shared environment (E) is so important to 
personality, what are the key environmental factors involved, and why have these also 
been so hard to identify (Turkheimer & Waldron, 2000)? 
We do not have easy answers to these tough questions, but we do believe that some key 
directions can be drawn out from Penke et al.’s thoughtful section on “practical implications 
for behavioural genetics”. As Penke et al. note in point no. 3, models for “genotype x 
environment interaction (GxE) and correlation (rGE)” have been developed recently, and 
they should be used more frequently. Characterizing these models in terms of GxE and rGE 
is fine as shorthand, but working with these models also leads us to believe that the 
concepts of GxE and rGE do not do justice to the transactional phenomena that can be 
articulated with newer approaches to modeling twin data. Recall that classical behavior 
genetic inquiry in personality consists of parsing the variance in personality into ACE 
effects. The newer models Penke et al. are citing (e.g.,  Purcell, 2002) continue to involve 
decomposing a variable of interest (a target variable) into ACE effects, but these effects 
can now be expressed as contingent on the level of another variable (a moderator 
variable). Hence, in these models, a moderator variable with its own ACE effects 
moderates the ACE effects on a target variable. The resulting problem with the language 
of GxE and rGE is that both the moderator and target variables have ACE components – 
neither variable is purely “genetic” nor purely “environmental”. It is not just that purely 
genetic factors interact and correlate with purely environmental factors (GxE and rGE). 
Rather, both genetic and environmental effects on both target and moderator variables 
transact continuously. We will use some findings from our own research to illustrate this 
point. 
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Krueger, South, Johnson and Iacono (submitted) examined genetic and environmental 
(ACE) influences on the broad personality traits of Negative Emotionality, Positive 
Emotionality, and Constraint in adolescents (the “Big Three”traits, higher in the trait 
hierarchy than the Big Five traits focused on by Penke et al., this issue; Markon, Krueger, 
& Watson, 2005). Specifically, Krueger et al. (submitted) examined how ACE effects on 
those traits varied vary as a function of aspects of the parent-adolescent relationship. Both 
positive (Parental Regard) and negative (Parental Conflict) aspects of the adolescent’s 
relationship with both parents were partly heritable (South, Krueger, Johnson, & Iacono, 
submitted), and both moderated the variance components of Positive and Negative 
Emotionality. 
Interestingly, at high levels of Conflict, the shared environment had a notable effect on the 
variance in adolescents’ personalities. Indeed, for adolescents with levels of Conflict two 
standard deviations greater than average, the variance in negative emotionality was as 
attributable to the shared environment (C) as it was to genetic factors (A). This finding fits 
well with Penke et al’s emphasis on how circumstances the organism encounters should 
affect the origins of personality variation in a dynamic fashion. It is tempting to frame this 
finding in the language of GxE: the “environment” of conflict with parents changes the 
“genetic” effect on negative emotionality. However, the finding does not fit neatly into the 
GxE framework because (a) the “environment” of conflict is partly heritable, driven in part 
by genetic characteristics of the adolescent (cf. Rowe, 1994) and (b) it is not just the 
genetics of negative emotionality that are affected; environmental contributions to negative 
emotionality also change as a function of conflict. 
While this type of transactional modeling is in its infancy, it has exciting applications in 
studying personality. An evolutionary theory of personality can guide this work by providing 
hypotheses about circumstances where gene-environment transactions are likely to occur. 
As Penke et al note, when socio-cultural relations are beyond normal boundaries, the 
organism needs to adapt to maximize fitness, so these may be circumstances where 
specific genetic and environmental effects are highlighted. Broadly speaking, evolutionary 
psychology can guide our thinking about when and where genes and environments matter, 
and should thereby be able to help us identify the effects of both specific genetic 
polymorphisms and environmental circumstances on behavior more reliably. 
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Neurogenetic Mechanisms 
Underlying Cognition and 
Temperament 
Alexander Strobel 
Department of Psychology, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, Germany 
alex.strobel@gmx.de 
Abstract 
This commentary discusses the target article’s sharp distinction between neurogenetic 
mechanisms underlying cognitive abilities and temperament. Evidence for associations of 
genetic polymorphisms with both temperament traits and cognitive control functions and 
for a shared or at least overlapping neuroanatomy and neuromodulation of cognitive 
control and of temperament traits may imply that we should consider the existence of 
cognitive reaction norms. 
 
Penke et al. (this issue) (PDM) must be applauded for their thoughtful and stimulating 
review of the evolutionary genetics of personality. Their model of the genetic, 
neurobiological, and environmental influences on cognitive ability and temperament traits 
provides a broader view on the factors underlying individual differences than many other 
contemporary models, and the theoretical and practical implications of their integrative 
approach for personality research go far beyond behaviour genetics. 
This commentary relates to PDM’s assertion that the distinction between cognitive abilities 
and temperament reflects different kinds of selection pressures that have shaped distinct 
genetic architectures underlying cognitive ability and temperament. Indeed, their model 
may explain why molecular genetic research has been less successful in discovering 
genetic variation underlying g, while some progress has been made in identifying 
molecular genetic influences on temperament traits. 
However, PDM’s sharp distinction between the neurogenetic mechanisms underlying 
cognitive abilities vs. those mediating temperament differences (see Fig. 3 of the target 
article) may be challenged if we apprehend cognitive abilities not only as to comprise 
abilities like reasoning, or verbal, numerical, and figural abilities, but as to also encompass 
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basic cognitive functions like cognitive control or working memory. Exemplary evidence for 
this view comes from a twin study by Posthuma, Mulder, Boomsma, and de Geus (2002), 
who observed a correlation between psychometric IQ, assessed with the WAIS-III, and 
cognitive control processes, assessed with the Eriksen Flanker task. Interestingly, this 
correlation was completely mediated by an underlying set of common genes. 
In recent years, numerous studies have reported molecular genetic influences on cognitive 
control or working memory. Intriguingly, accumulating evidence suggests that genetic 
variation impacting on cognitive functions is also associated with individual differences in 
temperament traits. In the following, I will shortly review two examples: 
1) Variation in the transcriptional control region of the gene encoding the brain-expressed 
isoform of the serotonin-synthesising enzyme tryptophan hydroxylase (TPH2), TPH2 G-
703T, which is associated with amygdala reactivity to emotional faces (Brown et al., 2005; 
Canli, Congdon, Gutknecht, Constable, & Lesch, 2005), was shown to be associated with 
the temperament trait Harm Avoidance, with individuals without the -703 T/T genotype 
exhibiting higher scores in Harm Avoidance (Reuter, Küpper, & Hennig, in press). In 
another study (Reuter, Ott, Vaitl, & Hennig, in press), this polymorphism was also 
associated with specific measures of executive control as assessed with the Attention 
Network Test (ANT, Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2001), with individuals 
without the T/T genotype showing enhanced executive control. Supportive evidence 
comes from an own study (Strobel et al., submitted), where individuals without the TPH2 -
703 T allele showed less reaction time variability and committed fewer errors than T allele 
carriers in a continuous performance task. 
2) A polymorphism in the gene encoding the catecholamine-metabolising enzyme 
catechol-O methyltransferase, COMT Val158Met, which results in reduced enzyme activity 
in the presence of the Met allele (Lachman et al., 1996), has been related to higher scores 
in Harm Avoidance (Enoch, Xu, Ferro, Harris, & Goldman, 2003) and Neuroticism (Eley et 
al., 2003). On the other hand, the Met variant has been associated with better 
performance in cognitive tests of prefrontal function including better working memory 
(Egan et al., 2001; Goldberg et al., 2003) and less perseverative errors in the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (Egan et al., 2001, Malhotra et al., 2002). 
Several further examples could be given for such pleiotropic effects, e.g. for 
polymorphisms in the genes encoding brain-derived neurotrophic factor or the serotonin 
transporter. It appears that this evidence provides examples for antagonistic pleiotropy, i.e. 
genetic polymorphisms have a positive effect on one trait and a negative effect on another. 
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However, as PDM convincingly argue, antagonistic pleiotropy tends to be evolutionary 
unstable. Rather, the mentioned findings may be viewed as examples for structural 
pleiotropy (at least in a broader sense), i.e. polymorphisms influence neurobiological 
mechanisms that are shared by different traits. Indeed, the brain circuitry assumed to be 
involved in cognitive control (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001) shows considerable overlap with 
structures suggested to modulate temperament traits (e.g. Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000). This brain circuitry comprises prefrontal cortex, amygdala, 
hippocampus, nucleus accumbens, thalamus, and other structures, with the information 
flow within this cortico-subcortico-thalamic network being crucially dependent on 
neuromodulatory influences exerted by dopamine (see Grace, 2000), but also, among 
others, serotonin (Robbins, 2005). Hence, genetic variation impacting on dopamine 
function (e.g. via variation in COMT enzyme activity) or serotonin function (e.g. via TPH2-
mediated variation in serotonin availability) is likely to influence a number of behaviours 
associated with the cortico-subcortico-thalamic circuitry, although neuromodulatory 
influences and the information flow within this network may differ from one situation (being 
confronted with emotional stimuli) to another (being challenged by demanding cognitive 
tasks). 
How, then, could the evidence for shared or at least overlapping neurogenetic 
mechanisms underlying both temperament and cognitive control be reconceiled with the 
model proposed by PDM? Perhaps, we might consider to assume a third category besides 
– or between – cognitive abilities as fitness components under mutation-selection and 
temperament traits as reaction norms with environment-contingent fitness consequences 
being under balancing selection. I would suggest this third category to comprise cognitive 
reaction norms. These cognitive reactions norms may also be under balancing selection, 
because cognitive control functions – albeit being cognitive in nature and being recruited 
when cognitive ability is challenged – are reaction norms in the sense that they are to 
some degree also situation- or environment-contingent: There are situations, or 
environments, where the ability to shield working memory representations against 
distracting information enhances fitness, and there are situations, or environments, where 
flexible updating of representations and rapid switching of goals or of the means to 
achieve them is more appropriate. 
It remains to be determined how exactly associations of genetic polymorphisms with 
cognitive functions and temperament are mediated by variation in the same vs. different 
brain functions. Nevertheless, the assumption of a category of behavioural differences 
located between and sharing genetic and/or (endo)phenotypic variance with cognitive 
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ability and temperament could help to resolve the ambiguous nature of temperament traits 
correlated with general intelligence. 
The Relevance of Personality 
Disorders for an Evolutionary 
Genetics of Personality 
Alfonso Troisi 
Department of Neurosciences, University of Rome, Italy 
alfonso.troisi@uniroma2.it 
Abstract 
The epidemiology of personality disorders confirms the importance of the evolutionary 
approach to a better understanding of individual differences in personality traits and adds 
credibility to the evolutionary genetic model. A full appreciation of the potential of the 
evolutionary genetic framework requires a critical revision of current measures of 
personality. 
 
Penke et al. (this issue) address the unsolved question of explaining persistent genetic 
variation in personality differences, examine data for and against three evolutionary 
genetic mechanisms (i.e., selective neutrality, mutation-selection balance, and balancing 
selection), and conclude that balancing selection by environmental heterogeneity seems 
best at explaining genetic variance in personality traits. The article focuses on personality 
differences in the normal range and limits the discussion of personality disorders to 
sketching some hypotheses that could explain their origin. However, a detailed 
examination of the epidemiology of personality disorders confirms the importance of the 
evolutionary approach to a better understanding of individual differences in personality 
traits and adds credibility to the evolutionary genetic model proposed by Penke et al. 
The National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) study has recently reported data on 
the prevalence and correlates of DSM-IV personality disorders in the general population of 
the United States (Lenzenweger, Lane, Loranger, & Kessler, 2007). Two unexpected 
findings were that personality disorder is a relatively common form of psychopathology 
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(point prevalence: 9.1%) and that a diagnosis of personality disorder not comorbid with 
Axis I syndromes has only modest effects on functional impairment. Taken together, these 
findings cast doubt on the traditional view of personality disorders as dysfunctional and 
maladaptive extremes of normal personality traits produced by rare genotypes and raise 
the question if these behavioral phenotypes have been adaptive in some environments or 
during some periods of human evolution. In other words, we cannot exclude that not only 
normal personality differences but also personality disorders are the product of a set of 
varying selection pressures favoring different phenotypes under different environmental 
conditions (Troisi, 2005). 
Epidemiological data on personality disorders also suggest that gender and age configure 
different socio-environmental niches. The DSM-IV general criteria for a diagnosis of 
personality disorder require that the “enduring pattern” (as defined in criteria A-C) be 
“stable and of long duration…” and “…onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or 
early adulthood” (criterion D). Such a definition reflects the traditional view of personality 
disorders as persistent, enduring, and stable patterns. However, available data suggest 
that some personality disorder diagnoses demonstrate only moderate stability and that 
they can show improvement over time. Cluster B personality disorders (antisocial, 
borderline, narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders) tend to become less evident or 
to remit with age (van Alphen, Engelen, Kuin, & Derksen, 2006). In particular, the behavior 
characteristics of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) first appear during adolescence 
and often disappear during the fifth decade, and all large-scale epidemiologic surveys of 
ASPD confirm that at least 80% of those meeting criteria are men. If ASPD is viewed as a 
risk-taking behavioral strategy, its improvement with age and higher prevalence among 
males fit with the pattern one would predict from a life-history theory perspective. 
Patterns in risk-taking are related to life-history variables, which include gender, age, 
marital and parental status, amount and predictability of resources, and rates and sources 
of mortality. Among patients with ASPD, ages 15-29 are those of most severe 
manifestation of the disordered personality traits, including impulsivity, aggressiveness, 
irresponsibility, and sensation-seeking. Among males in the general population, these are 
the years of highest risk for motorcycle accidents and arrest for assault. From a life-history 
theory perspective, the common explanation for these clinical and socio-demographic 
findings lies in the role of risk-taking in reproductive competition, which is typically more 
intense for young men than for women or older men. During the teens and young adult 
years, competition for social and economic resources is acute, and one’s fate in the mating 
market is being determined. For males at younger ages, the optimal strategy is to take 
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risks to acquire resources for immediate use in reproductive effort, especially when 
environmental characteristics are uncertain and unpredictable (Hill & Chow, 2002). 
In line with this argument, it is not surprising that personality disorders reflecting an 
internalizing dimension (i.e., mood and anxiety), such as for example dependent 
personality disorder, tend to be more prevalent among women (Torgersen, Kringlen, & 
Cramer, 2001). In contexts where infant survival would usually depend on the mother’s 
survival more than the father’s, women are expected to have been selected for a greater 
tendency than men for self-preservation (Campbell, 1999). 
Another crucial question addressed by Penke et al. is the validity of current measures for 
studying personality differences from the perspective of evolutionary genetics. The authors 
appropriately draw attention to the limits of self-report questionnaires, recommend 
changes based on the assessment of behavioral reactions to specific fitness-relevant 
situations, and argue for a wider use of the endophenotype approach. However, they 
seem satisfied with the Five Factor Model of personality and consider attachment styles as 
non-genetic personality traits. In effect, attachment research has generally presumed 
environmental mechanisms explaining individual differences in attachment security 
without, until recently, testing for possible genetic effects. However, in recent years, 
several behavioral genetic and molecular genetic studies have been conducted, and there 
is preliminary evidence for gene-by-environment interactions in the development of 
attachment styles. Recently, the first study combining molecular genetics with 
measurement of environmental influences (i.e., mothers’ unresolved loss/trauma or 
frightening behavior) on disorganized attachment has been conducted in children of 14-15 
months of age (Van IJzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2006). Results showed that the 
DRD4 polymorphism (short versus long) and the -521 C/T promoter gene were not 
associated with disorganized attachment. However, a moderating role of the DRD4 gene 
was found: Maternal unresolved loss or trauma was associated with infant disorganization, 
but only in the presence of the DRD4 7-repeat polymorphism. The increase in risk for 
disorganization in children with the 7-repeat allele exposed to maternal unresolved 
loss/trauma compared to children without these combined risks was 18.8 fold. The T.7 
haplotype showed a similar interaction effect: an elevated risk for infant disorganization in 
the case of maternal unresolved loss (odds ratio 3.24). 
If these preliminary data will be confirmed and expanded, attachment styles could be 
included among personality profiles amenable to an evolutionary genetic analysis. Such a 
possibility has been already suggested by Belsky (1999). In contrast with the traditional 
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perspective of clinical psychology that views insecure attachment patterns as reflecting 
some kind of personality pathology, Belsky has advanced the hypothesis that, in the 
ancestral environment, all the patterns of attachment were equally adaptive in terms of 
promoting reproductive fitness in the ecological niches that gave rise to them. According to 
his hypothesis, the main evolutionary function of early social experience was to prepare 
children for the social and physical environments they were likely to inhabit during their 
lifetimes. Thus, attachment patterns could represent evolved psychological mechanisms 
that used the quality of parental care received during childhood as a cue for optimizing 
adult reproductive strategies, as indicated by the strict association of each adult 
attachment style with different sexual and parental behaviors. 
The Need for Interdisciplinary 
Research in Personality Studies 
Kees van Oers 
Department of Animal Population Biology, Netherlands Institute of Ecology, The 
Netherlands 
k.vanoers@nioo.knaw.nl 
Abstract 
The target article demonstrates the value of evolutionary genetics for personality research. 
Apart from a summing-up of concepts, the authors validate their theory with evidence from 
studies on both human- and animal personality. In this commentary, I want to show the 
need for inter-disciplinary research to answer questions on personality in psychology and 
biology. 
The target article provides the reader with a very comprehensive review on how both 
traditional and modern evolutionary genetics may help us understand the maintenance of 
personality variation. The article gives us elaborate explanations of evolutionary genetical 
processes in combination with clear predictions for personality. Moreover, apart from a 
sum-up of concepts, the authors critically evaluate the theories of others, and validate their 
own with evidence from a wide range of studies. Where the authors were not able to 
confirm their argument with data from human personality research, they easily shifted to 
work on non-human animals. This clearly shows the importance of studies across 
disciplines. 
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Although a recent discovery of animal personalities was suggested in the target article, 
several animal psychologists had already started using methods from human personality 
research in the 1960s. Studies were mainly on primate species (see Buirski, Plutchik, & 
Kellerman, 1978). Yet, in spite of the obviousness of personality differences within many 
animal species (Wilson, Clark, Coleman, & Dearstyne, 1994; Gosling & John, 1999), very 
little work was carried out in evolutionary research because of the fear of being accused of 
anthropomorphism. And although the use of animals for studying personality is still 
controversial (Gosling & Vazire, 2002), animal models have now proven to be a useful tool 
for studying the underlying physiological and genetical mechanisms of personality (e.g. 
Koolhaas et al., 2001). These, mainly rodent studies, however were all on captive-bred 
populations and therefore give no insight into the evolutionary processes that shaped 
these traits (Merilä & Sheldon, 2001). 
Gradually the view changed that measured individual differences are only characterised by 
an adaptive mean flanked by non-adaptive variation, into the idea that variation in itself 
can also be maintained by natural selection (Wilson, 1998). Moreover, behavioural 
ecologists who usually studied one trait at a time now realized that traits do not evolve 
independently, but from an evolutionary compromise to optimize fitness over a range of 
traits. Therefore, more and more biological studies now try to integrate personality into 
evolutionary biology (Sih, Bell, & Johnson, 2004; Réale et al., in press). In contrast, 
psychologists are now trying to integrate evolutionary theory (e.g. Buss, 1991) and 
evolutionary genetics (presented in the target article) into the present knowledge on 
human personality. Evolutionary biology thereby has a long standing tradition in interest in 
fitness consequences, mostly directly measured by the response to selection on life history 
traits (Stearns, 1997). 
Two different approaches for studying trait evolution can thereby be recognised, 
phenotypic and genetic (Lessells, 1999). In a phenotypic approach questions about the 
adaptive value of a trait are asked and the genetic approach considers the effect of 
selection, but mainly how selection will affect gene frequencies (see e.g. Via & Lande, 
1985; De Jong & Van Noordwijk, 1992) and the genetic structure of traits (see e.g. Roff, 
1997). The authors show the value of the second approach for understanding evolutionary 
processes in humans and the similarity with animals. However, as the authors state: “the 
central question for an evolutionary personality psychology is: how do psychological 
differences relate to fitness (the f-factor in Miller, 2000c)”. Although in humans, personality 
has been shown to influence the success of an individual, by affecting social relationships, 
school- and career success, and health promotion and maintenance (e.g. Caspi, Roberts, 
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& Shiner, 2005), the phenotypic approach has still been neglected. What is lacking, are 
studies that link variation in individual success due to phenotypic variation in personality 
with life history characteristics; aiming to explain genetic changes over generations. Since 
the target article shows that similar selection profiles are present for humans and non-
human animals, similar approaches in measuring fitness should be feasible. Yet, only one 
study has looked at fitness aspects of human personality traits by comparing reproductive 
fitness among different groups (Eaves, Martin, Heath, & Hewitt, 1990). 
One example where direct measurements of selection pressures are needed is presented 
in the studies of Ciani and colleagues (Camperio Ciani, Capiluppi, Veronese, & Sartori, 
2007). Italian coast-dwellers were compared to people living on three small islands off the 
coast of Italy. Personality differences were studied and population differences were 
ascribed to genetic differences due to dissimilar fitness payoffs. However, populations may 
differ from each other because of many reasons (Roff, 1997). It is therefore even more 
likely that the differences are not caused by genetic change, but are due to e.g. differential 
dispersal patterns, founder effects and genetic drift. 
I am conscious of the difficulties in measuring selection in a direct way in studies on 
human personalities, although I believe that it is mainly disbelief that prevents us doing it. 
Twin studies could be immensely valuable in this, but they have some methodological 
limitations, especially since natural experiments do not permit full experimental control. 
Also the alternative approach suggested in the target article (the use of endophenotypes) 
may have a serious drawback: underlying mechanisms like hormonal mechanisms may on 
hand be used to assess personality differences, on the other hand they also present a 
context dependent expression of personality (see e.g. Carere & Van Oers, 2004). 
Animal studies could, however, be helpful in answering questions on selection pressures. 
They are able to measure the actual consequences of personality differences on life 
history characters such as reproduction and survival by manipulating the social and/or 
non-social environment. Animal studies may thereby profit from the substantial knowledge 
on personality development and the molecular genetic background of human studies. We 
need, however, to evaluate current methods how personality is measured, validate 
similarities between humans and non-human animal personalities and compare relevant 
selection processes. Promising starting points are a common molecular genetic basis 
(Ebstein et al., 1996), underlying physiological mechanisms. 
In conclusion, many proximate and ultimate factors underlying personality differences 
remain to be tested in both humans and non-human animals. The two distinct areas 
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(biology and psychology) have built up their own specific knowledge, but the target article 
shows that these findings can successfully be combined in building a shared theory. 
Interdisciplinary work combining these efforts in cooperative projects would thereby 
enhance this process and will allow us to measure micro-evolutionary processes that play 
a role in shaping personality variation in humans and other animals. 
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Abstract 
Most commentaries welcomed an evolutionary genetic approach to personality, but several 
raised concerns about our integrative model. In response, we clarify the scientific status of 
evolutionary genetic theory and explain the plausibility and value of our evolutionary genetic 
model of personality, despite some shortcomings with the currently available theories and 
data. We also have a closer look at mate choice for personality traits, point to promising 
ways to assess evolutionarily relevant environmental factors, and defend higher-order 
personality domains and the g factor as the best units for evolutionary genetic analyses. 
Finally, we discuss which extensions of and alternatives to our model appear most fruitful, 
and end with a call for more interdisciplinary personality research grounded in evolutionary 
theory. 
 
We were gratefully impressed to learn that our target article received 22 commentaries, 
coming from disciplines as diverse as traditional personality psychology (Funder; Matthews; 
McCrae), molecular behaviour genetics (Bates; Lee; Strobel), quantitative behaviour 
genetics (Jang; Johnson; Livesley; South & Krueger; Rebollo & Boomsma), 
evolutionary behavioural ecology (Dingemanse; Réale; Sih & Bell; van Oers) and 
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evolutionary psychology (Campbell; Euler; Figueredo & Gladden; Gangestad; Keller; 
Saad; Troisi). This shows the scientific community’s high level of interest in understanding 
heritable personality differences within an evolutionary framework. The volume of 
commentary is also a testament to the interdisciplinary challenge such an endeavour entails. 
We would like to thank all commentators for their thoughtful remarks and constructive 
criticism. 
The overarching goal of our article was to provide a theoretical introduction to 
evolutionary genetics for personality psychologists. Therefore, we found it especially pleasing 
that most commentators appeared open to an evolutionary genetic approach to personality, 
or even applauded it. We take this as an affirmation that our most central message – that 
personality psychology can benefit from an evolutionary approach grounded in evolutionary 
genetics – is already widely acceptable, if not fully accepted. 
Our second major goal was to try to infer the mechanisms that maintain genetic variation 
in personality differences, given the predictions from different evolutionary genetic models, 
and the phenotypic and genetic evidence available from personality psychology. Most 
commentaries focused on specific assumptions, conclusions, or details of our resulting 
evolutionary genetic model of personality. As Keller states, such healthy discussion is crucial 
in strengthening the relatively young scientific movement of evolutionary behavioural 
genetics. Of course, our evolutionary model of personality is only one possible reading of the 
current state of evolutionary genetic theory and the empirical research on human personality. 
It should be regarded as an initial working model that should be challenged, refined, and 
extended. 
In this response to commentaries, we will first reply to objections to the theoretical 
reasoning and use of empirical evidence in our target article, and then discuss more general 
issues – the optimal levels at which we should study the evolutionary genetics of personality, 
how our model should be extended in the future, and which alternatives could be explored 
further. Because so many researchers from diverse backgrounds made comments that were 
often quite specific, space limitations did not permit us to reply in detail to every point. 
However, we tried to address the key recurring themes in this rejoinder, and hope that such 
debate leads multidisciplinary research on the evolutionary genetics of personality to flourish 
in the future. 
Evolutionary genetics as a theoretical framework for personality psychology 
Funder and McCrae applauded our approach as being a healthy departure from the 
early days of “evolutionary” accounts of personality that could not be refuted by empirical 
evidence. In contrast, Bates criticized our attempt as using “armchair” evolutionary theorizing 
instead of hard empirical “field work” to settle the evolutionary history of traits. We think this 
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“data-first” bias, shared by Bates and many other personality researchers, is an 
understandable reaction to the peculiar history of personality psychology, but is now 
inhibiting progressive research. Before the trait approach integrated factor-analytic, cross-
cultural, and behaviour genetic studies of personality structure, personality psychology was a 
mess – a hodgepodge of Freud, Rogers, Maslow, and other “classic figures” who were long 
on theory and short on data. Frustration with this history (in which theory has more often 
retarded research than advanced it) has inoculated many personality psychologists against 
anything that sounds like theory. Here, we simply point out that evolutionary genetic theory 
has quite a different status than Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, or any other traditional 
“personality theory”. Evolutionary genetic theory is the dominant formal way that biologists 
use to think about the effects of selection, mutation, drift, and migration on the genetic 
structures of traits and populations. It is the mathematical heart of biology, and is rooted in 
140 years of progressive research. Well-established evolutionary genetic theories do not 
share the same limitations of traditional “personality theories”. In any case, we repeatedly 
descended from theory’s armchair to compare evolutionary genetic predictions against the 
current state of empirical knowledge on human personality differences. 
Can we already tell something useful about the evolutionary genetics of personality? 
To infer evolutionary histories and selective regimes from personality data is indeed a big 
step, dependent on the quality of both available data and theoretical models. McCrae asks if 
we really know enough to take this step, and Keller reminds us to be careful and critical 
before claiming firm conclusions. Evolutionary genetics, while well-established and intimately 
intertwined with quantitative genetics in evolutionary biology (Gangestad), is a rather new 
area for most psychologists and behaviour geneticists, who have only just begun to 
recognize its potential. We would hate to derail such a development through premature 
conclusions. It is also true that most theoretical models still provide at best ordinal predictions 
about trait characteristics for realistic evolutionary conditions (Euler), and that the relevant 
empirical data are still incomplete, though maybe not as indecisive as suggested by Bates, 
McCrae, and Keller (a point to which we will return below). Therefore, the model we 
proposed is not the only possible one, and it should not be understood as conclusive (see p. 
31). However, as the Table 1 in our target article shows, even though the theoretical 
predictions for individual characteristics of traits shaped by certain evolutionary mechanisms 
are sometimes vague, the pattern of predictions that emerges across various characteristics 
clearly discriminates between them. Similarly, even though the quality of available empirical 
evidence for the individual characteristics varies widely, it was the overall pattern of data that 
struck us and led us to propose the model that general intelligence is under mutation-
selection balance, whereas personality traits are under balancing selection. 
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Before we discuss how decisive the different predictions and lines of evidence really are, 
we would like to address the usefulness of an “inconclusive” evolutionary genetic personality 
model. After all, Keller called for an exceptionally high standard of evidence at the current 
stage. We agree that it is likely too early to draw a conclusive model, but we see the merits of 
proposing a sufficiently plausible model to help generate new hypotheses, guide empirical 
research, and inform theories about personality in general (see Funder and Matthews). The 
important point is that a plausible model should be explicitly labelled as such and should not 
blind researchers to alternatives. Nor should it constrain empirical endeavours, which could 
lead to scientific myopia. Contrary to Bates’ reading of our target article, we did not call for a 
theory-driven moratorium on any particular kind of research, even including molecular 
genetic studies on the genetic bases of general intelligence (g). Instead, we explicitly stated 
that such studies should be done to test the predictions of our model, though they might 
benefit from being more theoretically informed. 
Can we already make inferences from genetic architectures? 
Keller questioned our use of genetic architecture information to infer mechanisms of 
genetic variance maintenance. This criticism has a theoretical and an empirical aspect that 
are somewhat mixed up in his commentary. On theoretical grounds, we have to agree with 
Keller and also with Figueredo & Gladden that it is hard at the moment to discriminate 
between mutation-selection balance and balancing selection based on the relative 
contribution of non-additive genetic variance (VNA) to the total genetic variance of a trait (i.e., 
the coefficient Dα). We acknowledged the inconclusiveness of the current literature on page 
12, but were less explicit about it later on (especially in Table 1, where we simply stated the 
prediction we regard as most likely). As Keller rightly stated, the prediction that the 
proportion of VNA will be medium for traits under mutation-selection balance and large for 
traits under balancing selection might be considered as the weakest in Table 1. 
However, we do not follow Keller’s sudden dismissal of the prediction that VNA will be 
higher in traits under selection (including mutation-selection balance and balancing selection) 
than in neutral traits. The argument here is that selection tends to deplete additive genetic 
variance (VA), while VNA is largely robust against selection. (On a side note, Lee is right that 
this is an extrapolation from Fisher’s fundamental theorem, but a widespread one that is 
correct under many conditions, e.g. Roff, 1997.) Nor does Keller provide a theoretical 
counter-argument. Instead, he points to the rather independent issue of empirical difficulties 
with the establishment of VNA estimates, a topic on which we totally agree. In humans, most 
inferences about genetic architectures come from twin studies (e.g. Livesley), where the 
traditional design confounds VA and VNA, and VNA can only be estimated when shared 
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environmental influences are neglected. In line with Keller and Coventry (2005), we think that 
studies with large extended twin-family designs would provide the best solution. 
Furthermore, Keller noted that the unknown scale properties of most personality 
questionnaires and ability tests render rather uncertain even the existing estimates of genetic 
variance components from more powerful designs. As support, he cited a recent study by 
Lykken (2006) in which a scale transformation eliminated the VNA component of skin 
conductance level, a psychophysiological measure of arousal. However, Lykken (2006) 
argues that this correction actually served as a statistical control for all kinds of confounding 
factors beyond arousal that influence skin conductance (e.g. individual differences in the 
density and reactivity of sweat glands). In such cases where the scale transformation 
decreases the complexity of the measured construct, a reduction in VNA is what should be 
expected. This does not undermine the general validity of the untransformed score or the 
scale of the applied measure; it just shows that the untransformed score reflects a construct 
that is influenced by several interacting heritable components (Lykken, 2006). In our model, 
such a transformation would correspond to a statistical control of all but one of the interacting 
endophenotypic personality mechanisms. If a transformation like that becomes ever possible 
for personality traits, we would also predict a decline of VNA. We agree with Keller (see also 
Bates) that the development of new personality measures with improved scale properties 
(esp. ratio scales, see p. 30) is highly desirable, but we put more trust in the VNA estimates 
from extended twin-family designs than Keller does. While these results might not help us 
very much to discriminate between different forms of selection on personality differences 
(mutation-selection balance vs. balancing selection), they do suggest that selective neutrality 
of personality, as favoured by Campbell, is unlikely. 
While it is hardly possible to distinguish between mutation-selection balance and 
balancing selection based on just VNA estimates, data on inbreeding depression can be more 
decisive. This is because polygenetic traits under mutation-selection balance should always 
show inbreeding depression, while only traits under balancing selection through 
overdominance will (Keller), and overdominance is actually rare and evolutionarily unstable. 
In this case, the problem is on the empirical side: Experimental inbreeding studies are only 
possible in non-human animals, and strong natural experiments (e.g. children from cousin 
marriages) are rare. Fortunately, this kind of inbreeding data exists for intelligence 
(supporting mutation-selection balance), but is lacking completely for personality traits. In a 
noteworthy first attempt to fill this gap, Rebollo & Boomsma reinterpreted Camperio Ciani et 
al.’s (2007) study, and also reported their own data, on personality differences between 
parents and their children who mated with a spouse from a geographically close or distant 
region. Both studies together suggest that those who mate within the same regions (which 
may reflect stronger inbreeding effects) have children who are lower on sensation seeking 
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(esp. excitement seeking) and openness to experience, while results are unclear for 
extraversion and there was no effect for neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
anxiety, or anger. The problem with these results is that they are very indirect and allow for 
various alternative interpretations. It is especially striking that effects were found exclusively 
for traits (i.e. sensation seeking and openness to experience) that can be directly associated 
with migration tendencies and active niche selection. This is most obvious in the worldwide 
distribution of DRD4 polymorphisms, which suggests that carriers of the allele that has been 
associated with high sensation seeking are more likely to migrate (Chen, Burton, 
Greenberger & Dmitrieva, 1999). It is also striking that Rebollo & Boomsma found the 
sensation seeking difference already in the parent generation, even though we know nothing 
about the geographical mating habits of their parents. As these authors themselves state, 
migration might be a plausible alternative explanation for these particular results. What we 
need next are studies of inbreeding effects on personality traits with stronger designs (some 
suggestions are given by Mingroni, 2004). 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the other aspects of genetic architecture we 
discussed: while the theoretical models are specific enough to make predictions that 
distinguish at least one of the major evolutionary mechanisms for the maintenance of genetic 
variance from the other two, most empirical evidence on the number of genetic loci, the 
number of polymorphic loci, and the average effect size of loci is still rather indirect. Again, 
the overall pattern of results allows us to evaluate which mechanism is the most plausible for 
a given trait, but better data is needed to substantiate these conclusions. 
Is mate choice similar for intelligence and personality traits? 
On the phenotypic level, evolutionary genetic theory suggests that traits under mutation-
selection balance, but not traits under balancing selection or selectively neutral traits, should 
be sexually attractive in a general, species-typical way. The logic here is that choosing 
sexual partners based on reliable indicators of low mutation load will endow potential 
offspring with “good genes”. In our target article, we argued that studies on human mate 
choice support general mate preferences and assortative mating for intelligence, but not for 
personality traits. McCrae doubts this claim. He remarks that studies on self-reported mate 
preferences often find strong preferences for personal attributes such as “honest”, 
“considerate”, and “affectionate”, which can be ascribed to the agreeableness domain. 
However, aside from the problem that self-reported preferences often do not reflect actual 
mate choices (Penke, Todd, Lenton & Fasolo, in press), it is important to distinguish between 
sexual attraction per se and pragmatic preferences for long-term mates. Long-term 
relationships are, ideally, cooperative relationships, so people prefer honest and trustworthy 
partners for long-term mating relationships, just as in other social relationships (Cottrell, 
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Neuberg & Li, 2007). The likely reason for this, however, is not sexual attraction per se, but 
the pragmatic avoidance of exploitation, distress, inconvenience, and inefficient coordination 
(called “relationship load” by Buss, 2006). This becomes obvious in studies where 
preferences are assessed across different mating contexts and relationship durations (e.g. 
Kenrick, Groth, Trost & Sadalla, 1993). These studies show that the preference for 
agreeableness-related attributes vanishes when a mate is chosen for a sexual affair or a 
one-night-stand, where not much cooperation is necessary. Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether the long-term preference for warmth and trustworthiness really reflects the ideal of 
an agreeable mate personality (i.e., a trait of an individual), or the ideal of a secure 
attachment relationship (i.e., a dyadic trait) (Penke et al., in press). At least from an 
evolutionary theoretical perspective, people should seek a long-term partner who is faithful 
and supportive within the context of the relationship, but people should be less concerned 
their partner’s behaviour towards, for example, alternative mates, rivals, or out-group 
members. Exceptions might be traits like benevolence, generosity, heroic virtues, and 
magnanimity. These agreeable characteristics seem to be sexually attractive in short-term 
and long-term mates, but apparently because they are reliable indicators of good condition 
and low mutation load (Miller, 2007; Griskevicius et al., in press). However, the important 
point here is that high agreeableness per se is not sexually attractive, but some specific 
forms of agreeableness are generally attractive if they can only be displayed by individuals in 
good condition. Similarly, only people with high intelligence will be able to convert a high 
openness to experience into sexually attractive degrees of creativity (Miller, 2000a; Haselton 
& Miller, 2006). These personality traits are not always sexually attractive in themselves, but 
can be attractive under certain circumstances, when they advertise good condition and 
genetic fitness. 
McCrae also noted that some degree of assortative mating has sometimes been shown 
for conscientiousness and openness to experience, but other studies (e.g. Watson et al., 
2004) failed to show assortative mating on these traits. We are not aware of a meta-analysis 
of the large human assortative mating literature, but the general picture is that assortative 
mating for intelligence is a well-established phenomenon, while findings are rather weak and 
inconsistent for individual personality traits. 
Finally, McCrae mentions that assortative mating can result from social homogamy (i.e., 
choosing a mate from within one’s self-selected social environment, such as college, job, or 
neighborhood), not just from direct assortment on perceived traits within competitive mating 
markets. More sophisticated research designs are able to disentangle these two alternatives, 
and they reveal that direct preferences exist independent of social homogamy, especially for 
intelligence (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2000; Watson et al., 2004). 
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Overall, we think it is fair to say that intelligence is very often directly preferred in mate 
choice, while the evidence does not support such a general conclusion for personality traits. 
Is personality evolutionarily relevant at all? 
The most important kind of evidence to distinguish between selective neutrality and any 
selection-based account for heritable personality differences (including mutation-selection 
balance and balancing selection) is the empirical link between personality and fitness. Only if 
personality differences have behavioural consequences that influence fitness, can we posit 
that some form of selection acts directly on personality. Fitness is ideally operationalized as 
the relative long-term (multi-generational) reproductive success of genotypes in populations, 
but phenotypic selection studies have established more practical operationalizations of 
fitness, such as measured reproductive success over a single lifespan or even shorter 
periods such as breeding seasons (Réale). Since the necessary data is not hard to gather for 
human personality, it is both surprising and unfortunate that human phenotypic selection 
studies are extremely rare. More of these studies are desperately needed to inform an 
evolutionary genetic approach to personality (Dingemanse; Réale; van Oers). 
But does this mean that we have to fall back to the most “parsimonious” baseline model 
of selective neutrality, as suggested by Campbell? We don’t think so. As calculated by Keller 
and Miller (2006), the correlation between a truly neutral trait and fitness must not be greater 
than ±.0055 (i.e., the square root of the maximal .003% fitness difference under which 
genetic drift is a more important factor than selection, given typical ancestral human 
population sizes). This effect size is greatly exceeded in the few studies that directly link 
personality differences to general reproductive fitness in humans (e.g. Eaves et al., 1990) 
and other animals (see Dingemanse & Réale, 2004), and in the much more numerous 
studies that link personality differences to specific components of human fitness (such as 
survival, social status, mating success, and reproductive strategies; see our target article for 
references). Even if it turned out that genetic drift had been somewhat stronger throughout 
our evolutionary history than assumed in Keller and Miller’s calculation (Réale), which would 
allow somewhat greater effect sizes for neutral traits, and even though the effect sizes for 
single fitness components should be interpreted with caution because of evolutionary trade-
offs (Réale), it seems highly unlikely that all of the well-documented behavioural 
consequences of personality differences are invisible to selection. 
Finally, note that the selective non-neutrality of personality differences contradicts not 
only Tooby and Cosmides’ (1990) neutrality account for the maintenance of genetic variance 
in personality, but also their pathogen-defence hypothesis (Campbell, Livesley). This 
hypothesis assumes that the behavioural consequences of personality differences are so 
invisible to selection that their genetic foundations can vary freely, such that the organism’s 
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proteome is more distinctive, unpredictable, and harder for pathogens to exploit. Even if all 
personality-related polymorphisms (such as DRD4 or 5-HTTLPR) had pleiotropic effects at 
the level of organismic biochemistry that are relevant to anti-pathogen defence, any such 
anti-pathogen effects would need to be larger than the behavioural fitness payoffs of 
personality differences, in order for the pathogen defence model to be applicable. The same 
logic must hold for any similar hypotheses that regard heritable personality differences as by-
products of other adaptations (Keller). We would also like to add that, despite the ingenuity 
and prominence of the Tooby and Cosmides (1990) article, we are not aware of studies that 
have directly tested the pathogen defence model. So far, we regard our model as a more 
plausible alternative. 
Environmental challenges for an evolutionary personality psychology 
Our model suggests that future phenotypic selection studies should pay special attention 
to the way that human personality traits interact with specific environments. If spatio-temporal 
environmental heterogeneity is responsible for maintaining genetic variance in personality 
traits, then the correlation between a trait and fitness should reverse across some 
environments. Thus, certain environmental variables should act as statistical moderators of 
the relationships between personality traits and measures of survival, reproductive success, 
and/or kin success. A methodological implication is that we need more precise, valid, and 
evolutionarily informed ways of categorizing and measuring the environmental factors that 
interact with personality traits to yield adaptive or maladaptive behaviour (Funder; 
Matthews; Saad). Characterizing environmental structure at a useful level of description is a 
rather old problem that psychologists recognized long ago (see Meehl, 1978), but still 
struggle to solve (for a notable attempt see Holmes, 2002). 
While we cannot offer a panacea, we suggest that an evolutionary framework for 
personality, richly informed by mid-level adaptationist theories (e.g. concerning kin selection, 
multi-level selection, reciprocity, sexually antagonistic coevolution, parent-offspring conflict, 
and life history theory) might help to isolate relevant environmental features. This is because 
environments can vary in many ways (Johnson), but not all of them are equally relevant for 
understanding the fitness payoffs of particular traits. A useful exploratory heuristic might be 
to consider “Which variable environmental factors create different adaptive problems that are 
solved better or worse by individuals with certain personalities?”. For example, big cities with 
high population densities and anonymous interactions might give Machiavellian cheaters 
more chances to exploit others than small villages would, in which reputations spread faster 
through gossip; thus, cities may offer higher fitness payoffs for disagreeable individuals than 
small villages do. Living in big cities might also imply frequent changes in people’s social 
networks, which lead to persistent uncertainty about one’s social status and mate value, and 
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about the pool of available mates, friends, and allies. Neurotic fears of social rejection might 
be as maladaptive in this context as an indiscriminate tendency to strive for the alpha rank all 
the time. Harsh and dangerous physical environments likely make social cooperation and 
mutual support necessary, as do intergroup conflicts over limited resources, so both may 
favour agreeableness and neuroticism. More generally, the differences in styles of social 
interaction that are at the core of many personality traits suggest that we should pay special 
attention to social-environmental factors that may mediate and modulate relationships 
between personality traits and fitness payoffs. Such a research program is already 
exemplified by work on sociosexuality as a personality trait with different mating payoffs in 
different environments (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). 
Saad emphasized the four different roles that environmental factors play in an 
evolutionary genetic approach to personality. So far, this section only discussed 
environmental niches, which provide selection pressures. Two of Saad’s other environmental 
roles, the ontogenetic environment of personality development and the current real-time 
situational context of personality functioning, are combined in our reaction norm model as the 
“environment” that interacts with the genotype to evoke a behavioural response. These two 
different functions of the environment as (1) the source of selection pressures and (2) one of 
the interacting factors in reaction norms (which correspond to the two “Environment” boxes in 
Figure 3 of the target article) appear to be mixed up in one of Funder’s remarks: The 
ontogenetic and real-time environmental factors that evoke personality differences (an 
interaction effect) might or might not be the same across different environmental niches that 
select for or against these differences (a main effect). In future evolutionary genetic studies 
of personality, it should be helpful to distinguish more carefully between the environmental 
factors that shape a phenotypic personality trait and the environmental factors that make this 
trait have certain fitness cost and benefits. 
The fourth role of the environment that Saad acknowledges is the ancestral environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). Contrary to the commentaries by Livesley and Bates, 
the more evolutionarily remote and ancient forms of this environment play a negligible role 
within an evolutionary genetic perspective on current heritable variation in human 
personality. Understanding the remote Pleistocene EEA is very useful to explain non-
heritable conditional strategies and universal sex differences (Troisi, Saad), as in 
mainstream adaptationistic evolutionary psychology. However, genetic variation in 
contemporary human populations depends on much more recent selection pressures over 
the last few hundred generations, within the Holocene. Thus, an evolutionary personality 
psychology may end up paying much more attention to the environment-specific payoffs for 
personality traits during recent (e.g. Neolithic) prehistory, and even within historically 
documented civilizations. For example, the divisions of labour and diverse social roles that 
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emerge within complex hierarchical societies may have permitted a much wider range of 
personality traits to flourish than would have been possible under small-scale, egalitarian, 
hunter-gatherer conditions in the Pleistocene. 
At which level should we study personality traits from an evolutionary perspective? 
We have apparently reached one of those intriguing points in the history of science when 
there is a mutual recognition between two fields that they have been working on the same 
problems in slightly different but complementary ways. In this case, the two fields are 
evolutionary behavioural ecology (the study of variation in animal behaviour) and personality 
psychology (the study of variation in human behaviour) (van Oers). Such times of mutual 
recognition are always accompanied by initial confusions over terminologies, assumptions, 
methods, and objectives, before the two fields can take full advantage of each other’s 
insights and findings. Evolutionary ecologists, who usually study animals that cannot report 
their thoughts or feelings, naturally must focus on observed behaviours, and their 
correlations, contingencies, and fitness consequences across environments. Since 
personality psychologists have restricted their studies to a very talkative mammal, they 
usually prefer to ask their subjects to verbally report their thoughts and feelings, and to look 
for latent personality constructs that can explain patterns across these self-reports (Réale). 
In terms of the watershed model, evolutionary ecologists usually start their analyses more 
“downstream” than personality psychologists (Euler) — by observing emitted strategic 
behaviour rather than by recording verbal responses about intended or remembered 
behaviour. 
Evolutionary ecologists usually have a solid training in evolutionary genetics, and they 
know that selection does not operate on a single trait at a time, but affects all traits that are 
genetically intercorrelated at once. That is why one objective of animal personality studies is 
to find behavioural tendencies that are genetically correlated (the “character state 
perspective”, Dingemanse; Sih & Bell), to understand how patterns of genetic variance and 
covariance in behavioural propensities fit into the genetic variance-covariance matrix (the “G 
matrix”) that describes all phenotypic traits, whether morphological, physiological, or 
behavioural. The higher goal is to identify fairly independent dimensions in the G matrix, 
since these dimensions could also evolve fairly independent of each other. Consequently, 
these dimensions would constitute the most suitable units of analysis for evolutionary genetic 
studies (Mezey & Houle, 2003). 
Personality psychologists are very familiar with looking for independent dimensions in 
variance-covariance matrixes, using methods such as factor analysis. However, they started 
doing so many decades before evolutionary ecologists did, and tended to use phenotypic 
correlations among cognitive tests, or among self- or peer-ratings on personality-descriptive 
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adjectives or questionnaire items, rather than among field observations of actual behaviour. 
This search culminated in the discovery of independent, latent phenotypic dimensions in 
humans, of which the g factor and the Five-Factor Model of Personality (FFM) reached the 
highest consensus. Most interestingly, these dimensions replicate fairly well on the genetic 
level (e.g. Yamagata et al., 2006; Plomin & Spinath, 2004), suggesting that research on 
human personality has already come close to characterizing the genetically correlated 
dimensions that evolutionary ecologists are still seeking in other species. What is now called 
the “character state perspective” in evolutionary ecology is so fundamental to personality 
psychology that we simply took it for granted in our target article. Resolving such 
terminological and methodological confusions might be the most important first step for 
interdisciplinary personality research. 
When Livesley and McCrae suggested instead that lower-order, interdependent 
personality facets may be the best level of analysis for an evolutionary genetics of 
personality, they may have confused the heritable individual differences relevant to 
personality research with the species-typical, domain-specific adaptations studied by 
adaptationistic mainstream evolutionary psychology. A hallmark of adaptations is their 
complex functional design, which would break down when too much genetic variation is 
introduced. As a consequence, most heritable individual differences cannot be adaptations 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), and they cannot be analysed using traditional standards of 
adaptationism. Rather, they are dimensions of genetic variation that are tolerated within 
systems of interacting adaptations. For example, humans are likely endowed with 
adaptations to regulate attachment relationships (Troisi), to discover signs of social rejection 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000), and to monitor environmental dangers (Nettle, 2006). All these 
systems are under strong stabilizing selection to function effectively (which maintains their 
complex adaptive design), but they are still all influenced by individual differences along a 
heritable dimension called neuroticism. This dimension of personality variation is not at the 
same level of description as the adaptations themselves, and is maintained by different 
selective forces – according to our model, by balancing selection given environmental 
heterogeneity – rather than stabilizing selection for raw functional efficiency. 
The lower-level facets of broad personality dimensions show substantial genetic 
intercorrelations (Yamagata et al., 2006) and will thus show correlated responses to 
selection. This makes them unlikely to be the most useful units of analysis in studying the 
evolutionary genetics of personality traits. That being said, we are open to ongoing debate 
concerning which and how many personality factors best represent independent dimensions 
of variation in the behavioural aspects of the human G matrix. We concentrated on the 
dimensions of the FFM, mainly because of their clarity and familiarity, and the rich literature 
on them. South and Krueger as well as Figueredo & Gladden suggested that there may be 
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even higher levels of abstraction than the FFM, as suggested by the evidence of modest 
phenotypic (Markon, Krueger & Watson, 2005) and genetic intercorrelations between the 
FFM domains (Johnson). One problem with such jumping to a higher level of abstraction is 
that some genetic correlations may be different from zero at a statistical level of significance, 
but not at an evolutionary level of significance (cp. Jang): these genetic correlations may be 
caused by environmental factors through gene-environment interactions (GEIs), making 
them environment- and population-dependent. In the target article, we adopted van Oers et 
al.’s (2005) argument that genetic correlations due to structural pleiotropy (i.e., shared 
mechanisms on the endophenotypic level) should not change signs across environments, 
whereas those due to GEIs should change signs across environments. Johnson noted that 
this criterion might fail to distinguish between types of genetic correlations because people 
select, create, and evoke their own environments, leading to gene-environment correlations 
(rGEs). The effects of GEIs and rGEs can easily be confused in empirical results and are 
difficult to separate (but see Johnson, 2007). Johnson argues that rGEs are problematic 
because they could lead to a homogenization of the populations in certain environments with 
regard to the traits under study (if its result is that every niche harbours only individuals with 
exactly those personality trait levels that fit best to the niche’s demands). In this case, the 
genetic correlations could indeed be attenuated by reduced trait variance - possibly down to 
zero, given perfect rGEs. However, we do not see how the variance reduction within 
environments that could be caused by rGEs can lead to artificial sign changes in genetic 
correlations across environments. But even if the discriminatory power of the criterion offered 
by van Oers et al. (2005) is limited in certain cases, we do not follow Johnson’s conclusion 
that this (possible) methodological issue with the detection of structural pleiotropies implies 
that they are rare in nature. 
More critical is Dingemanse’s remark that the G matrix is not static and might differ 
between environments and populations as a result of local selection pressures. Genetic 
correlations that freely evolve between populations are likely not constrained by structural 
pleiotropy, but may be the result of selection for limited plasticity. While this does not make 
them less interesting from an evolutionary genetic perspective, some of our arguments would 
indeed be invalidated (see Dingemanse). We think that the key data to distinguish between 
structural pleiotropy and selected limits on plasticity would come from cross-cultural studies. 
If the factorial structure of the behavioural aspects of the G matrix replicate across 
populations around the world, it is unlikely to reflect recent, local selection pressures. Initial 
data suggests that the FFM shows good replication of genetic factorial structure across three 
populations from three continents (Yamagata et al., 2006). This and other studies also 
suggest that the structure of the behavioural aspects of the G matrix reflects fairly accurately 
the phenotypic structure of the FFM personality dimensions, which allows us, according to 
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the protocol suggested by Roff (1997, p. 100), to use phenotypic structures as a surrogate 
for genotypic structures. Phenotypic data is available for a larger sample of cultures, and 
again they suggest that the FFM structure replicates rather well across populations (McCrae 
& Allik, 2002). While more cross-cultural (and within-culture cross-environmental) 
comparisons of G matrices would be desirable (preferably with designs that are able to 
differentiate between additive and non-additive genetic variance), these results suggest that 
the structure of the FFM is caused by structural pleiotropy across behavioural propensities 
within each of its main dimensions. It remains to be seen, however, if other genetic factor 
solutions replicate better across cultures, or if the FFM dimensions (and the g factor, for 
which a similar logic holds) already are the best level to study the evolutionary genetics of 
personality. 
Extensions of our evolutionary genetic model of personality 
Evolutionary genetics is a rich and complex field, and offers much more to personality 
psychology than we could cover in our target article. Since evolutionary genetics is novel 
ground to most personality psychologists, we chose to focus rather simply on the major 
evolutionary mechanisms that can maintain genetic variation in traits. Also, we tried to rely on 
theoretical arguments and models that are already well-established and relatively 
uncontroversial in evolutionary genetics. So, for example, we did not discuss the new but 
sketchy literature on the maintenance of genetic variance in reaction norms (Sih & Bell), 
where the current conclusions depend on the specific assumptions of complex models and 
are sometimes contradictory (see de Jong & Gavrilets, 2000, vs. Zhang, 2006). Also, we 
could only make parenthetical references to some other topics, such as niche picking (a form 
of active rGE). In the future, our model should be extended by including, among others, a 
more explicit account of rGEs (Jang; Johnson; Sih & Bell), reactive heritability beyond 
condition-dependency (Gangestad), indirect selection in social groups (Sih & Bell), and 
models of genetic variance maintenance in reaction norms (Sih & Bell). It should also be 
contextualized within the broader frameworks of evolutionary game theory (Sih & Bell) and 
life history theory (Gangestad). We regard these extensions as generally compatible with 
our model, but more theoretical and empirical work is needed to see how exactly they would 
affect our conclusions about the origins and nature of genetic variation in personality. 
Dingemanse reminded us that our model and any future extensions should ideally be tested 
in formal mathematical models, not just as verbal descriptions. Furthermore, statistical 
models are needed that allow us to test these relationships against empirical data. First steps 
in this direction have already been made (South & Krueger; Johnson; Wolf et al., 1998), 
but there clearly is plenty of work that still needs to be done. 
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In itself, an evolutionary genetic model of personality cannot offer a complete theory of 
personality. It can provide an ultimate perspective on why heritable personality differences 
exist, how they change over evolutionary time and environments, and which fitness effects 
they may have. This makes it an important building block of any comprehensive personality 
theory. In the end, however, any evolutionary genetic model of personality should be 
complemented by more proximate theories (such as Matthew’s) concerning the phenotypic 
structure, underlying mechanisms, and lifespan development of personality traits. However, 
as Funder correctly noted, our evolutionary genetic model of personality is more compatible 
with some proximate personality theories than with others, and those theories that contradict 
it will have to provide alternative accounts for the existence of genetic variance in personality. 
In the following, we will compare our model to some alternatives suggested in the 
commentaries. 
Alternatives to our evolutionary genetic model of personality 
Recent selective sweeps. Mutation-selection balance models assume that within any 
given population, for any given trait, there is an abstract, idealized, mutation-free genotype 
that would show optimal adaptation to the population’s environmental demands and selection 
pressures. Applied to the case of human intelligence, mutation-selection balance models 
suggest that the highest possible g level can be attained only when all genes that influence 
cognitive functioning are free of harmful mutations. Lee called this a “Platonic ideal”. Both 
Bates and Lee pointed to studies suggesting that human general intelligence has been 
subject to recent selective sweeps and in the midst of a genetic transition (Wang, Kodama, 
Baldi, & Moyzis, 2006; Evans, Mekel-Bobrov, Vallender, Hudson, & Lahn, 2006; see also 
Williamson et al., in press). We agree that the hypothetical optimal genotype for optimal 
intelligence is an oversimplification, and might be better conceptualized as a “moving target”. 
Most mutations in protein-coding and regulatory regions of the genome are harmful, but 
beneficial mutations are more likely to occur when environments change. Given all the 
changes that have been occurring in the human ecology during the last 20,000 years, 
(including larger social groups and mating markets, novel habitats, agriculture, and literacy), 
it is very likely that some g-related mutations have become beneficial and are currently on 
their way to fixation. These newly-favoured polymorphisms might exist at any current 
prevalence level, and might have large phenotypic effects, so molecular genetic studies 
might be better able to identify them. 
Beneficial mutations that are on the rise probably contribute to the genetic variance of g, 
but so does a load of many, rare, small-effect harmful mutations. This is not only a 
widespread empirical conclusion (Plomin et al., 2006), but also a necessary implication if g 
has a large mutational target size. (Bates notes that several thousand rare polymorphisms 
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with strong effects on general intelligence have been identified, but these evolutionary 
transient, harmful mutations usually cause severe mental retardations, not individual 
differences in the normal range; see Plomin & Spinath, 2004.) In our view, only a 
conceptualization of g as a downstream trait that represents the functional integrity of large 
parts of the brain and the genome can explain why there are positive-manifold genetic 
correlations between different cognitive abilities, why g is linked to general phenotypic 
condition, and why g is sexually attractive. It can also explain why trauma often reduces, but 
never raises, g (Keller; Keller & Miller, 2006). We do not see how these findings can be 
reconciled with recent selective sweeps as the only explanation for the heritability of g. In an 
effort to refute our mutation-selection balance account, Bates referred to unpublished 
evidence of a zero genetic correlation between g and fluctuating asymmetry. While we 
cannot evaluate this study, such a result would challenge only one possible mediator 
between mutation load and cognitive ability (the construct of “developmental stability”), not 
the general claim that g is under mutation-selection balance. Contrary to Bates and Lee, we 
doubt that recent selective sweeps alone can explain most of the genetic variance in g, but 
we believe that such sweeps, in conjunction with mutation-selection balance, may be 
important, with their relative contributions to be determined by future empirical research. 
Cognitive reaction norms. While the g factor of intelligence seems to have a direct link to 
many components of fitness, Strobel noted that individual differences in certain lower-order 
cognitive processes show phenotypic and genetic relations to personality traits – which, in 
our balancing selection model, should have net fitness neutrality when averaged across all 
relevant environments. He suggests that such lower-level traits that combine cognitive and 
personality characteristics may constitute a third category of traits to consider in extending 
our model. We don’t think that such a fundamental modification is necessary. Our two trait 
categories are basically defined by the selective mechanisms that maintain their genetic 
variance, not by their apparent psychological nature (i.e., ‘cold’ and cognitive vs. ‘hot’ and 
temperamental). If the lower-order cognitive processes discussed by Strobel are indeed 
under balancing selection and structurally linked to personality traits, they clearly fall in the 
“reaction norm” category of our model and are likely best conceptualized as facets of certain 
personality traits. However, since they are usually assessed by cognitive tests that load on 
the g-factor, it might be advisable to control for g (which we suggest captures mutation load 
variance) when their genetic underpinnings and their associations with personality traits are 
studied. 
Gene-environment correlations. It is hardly debatable that humans have been perfecting 
ways to modify their own environments for thousands of years. Due to technical and cultural 
innovations, modern humans seldom face unmodified natural ecologies; rather we confront 
complex built environments and social institutions that have been shaped as our “extended 
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phenotypes”. Consequently, rGEs might be more important for humans than for any other 
species. Jang and Johnson argued that modern humans are so adept at creating, selecting, 
and evoking their own ideal environmental niches that almost no genetic variance in 
personality is lost to selection now. We agree that modern selection-minimizing environments 
might be one reason why “maladaptive” genetic variants, like those leading to mental 
illnesses, are sometimes preserved in the population (Jang). However, we doubt that rGEs 
can fully explain genetic variance in the normal range of personality. The reason is that mere 
survival is not the only adaptive problem – fitness also depends on success in social 
competition for resources, status, and mates. In modern societies, few will die because they 
are ill or incompetent, but many will fail to maximize the quantity and quality of their sexual 
partners and offspring (e.g. Keller & Miller, 2006). As we argued in our target article, it is 
likely that personality differences have their strongest effect on fitness in the social domain 
(see also Matthews). As long as diverging interests exist in social groups, no single 
individual will have full control over his or her social environment (Sih & Bell; Penke et al., in 
press). Some will do better than others, partly due to luck, but primarily due to individual 
differences in general fitness and variation in the fit between people’s personalities and their 
(socio-)environmental niches. Thus, rGEs may alter or attenuate the selection pressures on 
personality differences, but they are unlikely to eliminate them. Note also that if rGEs indeed 
neutralized all selection pressures, personality differences would be under neutral selection, 
which is, as we argue in our target article and above, inconsistent with empirical evidence. 
Accordingly, rGEs alone cannot maintain genetic variance. 
Antagonistic pleiotropy. Sih & Bell remark that antagonistic pleiotropy is still discussed 
as a viable mechanism for maintaining genetic variance, for example by Roff (2002). While it 
is true that the final word hasn’t been said about this mechanism (especially when trade-offs 
between more than two traits are involved), even Roff, in a recent review (Roff & Fairbairn, 
2007), regards antagonistic pleiotropy alone as very unlikely to explain persistent genetic 
variance. However, even if some genetic variance in some personality traits is maintained by 
antagonistic pleiotropy, it would not alter our model dramatically. All it would imply is that 
environmental heterogeneity is not necessary in these particular cases. 
Continua of evolutionary stable strategies. Keller lists MacDonald’s (1995) hypothesis of 
weak stabilizing selection on personality traits (which allows for continua of evolutionary 
stable strategies) as a viable explanation for genetic variation in personality. However, 
stabilizing selection, even if weak, can only erode, but never maintain, genetic variation (Roff, 
2002). The same is true for the related mechanism of correlational selection (Sih & Bell; Roff 
& Fairbairn, 2007). In both cases, either personality traits must be selectively neutral, or the 
mutational target size of personality traits must be sufficiently large that enough mutational 
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variance is reintroduced (see Gangestad), or some form of balancing selection must occur. 
This brings us back to the three main mechanisms we discussed. 
The K-factor. The r-K continuum describes differences in life-history strategies between 
species. Each species has evolved a complex functional design that allows for its specific 
strategy of growth, mating, and parenting. For example, many finely coordinated adaptations 
in a rat’s phenotype interact to let it mature fast, reproduce early and often, develop a small 
brain, refrain from extensive parental investment, die early, etc., and these systems of 
adaptations are different from those in an elephant or human. Such an r-K continuum might 
apply not just to explain between-species differences in life history adaptations, but to explain 
within-species differences in behavioural strategies and personality differences. Figueredo & 
Gladden suggested that the human G matrix might be characterized by just one principal 
dimension - the ‘K factor’ - corresponding to individual differences in life-history strategies 
and their associated personality traits. Our concerns with this suggestion are mostly 
theoretical. 
We do not see how such an all-encompassing genetic dimension can be maintained by 
frequency-dependent selection or any other form of balancing selection. Selection cannot 
change the whole adaptive design of a species back and forth at the level of all genetic loci 
that influence life history traits, since this would inevitably break up the complex functional 
coordination of the life history strategy (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Instead, balancing 
selection can only maintain a small set of polymorphisms that act as “switches” between 
different life-history or behavioural strategies (Kopp & Hermisson, 2006; Turelli & Barton, 
2004). These polymorphisms must, through cascading effects in genomic regulatory 
systems, affect all adaptations involved in the strategy. One – and possibly the only – 
example for such a potent genetic switch in humans is the SRY gene that guides the sexual 
differentiation of males and females (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). In the case of the K-factor, a 
similar master genomic regulatory switch would have to be identified (and we suspect it 
already would have been discovered if it existed, given the intensity of gene-hunting for loci 
with major behavioural effects). Such a master regulatory switch might, for example, affect a 
range of behavioural traits by regulating testosterone levels and receptor sensitivities during 
brain development and functioning, since testosterone affects a wide range of sexual, 
competitive, aggressive, and parental behaviours (Ellison, 2001). However, testosterone-
related polymorphisms alone cannot explain all the other traits subsumed in the K-factor, 
including general intelligence and the dimensions of the FFM. As long as there is no 
evidence for more potent genetic switches that affect all these traits, we regard K-factor 
theory as slightly over-ambitious in trying to explain human individual differences. 
Alternatively, Gangestad offers some more detailed considerations on the evolutionary 
genetics of life-history strategies, including reactive strategy adjustment to one’s own 
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mutation load (i.e., condition-dependency). We encourage future studies to proceed in the 
directions he suggests. 
Conclusion 
Our target article introduces a way to study personality from an evolutionary perspective, 
based on evolutionary genetics. Thereby, it supplements adaptationistic evolutionary 
psychology with a toolbox for the study of individual differences, and it supplements 
behaviour genetics and personality psychology with a theoretical framework to understand 
heritable personality differences. We reviewed three theoretical models for the maintenance 
of genetic variance in heritable traits, and assessed the available empirical evidence to draw 
conclusions about the plausibility of each model as it might apply to human personality. 
While some aspects of the evidence remain weak, the overall pattern of results suggests that 
balancing selection is more plausible than its alternatives as an explanation for most 
heritable personality traits, as is mutation-selection balance for general intelligence. It 
remains to be seen whether our model can integrate future theoretical innovations and 
empirical findings. We are open to alternatives, extensions, modifications, and most 
importantly empirical studies with more refined methods that test the predictions of our 
model. 
Clearly, the development of a comprehensive evolutionary personality psychology is a big 
challenge that is still to be met. Many of the challenges and opportunities in this endeavour 
lie in its interdisciplinary nature: neither psychologists nor biologists will be able to solve this 
problem on their own (van Oers). The commentaries are encouraging because they suggest 
that both sides are willing to learn from each other. If basic communicative issues 
(terminologies etc.) can be resolved, we see many opportunities for fruitful interdisciplinary 
cooperation, and maybe we can even come a little bit closer to the utopian ideal of 
consilience (Euler). 
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Table 1: Mean values for personality variables that show significant differences in parents of twins 
 Father’s Mean Mother’s Mean 
 Same 
region 
Different 
region 
Effect 
size 
Same 
region 
Different 
region 
Effect 
size 
 N = 1433 N = 855  N = 1557 N = 950  
Boredom susceptibility  36.44 37.25** .113 35.43 35.68  
Experience seeking 31.61 33.76** .289 29.47 31.62** .282 
Thrill and adventure 
seeking 
28.69 29.50  21.75 22.66** .118 
Test attitude  39.45 38.72* .086 41.28 40.05** .143 
Somatic anxiety 16.47 16.20  18.16 18.67* .091 
Note. p values next to the means correspondent to the F statistic of the between subjects effects of 
‘same region’. *p < .05; **p<.01 
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Table 2: Mean values for personality variables that show significant differences in both twins 
 Twin 1 Mean Twin 2 Mean 
 Same 
region 
Different 
region 
Effect 
Size 
Same 
region 
Different 
region 
Effect 
Size 
 N = 1581 N = 955  N = 1574 N = 954  
Boredom susceptibility 38.01 38.56* .082 37.86 38.77** .137 
Experience seeking 33.95 35.48** .220 34.12 35.33** .180 
Thrill and adventure 
seeking 
39.09 40.09** .110 38.83 39.59* .094 
Somatic anxiety 18.66 19.20** .119 18.66 19.15* .089 
Note. p values next to the means correspondent to the F statistic of the between subjects effects of 
‘same region’ independent of the effect of sex.  * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of genetic variation in personality as viewed from (a-b) a 
character state approach (both panels plot the breeding values of two behaviours) or (c-d) a 
reaction norm approach (both panels give breeding values of the same behaviour expressed in 
two different environments). Note that the two approaches are essentially two sides of the 
same coin: (a) and (c) depict the same fictional data as do (b) and (d), where each genotype 
(number) is given either as a dot (a, b) or a line (c, d). Personality does not exist in (a) and (c) 
but does exist in (b) and (d). Note that the correlation between the breeding values for the 
behaviours plotted in (a) en (b) represents their additive genetic correlation (Lynch & Walsh 
1998). 
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Abstract 
A major problem with Implicit Association Tests (IATs) is that they require bipolar attributes 
(e.g., good - bad). Thus, IAT effects for an attribute category can be interpreted only relative 
to an opposite category. Problems arise if there is no clear opposite category; in this case, a 
neutral category can be used although it induces systematic error variance and thus reduces 
validity. The present study suggests that this problem can be solved using Single Attribute 
IATs (SA-IATs). Sociosexuality (the tendency to engage in uncommitted sex) was expected 
to be related at the implicit level to stronger stranger - sex associations relative to partner - 
sex associations. An IAT was constructed that used conversation as a neutral attribute; it 
showed satisfactory reliability but only low correlations with explicit sociosexuality. An 
alternative SA-IAT with sex as the only attribute showed a similar reliability but higher 
correlations with explicit sociosexuality. 
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Current dual-system models in social cognition research take into account that there are 
deliberate, reflective as well as spontaneous, impulsive determinants of behavior. Some 
models such as the one by Strack and Deutsch (2004) assume that information processing 
giving rise to spontaneous behavior involves implicit mental representations of objects and 
their attributes in the form of associative networks. The association strength between the 
mental representations reflects the likelihood that the represented entities co-occur in reality 
or imagination. Thus, in principle it should be possible to use this information about implicit 
associations in order to assess individual evaluations and behavioral tendencies, without 
explicitly asking the respondents to report them. 
In recent years, methods such as the Implicit Association Tests (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) have been developed for this purpose. Frequently, these 
procedures were designed to study implicit attitudes including implicit self-esteem by 
assessing associations between target objects and attributes along a good - bad dimension 
(see Fazio & Olson, 2003, and Spence, 2005, for reviews). Other studies explored 
associations between the self as a target concept and behavioral attributes such as shy - 
nonshy or angry - self-controlled (e.g., Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002; Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, in press). The underlying assumption of 
these IAT versions is that they predict spontaneous behavior particularly well because they 
provide direct access to associations between the self and representations of such 
behaviors. 
Evolutionary psychology assumes that many impulsive determinants of human social 
behavior are based on domain-specific evolved psychological mechanisms that were shaped 
by selection pressures in our evolutionary past and continue to operate in all humans, or are 
sex-specific (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Buss, 2003). More recently, attempts have been 
made by evolutionary psychologists to explain not only sex differences but also systematic 
interindividual differences within sex by principles of evolution such as frequency-dependent 
selection, environmentally-contingent strategies, or environment-contingent development 
(e.g., Buss & Greiling, 1999). The present study combines the social cognition and the 
evolutionary approaches in an attempt to study impulsive determinants of interindividual 
differences in sociosexuality. 
Sociosexuality 
Individuals differ in their tendency to engage in uncommitted sexual activity, a disposition 
Kinsey (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953) 
termed sociosexual orientation or sociosexuality. Sociosexuality is conceptualised as a 
personality dimension, with the poles labeled “restricted” (monogamous) vs. “unrestricted” 
(promiscuous) sociosexuality. Based on the observation that sociosexual behaviors, attitudes 
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and fantasies tend to correlate, Simpson and Gangestad (1991) developed the Sociosexual 
Orientation Inventory (SOI), a 7-item self-report questionnaire that combines measures of 
sociosexual attitudes, behaviors and fantasies to an overall score. The SOI has been applied 
in over 40 published studies (reviewed in Simpson, Wilson, & Winterheld, 2004), including a 
large-scale intercultural study that confirmed its reliability and validity across 48 nations 
(Schmitt, 2005). The latter study also showed that men universally have a more unrestricted 
sociosexual orientation than women (an overall effect size of d=0.74), a sex difference that is 
expected from evolutionary theorizing (Trivers, 1972; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). 
The heterogeneity of the SOI due to the inclusion of both sociosexual attitudes and 
behaviors has sometimes been criticized (e.g., Townsend, Kline & Wasserman, 1995). We 
therefore first examined the factorial structure of sociosexuality in an extended version of the 
SOI, the Sociosexuality Scale (SS) by Bailey, Kirk, Zhu, Dunne, and Martin (2000). 
Sociosexuality is distinct from general sex drive or libido (Ostovich & Sabini, 2004), and 
unrelated to the interest to engage in sexual activity with a committed relationship partner 
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). Indeed, sexual motivation towards strangers appears to 
serve completely different functions than sexual motivation in committed relationships (Buss 
& Schmitt, 1993; Klusmann, 2002). 
Assessment of Implicit Sociosexuality 
If interindividual differences in sociosexuality are primarily based on evolved mechanisms 
at the level of impulsive information processing, they are a prime candidate for the 
application of social cognition methods such as Implicit Association Tests. However, we are 
not aware of any such study in the literature. Our attempt to study implicit sociosexuality was 
guided by four assumptions. First, the evolved mechanism underlying sociosexuality is the 
desire for sexual variety, a motive to quickly engage in sexual activity with members of the 
preferred sex, even if they are totally unacquainted (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Schmitt, 
Shackelford, Duntley, Tooke, & Buss, 2001; Schmitt et al., 2003). Second, therefore, 
sociosexuality is characterized at the level of impulsive information processing (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) by the strength of the association between stranger and sex. That is, when 
unrestricted males and females meet strangers, they associate sexual thoughts and feelings 
with them more easily than restricted males and females. 
Third, because of the theoretically expected higher sociosexuality of males that has been 
strongly confirmed at the explicit level (Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2003), males should 
show, on average, stronger stranger - sex associations than females. And fourth, the 
correlation between measured explicit sociosexuality and the measured association strength 
between stranger and sex should be moderately positive because both measures relate to 
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the same construct but show method-specific variance in the explicit measures (e.g., 
tendencies to admit or to exaggerate sexual motives) and in the implicit measures. 
Thus, the key task was to construct a test that assesses the individual strength of the 
association between stranger and sex. Because of the notoriously low reliability of affective 
or semantic priming as a method for the assessment of interindividual differences (see, e.g., 
Spence, 2005), we initially attempted to construct an Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald et al., 1998) that contrasts the association strength between stranger and sex 
with the association strength between sex and a control category that was  generally linked 
with sex but not specifically linked with sex in unrestricted individuals. We chose partner as 
such a control target category because partner - sex is an ubiquitous association and 
because we did not expect a stronger partner - sex association for unrestricted individuals 
because explicit sociosexuality is unrelated to sexual interest in committed relationships 
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). 
Another requirement for IATs is an opposite or at least neutral attribute category (in the 
present case: for sex). We used conversation as such an attribute because it can be easily  
associated with both strangers and partners and because we asssumed that conversation is 
sexually neutral and therefore unrelated to sociosexuality. Thus, our sociosexuality IAT used 
categories that referred to social interaction: the bipolar target categories stranger - partner 
that primarily differ with regard to the unfamiliarity of the social interaction partner, and the 
attribute categories sex - conversation that primarily differ with regard to the sexual nature of 
the social interaction. 
Study 1: IAT 
A sociosexuality IAT aiming at assessing the association strength between stranger and 
sex relative to the association strength between partner and sex was developed in a 
laboratory experiment, and subsequently tested on the internet. Conversation was chosen as 
a sexually neutral control category. Explicit ratings of the association of sex and conversation 
with an opposite-sex stranger in a hypothetical situation and the Sociosexuality Scale by 
Bailey et al. (2000) that includes the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory by Simpson and 
Gangestad (1991) served as validation criteria. 
Method: Laboratory IAT Study 
Adult males and females were invited to participate in a laboratory study on sexuality 
through advertisements in local magazines or personal contacts. Most participants were 
students (less than 10% psychology students). Participants either received course credits, 
coupons for a local movie theater, or participated in a lottery with attractive prizes. The 
present study refers only to those participants that (a) aged 18 - 39 years, (b) were 
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heterosexual and sexually experienced according to self-report, and (c) had an overall error 
rate not above 15% in the sociosexuality IAT (see below). These criteria were met by 50 
males and 44 females; mean age was 24.0 years (SD = 4.3). 
Participants answered a few questions concerning personal information such as age, 
sex, sexual orientation, and relationship status, completed the sociosexuality IAT, and 
subsequently answered various questionnaires including a sociosexuality situation rating and 
the Sociosexuality Scale, in this sequence. Thus, the implicit sociosexuality measure was 
assessed before the two explicit sociosexuality measures. All items were answered on a 
computer. 
Sociosexuality IAT. This IAT was constructed closely following the procedure outlined by 
Greenwald et al. (1998). The target-concept discrimination was partner - stranger, and 
attributes were sex - conversation. In a first step, participants discriminated partner - 
stranger, then sex - conversation. In the initial combined task, they discriminated partner - 
sex from stranger - conversation. Subsequently, they discriminated partner - stranger in 
reversed order, and finally stranger - sex from partner - conversation (reversed combined 
task; see Table 1). The 80 test trials in each combined condition were preceded by 40 
training trials. The IAT effect was computed by subtracting the mean reaction time in the test 
trials of the reversed combined task from the mean reaction time in the test trials of the 
combined task; thus, positive IAT effects indicate faster associations between stranger and 
sex than between partner and sex, assuming that conversation is equally associated with 
strangers and partners. 
Participants used the letter A on the left side of the keyboard and the number 5 on the 
right-side numeric keypad for discrimination. The target and/or attribute category names 
were presented in the left and right upper corners of the computer screen throughout each 
task. The stimuli (category exemplars; see Table 2) were presented in the center of the 
screen until the participant responded. In the two combined tasks, the stimuli alternated 
between target and attribute. Target and attribute categories were randomized in order within 
six blocks of 20 trials. Interstimulus interval was 250 ms; after an incorrect response, the 
word FEHLER (German for error) immediately replaced the stimulus for 300 ms. Because 
this study focuses on interindividual differences, all participants received the blocks and the 
stimuli in the same order to minimize interindividual variance due to order effects. Thus, the 
IAT means are confounded with block order and can be interpreted only with regard to 
interindividual and group differences, not absolutely. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Their 
responses were recorded using Experimental Run Time System Software (Beringer, 1994). 
In keeping with Greenwald et al. (1998), the first two responses in the combined tasks were 
not analyzed, response latencies below 300 ms were recoded as 300 ms, and latencies 
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above 3,000 ms were recoded as 3,000 ms; incorrect responses were treated as missing 
values. The raw latencies were used only for descriptive purposes. All other statistical 
analyses were based on log-transformed latencies to correct for the skewed latency 
distribution. 
Sociosexuality Situation Rating. Participants were asked to imagine a situation where 
they are alone in a train compartment with an attractive stranger of the opposite sex, and to 
rate the extent to which they would associate this situation with 20 items on a 5-point scale 
(not at all - very much). Of the 20 items, 10 were the attribute stimuli for conversation and 
sex in the sociosexuality IAT (see Table 2) which were randomly mixed with 10 distractor 
items (e.g., window, smoking). The 5 conversation ratings (α=.94) and the 5 sex ratings 
(α=.94) were aggregated, serving as explicit measures of the tendency to associate 
conversation, or sex, with the stranger situation. 
Sociosexuality Scale. The 20-item Sociosexuality Scale (SS) by Bailey et al. (2000) was 
translated into German. It consists of the items of the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory 
(SOI; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991), 12 items in a yes/no format from Eysenck (1976) that 
assess sociosexual attitudes and a further open question about the lifetime number of sexual 
partners. A factor analysis with varimax rotation identified, according to the scree plot, two 
orthogonal factors which could be clearly interpreted as sociosexuality attitude (highest 
loading item Sex without love is ok, explained variance 18.9%) and sociosexual behavior 
(highest-loading item During your entire life, how many partners of the opposite sex have you 
had sexual contact with?, explained variance 14.6%). 
Therefore we constructed from the z-standardized items that loaded above .50 on one 
factor and below .30 on the other factor two short subscales of the SS, the sociosexual 
attitude scale (items no. 3, 9-12, 14 of the original SS) and the sociosexual behavior scale 
(items no. 16-19 of the original SS). Because the items of the sociosexual behavior scale 
were strongly skewed and included zero responses, they were submitted to a log+1 - 
transformation. The resulting scales showed sufficient reliability despite their shortness, 
α=.79 for attitude, α=.72 for behavior. The two subscales correlated significantly but not 
highly, r=.34, p<.001. To compare our findings with other studies, we also report results for 
the SOI score (α=.69). 
Method: Internet IAT Study 
A similar study was conducted online on www.psytests.de, the online portal for internet 
studies of the Institute of Psychology, Humboldt University. The website was also linked with 
multiple German websites specializing in psychological experiments and tests. Despite 
former preconceptions, evidence is accumulating that online studies can provide valid data 
for research on implicit associations (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), personality 
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(Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004), and sexuality (Mustanski, 2001). The study was 
implemented in line with the guidelines on internet research proposed by Michalak and 
Szabo (1998) and the recommendations given by Kraut, Olson, Banaji, Bruckman, Cohen, 
and Couper (2004). 
After basic demographic questions, the sociosexuality IAT was given, followed by, among 
other measures, the Sociosexuality Scale. Both the implicit and explicit measures were 
analyzed exactly as in the laboratory study. The explicit ratings were programmed in HTML 
and php. The IAT was programmed as a JAVA applet, which was embedded in the web page 
that the participants loaded into their browsers. When the IAT was successfully finished, the 
results were uploaded to the website. The JAVA applet used an inaccurate-timing filter 
(Eichstaedt, 2001) such that response time biases due to, e.g., the parallel execution of other 
programs were minimal. Participants were prompted to reduce any sources of environmental 
disturbances during the study and asked to participate only if they had enough time and 
privacy. 
During 17 days, 187 website visitors completed all parts of the study. Selected for the 
final sample were all sexually experienced heterosexuals aged 18 - 39 years (47 males, 89 
females); mean age was 23.7 years (SD=5.2). The sample did not differ significantly from the 
laboratory sample with regard to age and the number of lifetime sexual partners (all p>.10). 
Results 
In the laboratory IAT, 4 participants (4.3%), and in the internet IAT, 3 participants (2.2%) 
showed more than 15% incorrect responses during the combined blocks; they were excluded 
from further analysis. As Table 3 indicates, the laboratory and the internet IAT showed 
similar means, SDs, error rates, and internal consistencies α; t tests confirmed this for the 
mean IAT effect and the error rate, t<1 in both cases. Also, the correlations with the explicit 
sociosexuality scales were not significantly different as confirmed by z tests for differences 
between correlations. Thus, the internet method yielded virtually identical results as the 
laboratory method. 
Concerning the validity of the IAT, the results were disappointing because the 
correlations with the explicit sociosexuality scales (SOI and the behavioral and attitudinal 
subscales of the SS) were not significant in all 6 cases (the mean correlation was .04). Also, 
the sex difference was not even marginally significant for both the laboratory IAT and the 
internet IAT, p>.10 in both cases. This result suggested that there was perhaps a problem 
with the conversation category. If conversation is positively related to implicit sociosexuality, 
this would at least partly explain the low correlation between the IAT and the sociosexuality 
scales. 
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In order to test this a posteriori hypothesis, the stranger situation ratings in the laboratory 
study were analyzed (situation ratings were not assessed in the internet study). The 
conversation ratings correlated clearly positively with the sex ratings, r=.41, p<.001. Thus, 
participants who more strongly associated sex with the stranger situation also tended to 
more strongly associate conversation with it, and vice versa. However, the SOI scores were 
only associated with the sex ratings. They correlated significantly, r=.26, p<.05, with the sex 
ratings, not at all with the conversation ratings, r=.00, and significantly with the difference 
score sex - conversation, r=.26, p<.05. Thus, as expected, explicit sociosexuality was related 
to the explicit tendency to associate sex with this situation, but not conversation. In other 
words, conversation was a neutral category, not an opposite category, with regard to explicit 
sociosexuality. As Table 3 indicates, the sociosexuality IAT replicated this pattern. It 
correlated r=.19, p=.07, with the sex rating, and r = -.03, ns, with the conversation rating; the 
correlation with the difference score sex - conversation was r=.21, p<.05. 
Together, these results for the stranger situation ratings suggest that conversation is a 
neutral category with regard to sociosexuality at both the explicit and the implicit level. The 
rather high correlation of .41 between the ratings of conversation and sex seems to be due to 
shared method variance that is independent of sociosexuality, particularly situation-specific 
tendencies to engage in any activity with strangers. 
Discussion 
This study has replicated for a laboratory version and an internet version descriptive 
indices of an sociosexuality IAT that aims at assessing the association between stranger - 
sex relative to partner - sex, with conversation serving as a neutral category. For young adult 
samples, the mean, the standard deviation, and a satisfactory error rate and reliability were 
replicated. However, at the same time this study also replicated that this IAT failed to show 
any significant correlations with three explicit sociosexuality scales. Weak evidence for the 
IAT's validity was only found for the ratings of a potential interaction with an opposite-sex 
stranger; the IAT was significantly related to sex minus conversation ratings that used the 
IAT stimuli for these categories as items. Together, these results point to a weak validity of 
the IAT that was only revealed for an explicit measure that was more closely matched to the 
IAT procedure than the traditional sociosexuality scales. These situation ratings also 
confirmed that conversation is a neutral category with regard to both implicit and explicit 
sociosexuality because both explicit sociosexuality and the IAT correlated virtually zero with 
the conversation ratings while showing at least marginally positive correlations with the sex 
ratings. 
These results suggested to us that the validity of the sociosexuality IAT was suppressed 
by individual differences in the tendency to associate conversation more with strangers than 
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with partner, individual differences that were irrelevant for sociosexuality but confounded with 
the IAT scores. Therefore we constructed a sociosexuality Single Attribute IAT (SA-IAT) that 
relied solely on the attribute category sex but was otherwise as much comparable with the 
sociosexuality IAT as possible. 
Study 2: SA-IAT 
Method 
For this study, the sociosexuality IAT was modified to a single attribute IAT. Target 
concepts were again partner and stranger, but only sex served as the (unipolar) attribute; for 
these 3 categories, the same stimuli were used as in the sociosexuality IAT. The testing and 
analysis procedures were the same as for the sociosexuality IAT except that (a) the attribute 
discrimination and the reverse attribute discrimination were dropped, and (b) only sex-related 
stimuli were presented in the attribute conditions (thus, each of the 5 sex stimuli occurred 
twice as often as in the sociosexuality IAT). Table 4 presents the SA-IAT task; it is 
structurally highly similar to the Single Target IAT (ST-IAT) by Wigboldus, Holland, and van 
Knippenberg (2005) except that the asymmetry in this variant of the IAT refers to attributes 
rather than targets. 
Because we were initially concerned that participants would become bored during the 
many trials of this simplified procedure, and because Wigboldus et al. (2005) used only 40 
trials in the combined blocks of their ST-IAT, we first implemented a short version of the SA-
IAT with only 20 trials in the target discrimination task and only 60 trials in the combined 
tasks. Because of reliability problems we subsequently used the full procedure. Below we 
refer to these two versions as the short version and the full version. 
The short version was tested on 17 days immediately preceding the internet IAT study, 
thus, on as many days as the internet IAT, resulting in 236 completed tests. The full version 
was tested during a whole year, starting after the IAT testing, because it was found to be 
advantageous to the short version as shown in the result section. To provide a fair 
comparison between short and full version, only the tests of the full version completed on the 
first 17 days of testing are considered here (171 tests). The final sample consisted of 315 
sexually experienced heterosexuals aged 18 - 39 years (56 males and 117 females, mean 
age 23.9 years, SD=5.4, short version; 54 males and 89 females, mean age 24.3 years, 
SD=5.9, full version). The internet samples in Studies 1 and 2 (IAT, short SA-IAT, full SA-
IAT) did not differ significantly with regard to sex composition, age, highest achieved 
educational level, and number of lifetime sexual partners. 
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Results 
Because of error rates above 15% in the SA-IAT, 9 participants (5.2%) were excluded for 
the short SA-IAT, and 4 participants (2.9%) for the full SA-IAT. Table 5 presents the results 
for these two SA-IAT versions that can also be directly compared with the results for the two 
IAT versions in Table 3. Table 5 indicates that the short and the long versions had a mean 
close to zero and similar standard deviations and error rates. However, the long version was 
more reliable, which can be attributed to the double number of trials in each combined task. 
Indeed, the Spearman-Brown formula predicts a reliability of .81 for the full version on the 
basis of the .68 reliability for the short version. An inspection of the corrected block - total 
correlations for the 6 20-trial blocks to which the reliability of the full version refers indicated 
that these correlations were similarly high; in particular, they did not decrease toward the end 
of the test trials. Because of the higher reliability of the full version, it is not surprising that the 
correlations with the sociosexuality scales were somewhat higher for the full version. 
When the SA-IAT findings for the full version are compared with the internet IAT results 
(to avoid methodological differences with the laboratory IAT), the SA-IAT showed a similar 
error rate and reliability, significantly higher correlations with the SOI scale, z=2.48, p<.05, 
the behavioral SS subscale, z=2.46, p<.05, but not the attitudinal SS subscale, z=1.57, ns. 
The SA-IAT also showed a significantly more positive mean, t(270)=9.09, p<.001, and a 
smaller standard deviation, F(1,270)=10.93, p<.001; the interindividual variance was reduced 
to 60% of the IAT variance. Finally, a comparison of the mean reaction times for the 80 test 
trials between the internet IAT and the full SA-IAT revealed significantly faster reactions in 
the SA-IAT (for the first combined block: IAT, M=795.2 ms, SD=165.7, SA-IAT, M=750.4 ms, 
SD=240.3, t(270)=2.90, p<.005, d=0.35; for the reversed combined block: IAT, M=921.8 ms, 
SD=197.6, SA-IAT, M=741.2 ms, SD=228.8, t(270)=8.87, p<.001, d=1.08). The faster 
responses particularly for the reversed combined block can be attributed to the easier SA-
IAT task, particularly regarding the reversal of a single attribute in the SA-IAT versus two 
targets in the IAT (see Tables 1 and 4). 
An analysis of the sex differences in the two SA-IAT versions was consistent with the 
hypothesis that the full version showed a higher validity than the short version. Whereas the 
sex difference for the short version was not significant, p>.10, which was consistent with the 
IAT, the full SA-IAT showed the expected sex difference. Males had significantly higher 
implicit sociosexuality scores than females (for males, M=21.4 ms, SD=128.0; for females, 
M=-13.0 ms, SD=97.6; t(137)=2.01, p<.05, d=0.34) which was slightly smaller than the effect 
at the explicit level for Germany of d=0.48 (Schmitt, 2005). Thus, only the full SA-IAT version 
showed a significant, moderate sex difference. 
In order to test whether this sex difference was only due to the correlation of the SA-IAT 
with explicit sociosexuality, an analysis of covariance was conducted, with sex as the 
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independent factor and the SOI score as the covariate. The sex effect for the SA-IAT 
remained nearly unchanged, F(1,136)=3.46, p=.06, d=0.32. Thus, it cannot be attributed to a 
mediation through explicit sociosexuality.1 
Discussion 
The findings for the two SA-IAT versions suggest that (a) the full version should be 
preferred to the short version because of the higher reliability of the full version, and (b) the 
SA-IAT is a more valid measure of implicit sociosexuality than the IAT.2 
The much larger interindividual variance of the internet IAT, as compared to the full SA-
IAT, suggest that the IAT effects were confounded with interindividual differences to 
associate conversation more with a stranger versus a partner. As the stranger situation 
ratings in the laboratory study suggested, these additional interindividual differences were 
largely independent of the target interindividual differences, namely to associate sex more 
with a stranger than with a partner. Due to this additional variance component, the variance 
was higher in the IAT than in the SA-IAT. The more negative mean in the IAT as compared 
to the SA-IAT suggests that the confounding component in the IAT had a negative mean, 
that is, participants overall associated conversation less strongly with a partner than with a 
stranger, slowing down the reversed combined task which is interpreted in terms of implicit 
sociosexuality as low implicit sociosexuality. 
It should be noted that this is by no means the only possible interpretation. Alternatively 
or additionally, a comparison of the reaction times between the IAT and the SA-IAT suggests 
that the participants in the SA-IAT profited more from the simpler task reversal, speeding up 
their responses in the reversed combined block, which is interpreted as higher implicit 
sociosexuality. Also, the higher variance of the IAT as compared to the SA-IAT may be partly 
due to higher task shift costs in the IAT, a cognitive variable that has been shown by Mierke 
and Klauer (2003) to confound IAT responses and to increase their variance. These task shift 
costs refer to the alternating between target and attribute stimuli in the combined tasks. 
                                                
1 The effect sizes remained highly similar with regard to reliability, correlation with explicit 
sociosexuality, and sex differences when the full SA-IAT data obtained during a whole year were 
analyzed, and these effects were all confirmed at the p < .001 level due to the much larger sample 
(N=1611). 
2 The IATs and SA-IATs were also analyzed using the D-measure proposed by Greenwald, Nosek and 
Banaji (2003) where the difference between the mean log-transformed latencies in the combined tasks 
is divided by the intraindividual standard deviation of these latencies. The D measure correlated above 
.95 with the traditional difference measure in all four studies, and yielded results that were highly 
similar to those obtained by the traditional unstandardized difference measure. Therefore, we report 
here only the results for the traditional measure. 
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Although both the IAT and the SA-IAT were designed such that targets and stimuli alternated 
constantly from trial to trial, the associated task shift costs may have been lower for the SA-
IAT because the task was simpler. 
In any case, an additional irrelevant variance component in the IAT might have 
suppressed its validity. Psychometric considerations support this view. If a variable X with 
variance s² correlates r with a criterion Z, the sum of X and a variable Y with the same 
variance s² correlates r√1/2 with Z if Y is uncorrelated with both X and Z (a mathematical 
truth that can be proved algebraically). For example, applying this formula to the SA-IAT 
correlation of .20 with the SOI yields an expected IAT - SOI correlation of .14 if the IAT effect 
can be represented as the sum of the SA-IAT effect plus the effect of an uncorrelated 
variable with the same variance as the SA-IAT. 
It is important to note that a higher validity of the SA-IAT cannot be claimed only on the 
basis of the implicit - explicit correlations because the true correlation between implicit and 
explicit sociosexuality is unknown. If this correlation would be zero, the correlational results 
would suggest that the SA-IAT is more strongly related to explicit sociosexuality because the 
procedure might be more transparent to many participants. However, the sex difference in 
the full SA-IAT supports the view that the SA-IAT was in fact more valid than the IAT. As 
expected, males showed a larger SA-IAT effect than females, and when explicit 
sociosexuality was controlled in an analysis of covariance, the sex difference for the SA-IAT 
remained nearly unchanged. Thus, the sex effect for the full SA-IAT was not mediated by 
explicit sociosexuality. In contrast, the sociosexuality IAT did not show this expected sex 
difference. 
General Discussion 
Problems can arise for Implicit Association Tests if there is no clear opposite category. In 
this case, a neutral category can be used although it induces systematic error variance and 
thus reduces validity. The present study suggests that this problem can be solved using 
Single Attribute IATs (SA-IATs). Sociosexuality was expected to be related at the implicit 
level to stronger stranger - sex associations relative to partner - sex associations. An IAT 
was constructed that used conversation as a neutral attribute; it showed satisfactory 
reliability but only low correlations with explicit sociosexuality, and failed to show a 
theoretically expected sex difference. An alternative SA-IAT with sex as the only attribute 
showed a similar reliability but higher correlations with explicit sociosexuality, and confirmed 
the expected sex difference even when explicit sociosexuality was controlled. 
Whereas a Single Attribute IAT was superior to a traditional bipolar attribute IAT in the 
present study, we cannot exclude the possibility that another sociosexuality IAT with an 
opposite attribute to sex that is more strongly associated with stranger by those low in 
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sociosexuality than by those high in sociosexuality, is more valid than the present 
sociosexuality IAT. In such a case, the construct of sociosexuality would be better compatible 
with the bipolar attribute assumption underlying IATs. However, it is hard to imagine that 
such a "naturally opposite" attribute to sex exists for sociosexuality. 
 Apart from this construct-specific problem, we do not claim that Single Attribute IATs are 
always a good solution for the assessment of implicit associations involving unipolar 
attributes. Instead, we consider the Single Attribute IAT option as an interesting hypothesis 
that should be tested for a wide variety of constructs. Such studies could also study 
correlations between an IAT and a SA-IAT for the same construct by assessing both in 
counterbalanced order within sex. 
Last but not least, we would like to point out a problem that even Single Attribute IATs 
cannot solve: the problem of unipolar targets. Our SA-IAT was designed to assess the 
relative association strength of sex - stranger as compared to sex - partner, assuming that 
the sex - partner association is not positively related to sociosexuality because explicit 
sociosexuality has been shown to be largely independent of explicit reports of sexual interest 
in committed relationships. This assumption could be empirically tested at the explicit level 
similarly to our test of the association between sociosexuality and conversation. 
Ultimately, however, it would be necessary to assess the sex - stranger association 
independently from the sex - partner association at the implicit level. This would require 
reliable and valid "Single Attribute Single Target Association Tests", i.e. procedures that 
purely asses associations between two concepts. At a first glance, priming seems to be a 
candidate method, but the reported reliabilities for interindividual differences assessed with 
priming are discouraging (Spence, 2005). We consider the development of new instruments 
for the reliable assessment of interindividual differences in the strength of simple 
associations between one target concept and one attribute concept as an important task for 
the years to come. 
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Table 1: Implicit Association Test for Sociosexuality: Task Sequence 
 No. of  Response key assignment 
Block trials Task Left key Right key 
1 40 Target discrimination Stranger Partner 
2 40 Attribute discrimination Conversation Sex 
3 40+80 Initial combined task Stranger, 
conversation 
Partner, sex 
4 40 Reversed target discrimination Partner Stranger 
5 40+80 Reversed combined task Partner, conversation Stranger, 
sex 
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Table 2: Implicit Association Test for Sociosexuality: Stimuli (original German stimuli in parentheses) 
Partner Stranger Sex Conversation 
Partner (Partner/in) Stranger 
(Fremde/r) 
Sex (Sex) Talk (Gespräch) 
Steady partner 
(Feste/r Partner/in) 
Unknown person 
(Unbekannte/r) 
Seduce 
(Verführen) 
Conversation 
(Unterhaltung) 
Lifetime companion 
(Lebenspartner/in) 
Unfamiliar person 
(Unvertraute/r) 
Lust (Lust) Chat (Geplauder) 
Steady relationship 
(Feste Beziehung) 
New acquaintance 
(Neue/r 
Bekannte/r) 
Erotic (Erotik) Talking (Reden) 
Lifemate 
(Lebensgefährte/in) 
New man/woman 
(Neue/r 
Mann/Frau) 
Arousal 
(Erregung) 
Speaking 
(Sprechen) 
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Table 3: Results for the Sociosexuality IAT: Effect, error rate, reliability, and external correlates 
  Effect (ms) Error ratea Reliability Correlation r with 
IAT N M SD M SD αb SOI SSatt SSbeh Conv Sex 
Laboratory 94 -156.2 148.3 5.3% 3.3% .81 .13 .20# .07 -.03 .19# 
Internet 133 -126.6 141.8 5.4% 3.6% .75 -.06 .02 -.13 - - 
Note. SOI = Sociosexual Orientation Inventory sum score, based on the z-transformed items of the 
SOI 
SSatt = sociosexual attitude subscale of the SS; SSbeh = sociosexual behavior subscale of the SS; 
Conv = situation rating conversation; Sex = situation rating sex 
a Percentage of incorrect responses in the combined tasks. 
b Reliability was evaluated with regard to the four 20-trial blocks in the test trials of the combined tasks. 
# p < .10. 
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Table 4: Single Attribute IAT for Sociosexuality: Task Sequence 
 No. of  Response key assignment 
Block trialsa Task Left key Right key 
1 40 Target discrimination Stranger Partner 
2 40+80 Initial combined task Stranger Partner, sex 
3 40+80 Reversed combined task Stranger, sex Partner 
a Half as many trials in each condition for the short version. 
196 
Table 5: Results for the Sociosexuality SA-IAT: Effect, error rate, reliability, and external correlates 
  Effect (ms) Error ratea Reliability Correlation r with 
SA-IAT N M SD M SD α SOI SSatt SSbeh 
Short 163 -1.95 101.1 5.7% 3.8% .68b .20* .14 .14 
Full 139 -0.64 110.3 4.5% 2.6% .82c .21* .19* .14 
Note. SOI = Sociosexual Orientation index, based on the z-transformed items of the SOI; SSatt = 
sociosexual attitude subscale of the SS; SSbeh = sociosexual behavior subscale of the SS. 
a Percentage of incorrect responses in the combined tasks. 
b Reliability was evaluated with regard to the 3 20-trial blocks in the combined task. 
c Reliability was evaluated with regard to the 6 20-trial blocks in the combined task. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01 
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Abstract 
Sociosexuality is usually assessed as the overall orientation towards uncommitted sex. While 
often useful, this global approach masks the theoretically meaningful, unique contributions of 
its components. In a large online study (N = 2,708) and a detailed behavioral assessment of 
283 young adults (both singles and couples) with a 1-year follow-up, we showed discriminant 
validity for behavioral experiences, attitudes towards uncommitted sex, and sociosexual 
desire (all measured by a revised version of the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, the SOI-
R) regarding both sex differences and many established correlates of sociosexuality. 
Furthermore, these three facets played unique roles in the predictions of observed flirting 
behavior when meeting an attractive opposite-sex stranger, even down to the level of 
objectively coded behaviors, and in the prediction of the self-reported number of sexual 
partners and changes in romantic relationship status over the following year. They also 
showed distinct developmental patterns, degrees of assortative mating, and effects on a 
romantic partner. Implications for the evolutionary psychology of mating tactics are 
discussed. 
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Kinsey’s studies on normative sexuality (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, 
Pomeroy, Martin & Gebhard, 1953) were the first to provide scientific evidence that 
promiscuity is a fairly frequent phenomenon (a finding later confirmed, for example, by 
Laumann, Gagnon, Michael & Michaels, 1994, and Schmitt, 2005a). Kinsey introduced the 
term “sociosexuality” to describe individual differences in people’s willingness to engage in 
uncommitted sexual relationships. The construct of sociosexuality received much interest in 
various branches of psychology when Simpson and Gangestad (1991) provided a short self-
report measure of global sociosexual orientations, the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory 
(SOI). It assesses sociosexuality along a single broad dimension, with high scores indicating 
an unrestricted sociosexual orientation (i.e., an overall more promiscuous behavioral 
tendency) and low scores indicating a restricted sociosexual orientation. The SOI proved to 
be a valuable instrument in more than forty published studies (reviewed in Simpson, Wilson 
& Winterheld, 2004), where it showed relations to, for example, mate choice preferences 
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1992; Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas & Giles, 1999), courtship 
behaviors (Simpson et al., 1993, 1996, 1999), romantic relationship stability (Simpson, 1987) 
and quality (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Ellis, 1998; Jones, 1998), and high-risk sexual 
behavior (Seal & Agostinelli, 1994). Another important reason for the success of the SOI was 
that it became the standard operationalization of individual differences in the study of long-
term versus short-term mating tactics in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Schmitt, 2005a). This 
allowed sociosexuality research to take place within an elaborated theoretical framework 
(Trivers, 1972; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). However, despite its 
undeniable success, a limitation that runs through the history of sociosexuality research like 
a central thread is the almost exclusive focus on sociosexual orientations as a unitary 
behavioral tendency (Asendorpf & Penke, 2005; Webster & Bryan, in press; Townsend, Kline 
& Wasserman, 1995). In the current article, we argue for a more differentiated perspective. 
Global Sociosexual Orientations 
When biologist Alfred Kinsey (Kinsey et al., 1948, 1953) first wrote about 
sociosexuality, his approach to human sexuality was the standard biological approach to an 
unknown territory (which human sexuality was at that time): as descriptive and objective as 
possible. Consequently, he introduced sociosexuality as a global behavioral tendency; his 
interests in underlying causes and mechanisms were fairly limited. Simpson and Gangestad 
(1991) appeared to share this global perspective when they developed the SOI. Even though 
they acknowledged different aspects of sociosexuality (“overt” and “covert” behaviors, 
attitudes), their endeavors were guided by the explicit aim of developing a broad measure of 
global sociosexuality (p. 883). As a result, the SOI total score became an amalgam of (1) 
past sociosexual behaviors (items 1 and 3), (2) future behavioral expectancy (item 2), (3) the 
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frequency of unrestricted fantasies (item 4), and (4) attitudes towards sociosexuality (items 5, 
6, and 7) (Table 1). 
Despite the obvious psychological heterogeneity of these items, the fact that the SOI 
remained the sole operationalization of sociosexuality corroborated the implicit equation in 
the literature of sociosexuality with the SOI total score. In addition, the global 
conceptualization of sociosexuality happened to fit quite smoothly with the evolutionary 
psychology of human mating that developed around it in the following years, which tended to 
focus more on the environmental and personal factors that determine global sociosexual 
orientations (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Schmitt, 2005a) than on the evolved 
psychological mechanisms that allow individuals to choose their mating tactics adaptively 
(Miller, 1997; Mata, Wilke & Todd, 2005; Penke, Todd, Fasolo & Lenton, in press). 
Characterizing how different psychological aspects of sociosexuality relate to the mating 
tactics that people show might tell us where to look for underlying psychological mechanisms 
and might thus aid their discovery in future research. 
Table 1 about here 
Three Components of Global Sociosexual Orientations: Behavior, Attitude, and Desire 
According to Kinsey, individual differences in sociosexuality are first of all behavioral: some 
people have uncommitted sex on a regular base, others only seldom or never. Histories of 
more or less unrestricted sociosexual behaviors, in turn, are the developmental outcome of 
individual desires in transaction with personal and external (social and non-social) 
constraints on each individual’s ability to fulfill his or her sociosexual desire. 
Sociosexual desire can be defined as a specific form of interpersonal sexual desire (as 
opposed to the impersonal sexual desire that may motivate masturbation; Spector et al., 
1996). Like general sexual desire (Beck et al., 1991; Ostovich & Sabini, 2004), sociosexual 
desire is an affective state that is characterized by sexual arousal, heightened sexual 
interest, and sexual fantasies. But unlike general sexual desire, unrestricted sociosexual 
desire comes with a sexual attraction that is specifically targeted at potential mates to whom 
no committed romantic relationship exists (see Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Simpson et al., 
2004). This preference for a certain class of incentives (i.e., uncommitted sexual partners) 
gives sociosexual desire a clear motivational component that makes it more concrete than 
the somewhat vague concept of general sexual desire (Bancroft, 1989). The affective state of 
passionate love (also called infatuation or “limerence”) usually focuses sexual attraction on a 
single person and thus makes sociosexual desire highly restrictive (Fisher, 2004; Tennov, 
1979). However, this highly activated state does not last forever, making sociosexual desires 
more unrestricted again after a period of time that has been said to be limited to 
approximately four years of romantic relationship (the “four-year-itch”, Fisher, 1987). For 
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some, the infatuation period might be much shorter; these people tend to fall in and out of 
love quite frequently. As a consequence, they experience unrestricted sociosexual desire 
more often. Still others rarely or never fall into the state of infatuation (Tennov, 1979) – for 
them, the degree of sociosexual desire should be purely dispositional. 
Sociosexual desire usually shows a sex difference: on average, men are much more 
willing to have sex with strangers (Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Schmitt et 
al., 2003), wish for a larger diversity of future sex partners (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Schmitt et 
al., 2003), and have unrestricted fantasies more often (Ellis & Symons, 1990; Leitenberg & 
Henning, 1995). Indeed, these sex differences are among the largest ones found in 
psychology (Hyde, 2005). As a proximate explanation, it has been suggested that the 
physiological systems for sexual attraction are more dependent on the physiological systems 
for interpersonal attachment in women than in men (Diamond, 2003, 2004). Ultimately, 
parental investment theory argues that the sex difference in sociosexual desire is an evolved 
psychological adaptation to the inevitable differences in minimal parental investment 
between the sexes (Buss & Schmitt, 1993), which implies higher potential benefits and lower 
costs of short-term mating for men than for women (Trivers, 1972). 
However, Gangestad and Simpson (2000) argued that intrasexual differences in 
sociosexual desires are much larger than intersexual differences. To account for intrasexual 
differences in sociosexuality, they proposed the strategic pluralism model. According to this 
model, men will be motivated to have multiple uncommitted sexual relationships due to their 
more unrestricted sociosexual desire, but their behavioral success will be limited by their 
ability to find willing sexual partners, because mating markets are competitive: As long as 
heterosexual men and women who desire different degrees of variety and commitment in 
their sexual relationships live in a population with roughly equal sex ratio, it will be impossible 
for every man and every woman to translate their sociosexual desire into behavior 
(Asendorpf & Penke, 2005; Penke et al., in press). There will always be women who fail to 
turn a sexual affair with the man they want into an exclusive long-term relationship, and most 
men won’t have as many one-night-stands as they might wish for. 
A man’s behavioral success will depend on his ability to live up to the mate choice 
preferences of women. Female preferences, in turn, are contingent on the reproductive 
demand imposed by the environment: under harsh environmental conditions, when offspring 
survival is heavily dependent on biparental care, the model predicts that women will have 
restrictive sociosexual desires and prefer exclusive relationships with men who are good 
fathers and good providers. However, when environmental conditions are more luxurious, it 
is predicted that female desires will become less restricted. This should especially be the 
case when high prevalence rates of infectious diseases and parasites make mate choice for 
genetic benefits (“good genes” that are passed from the chosen mate to potential offspring) 
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highly important. Under such conditions, women might forego relationship exclusivity for 
mating opportunities with those few men with the best indicators of genetic quality (Simpson 
& Oriña, 2003). While it is likely that further conditions affect sociosexuality (e.g. Schmitt, 
2005a), the principles of the strategic pluralism model nicely illustrate how personal and 
environmental factors constrain people’s abilities to translate their sociosexual desires into 
behaviors. 
Cultural values (like chastity or freedom of self-expression), traditions (like religious 
commandments), and institutions (like marriage systems) tend to reflect the reproductive 
demands of the environment, and can thereby reinforce the adaptive degree of 
sociosexuality in populations (Gangestad, Haselton & Buss, 2006; Low, 2007). 
Simultaneously, they provide powerful means to influence the sociosexuality of other people 
in the population. For example, Baumeister and Twenge (2002) argued that the cultural 
suppression of female sociosexual unrestrictiveness is likely the result of women 
constraining each others’ behavior. This way, they can control the availability and 
consequently the exchange value of female sexual accessibility on the mating market (see 
also Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Thus, the culturally expected degree of sociosexuality will 
not necessarily reflect the sociosexual desire or determine the sociosexual behavior of each 
particular individual, though it will likely influence each individual’s sociosexual attitude and 
social self-presentation. 
It follows that there are at least three distinguishable components of global 
sociosexual orientations: the individual degree of desire for uncommitted sexual 
relationships, the attitude towards sociosexuality that an individual acquired during 
socialization and communicates in social settings, and the sociosexual behavior that results 
from the individual desire and attitude in the socio-environmental context of a local mating 
market. These three components will have reciprocal effects on each other during an 
individual’s lifelong development. For example, a young man might start with a highly 
unrestricted sociosexual desire during puberty, but may soon face the social disapproval of a 
restricted social environment (e.g. in his conservative hometown) and rejection by restricted 
women as a response to his unrestricted advances. This will put severe limits on his 
behavioral success with unrestricted mating tactics and might make his attitudes more 
restricted, but at the same time might have no effects on his desires. When he later changes 
to a more unrestricted environment (e.g. by moving to a more liberal city), he might 
encounter less restricted potential mates. At first, his learned restricted attitudes might inhibit 
his motivation to initiate unrestricted behaviors, but after a while his attitudes might change 
and reflect his unrestricted desire again. How well he is able to translate his desire into 
behavior will depend on his attractiveness. If his attractiveness is low, his continuing failures 
on the behavioral level might have a restricting impact on his attitude and maybe even his 
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desire. If his attractiveness is high, all three components may become very unrestricted - or 
he eventually falls in love (i.e., infatuation, limerence) and becomes highly restricted in his 
desire and actual behavior, but keeps some degree of unrestrictedness in his attitudes that 
reflect his unrestricted cultural environment. 
Global sociosexuality, as measured by the SOI, provides a snapshot of this 
transactional process. It reflects the communality (shared core) of sociosexual desires, 
attitudes, and behavioral histories, which results from the correlations these interdependent 
components will naturally show at any point in time (see Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; 
Snyder, Gangestad & Simpson, 1986). While global sociosexual orientations are informative 
to a certain degree, each component has a very unique psychological meaning, and a more 
differentiated perspective might provide deeper insights into the construct of sociosexuality 
and human mating in general. 
Overview 
In the following, we aim to provide a more differentiated perspective on global 
sociosexuality by studying its three components separately, and their unique contributions to 
human mating. In Study 1, we revisited the structure of the SOI and revised it to become a 
multidimensional operationalization of the three sociosexuality components that we 
theoretically deduced: sociosexual behavior, attitude and desire. At the same time, we 
improved on some of the psychometric issues with the SOI that are frequently criticized 
(Asendorpf & Penke, 2005; Voracek, 2005; Webster & Bryan, in press). Furthermore, Study 
1 investigated the relative strength of the relationships between sociosexuality components 
and a broad array of variables in the nomological network of global sociosexuality. Study 2 
explores how the sociosexuality components differ in their temporal stability, developmental 
transactions with romantic relationships, degrees of assortative mating, and predictive 
validity with regard to flirting behavior when meeting an attractive stranger of the opposite 
sex, relationship outcomes, and number of future sexual partners. 
Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish the three-component-structure of 
sociosexuality, in tandem with an appropriate measure. We first compared psychometric 
characteristics and sex differences in the well-established SOI with a revised version of the 
SOI that allows for a separate assessment of past sociosexual behavior, sociosexual 
attitudes, and sociosexual affectivity. Furthermore, we replicated parts of the nomological 
network that has been found for global sociosexuality (Simpson et al., 2004), including 
indicators of individual romantic relationship and sexual history, current relationship quality, 
general sexual desires, mate choice preferences, self-assessments, and related personality 
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traits and attitudes. For each correlate, we explored the unique contributions of each 
sociosexuality component. 
Psychometric issues of the SOI. Despite its unquestionable success, various technical 
details of the SOI have been repeatedly criticized (Asendorpf & Penke, 2005; Voracek, 2005; 
Webster & Bryan, in press). These include the one-dimensional conceptualization of 
sociosexuality in the SOI, which is not only problematic on the theoretical grounds we 
outlined above, but also empirically: the internal consistency of the SOI tends to by quite 
variable across samples, sometimes falling below the threshold of what is usually regarded 
as acceptable. For example, across the 48 samples of the International Sexuality Description 
Project, Cronbach’s α for the SOI (based on raw scores of all seven items) varied between 
.31 and .86 (Schmitt, 2005a). Furthermore, Webster and Bryan (in press) failed to find 
support for a one-factorial structure of the SOI in a large sample of college students. They 
suggested two correlated factors, sociosexual behavior and attitude, instead. However, these 
two factors also failed to provide a clear solution, since the behavioral expectancy item 
(number 2) showed equal loadings on both factors, and the fantasy item (number 4) was not 
well represented in this structure. 
In addition to construct heterogeneity, the psychometric quality of the SOI is attenuated 
by the open response formats of the first three (behavioral) items. Such open questions for 
numbers of sexual partners tend to provide heavily skewed data, with low reliability of the 
values in the right tail of the distribution due to exaggerations, ballpark estimations, and 
systematic memory biases (Brown & Sinclair, 1999; Wiedermann, 1997). As a consequence, 
the first three items can contribute an amount of variance to the SOI total score that is 
several times higher than the variance of the other four items - one very high value can thus 
completely dominate an individual’s total score. High values in the open SOI items often 
receive some form of special treatment, but there is no consensus on this among 
researchers: some trim only item 2 (e.g. Simpson & Gangestad, 1991), others trim all three 
open items (e.g. Webster & Bryan, in press), eliminate the upper 1% of the data (e.g. 
Schmitt, 2005a), or log-transform them to normality (Penke, Eichstaedt & Asendorpf, 2006). 
Most often, however, the way this problem is treated is not reported. Needless to say, this 
reduces the comparability of results. 
Another factor that limits result comparability is that there is also no consensus in the 
literature with regard to the scoring of the SOI. This issue stems from the fact that the seven 
SOI items come with three different response scales of unequal length. As a consequence, 
the SOI items cannot simply be summed or averaged to a total score, but must be 
transformed to a common metric first. Simpson and Gangestad (1991) suggested three 
alternative ways to do so (factor analysis, z-standardization, and a weighting formula). One 
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of the latter two is usually used, even though they tend to provide different results (Voracek, 
2005). 
Finally, the origin of the SOI in the study of romantic couples (Simpson, 1987; Simpson & 
Gangestad, 1991) left its marks in the formulation of the fantasy item 4. In its original 
wording, only subjects who are currently involved in a romantic relationship are able to give a 
meaningful response. Since then, however, the SOI has been used in samples that included 
singles, with the consequence that item 4 is often skipped by these participants or omitted by 
the researchers (e.g. Clark, 2004, 2006; Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Greilling & Buss, 2000). 
Others (e.g. Schmitt, 2005a) circumvent this problem by changing the item text, even though 
the consequences for the construct validity are largely unknown. 
The nomological network of global sociosexuality. Since sociosexuality is defined as 
the willingness to engage in uncommitted sexuality, its most obvious correlates are the 
desire for sexual variety (Schmitt, 2005a, b) and the lifetime number of sexual partners 
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Ostovich & Sabini, 2004). However, as Simpson and 
colleagues (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Simpson et al., 2004) emphasized, an unrestrictive 
sociosexual orientation does not imply the general avoidance of long-term romantic 
relationships. Therefore, sociosexuality should only show weak relations to romantic 
attachment style. Instead, unrestricted individuals in committed relationships might consider 
having uncommitted sex with extra-pair partners (i.e., sexual affairs). More central to the 
construct of sociosexuality is a trade-off in the allocation of efforts (in terms of time, energy, 
money, and other limited resources) to either one primary mate or many mates: while 
restricted individuals tend to allocate their mating efforts in favor of the former, unrestricted 
individuals will prefer the latter option. It is thus not the mere engagement in long-term 
relationships that marks different sociosexual orientations, but the quality of these 
relationships (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Ellis, 1998). 
Partly because unrestricted individuals care less about long-term relationships, partly 
because the social values and norms in Western societies do not tolerate “open 
relationships”, the lack of motivation for relationship exclusivity in unrestricted individuals 
presents a permanent threat for relationship stability (Simpson, 1987). A natural side-effect of 
unrestricted sociosexuality is thus an accumulation of ex-partners. Furthermore, since 
romantic commitment is encouraged in every major religion, sociosexual orientations tend to 
be more restrictive in more religious individuals (Kinsey et al., 1948, 1953; Laumann et al., 
1994; Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003). 
Gangestad and Simpson (1991) originally introduced the construct of sociosexuality 
as independent of general sexual desire. Indeed, they showed that it was unrelated to the 
frequency of sexual intercourse in couples. However, Ostovich and Sabini (2004) later 
pointed out that general sexual desire should reflect the overall sexual outlet, which is 
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arguably better captured by more impersonal indices, like masturbation frequency (see also 
Kinsey et al., 1948, 1953). When operationalized this way, there is a substantial relationship 
between general sexual desire and sociosexuality. 
Sociosexuality is also related to mate choice, but in a highly specific manner. Several 
studies have shown that unrestricted individuals have a higher preference for physical 
attractiveness and other indicators of good overall condition (e.g. Gangestad & Simpson, 
1992; Fletcher et al., 1999), with the theoretical rational that these traits signal good genetic 
quality (Simpson & Oriña, 2003; Penke et al., in press). In contrast, sociosexuality tends to 
be unrelated to other mate preferences (e.g. for warmth, reliability, or status). Since attractive 
individuals are more likely to be chosen as short-term mates, people seem to infer their own 
mate value from their sociosexual history and use this information for their mating decisions 
(Penke et al., in press; Landolt, Lalumiere & Quinsey, 1995; Clark, 2004, 2006). 
Finally, a number of studies have related sociosexuality to various personality traits, 
with the overall result that unrestricted individuals tend to be extraverted sensation-seekers, 
while restricted people tend to be agreeable and inhibited (reviewed in Simpson et al., 2004). 
Method 
Sample. Study 1 is based on data from a large online survey. Despite former 
preconceptions, evidence is accumulating that online studies can provide valid psychological 
data (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), 
including data for sex research (Mustanski, 2001; Penke, Eichstaedt & Asendorpf, 2006). 
Online studies tend to provide heterogeneous and quite representative samples (Gosling et 
al., 2004), especially when compared to student samples. The current study was 
implemented in line with the guidelines for internet research proposed by Michalak and 
Szabo (1998) and the recommendations given by Kraut, Olson, Banaji, Bruckman, Cohen, 
and Couper (2004). It was limited to adult participants aged 18-50 years who reported 
heterosexual orientation and prior sexual experience. A total of 1,708 German-speaking 
internet users (1,026 men, 1,682 women, M = 24.2, SD = 7.1, Mdn = 22) completed the 
survey and agreed to a final item that asked if all there responses had been serious. The 
majority (92.8%) were native speakers. Slightly more than two thirds of the sample (71.3%) 
had at least a German Fachabitur or Abitur (college entrance examinations), while the others 
had left school with ten years of formal education or less. A total of 1,447 participants 
(53.4%) were currently involved in a committed romantic relationship. As an incentive, 
participants received an automatically generated personality profile after completing the 
study. 
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Measures. After a list of demographic questions, including items regarding age, sex, 
native language, education, religious affiliation, and degree of religiosity, the participants 
answered German adaptations of the following measures: 
The Self-Perceived Mate Value Scale by Landolt, Lalumiere and Quinsey (1995) 
consists of eight items with 7-point rating scales that ask for the reactions one usually 
receives from members of the opposite sex (exemplary item: “Members of the opposite sex 
are attracted to me”; men: α = .91, M = 3.23, SD = 1.01; women: α = .93, M = 3.84, SD = 
1.13). 
A questionnaire on romantic relationships and sexuality included the original SOI 
(Table 1, for descriptive and psychometric statistics see Table 2), the five new sociosexuality 
items of the revised Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI-R, see below and Appendix), 
and items asking for (1) current romantic relationship involvement, (2) the number of past 
romantic relationships that lasted longer than one month, (3) the total number of sexual 
intercourse partners so far, (4) the number of sexual intercourse partners while in a 
relationship with someone else (i.e., extra-pair copulation partners), and (5) their average 
monthly masturbation frequency. For all following analyses, the total number of sexual 
partners and the number of extra-pair copulation partners were log-transformed to reduce 
their skewness. 
Those participants who reported current involvement in a romantic relationship also 
reported the duration of their current relationship and their average monthly sexual 
intercourse frequency with their partner. Furthermore, they answered the following questions 
on a dichotomous yes-no scale: “Do you believe your current partner is ‘Mr./Mrs. Right’?”, 
“Have you ever had a sexual affair with someone else while in the relationship with your 
current partner?”, and “Could you imagine having a sexual affair with someone else while 
being in the relationship with your current partner?”. 
Finally, the participants who were currently in a relationship completed two 
questionnaires concerning their current relationship. The Personal Relationship Quality 
Components questionnaire (Fletcher, Simpson & Thomas, 2000) assesses six components 
of romantic relationship quality: satisfaction, commitment, closeness, trust, passion, and love. 
In this study, the short version of the questionnaire was used, which assesses each 
component with one item, all presented with a 7-point rating scales. In our analyses, we 
concentrated on the more reliable sum score (men: α = .86, M = 32.30, SD = 6.74; women: α 
= .87, M = 33.21, SD = 6.90), which can be regarded as a broad measure of relationship 
quality. 
The Relationship Questionnaire (RQ, Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; German 
version by Doll et al., 1995) is a short measure of adult attachment. It encompasses short 
paragraphs describing each of the following attachment styles: secure, anxious, preoccupied, 
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and dismissive. Participants rated how well each description matched their own thoughts and 
feelings on 7-point rating scales. While attachment styles are often assessed as traits, there 
is a discussion in the literature how relationship-specific adult attachment styles are (Lehnart 
& Neyer, 2006). In this study, the instruction made clear that the descriptions refer to 
attachment to the current romantic relationship partner. It is thus used as a measure of 
relationship-specific attachment to the current mate. Besides analyzing the four attachment 
styles separately, we also followed Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) and calculated two 
scores reflecting the “model of self” and “model of others”. 
In addition, one subgroup of the total sample (N = 867) indicated on 10-point 
percentile scales (as used by Swann, de la Ronde & Hixon, 1994) how much they preferred 
the following 20 characteristics in a potential mate: friendliness, dominance, creativity, 
physical attractiveness, even temper, responsibility, intelligence, sense of humor, athletic 
ability, parental qualities, good education, sex-appeal, good vocational prospect, sexual 
experience, fidelity, social status, richness, interesting personality, desire for children. We 
reduced this list of preferences by submitting the data to a principal component factor 
analysis.1PPPP Both the scree plot and a parallel analysis of 100 random datasets suggested the 
extraction of three factors (explained variance: 46.35%). After VARIMAX rotation, factor 1 
was marked by friendliness (.74), fidelity (.73), and responsibility (.71). This factor closely 
resembles the warmth-trustworthiness ideal that was found by Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas 
and Giles (1999) in a more comprehensive analysis of partner ideals and the attachment 
preference that Penke et al. (in press) proposed based on a theoretical review. Richness 
(.78), social status (.75), and good vocational prospect (.71) were the items with highest 
loading on factor 2, a factor matching well to Fletcher et al.’s (1999) status-resources ideal 
and Penke et al.’s (in press) resource preference. Finally, factor 3 was marked by physical 
attractiveness (.65), sex-appeal (.64), interesting personality (.57), and creativity (.56), fitting 
with Fletcher et al.’s (1999) vitality-attractiveness ideal and Penke et al.’s (in press) condition 
preference. The factor structure of self-reported mate preferences in our study thus reflected 
three major preference dimensions that have been established in the mate choice literature. 
Individual factor scores were calculated for each participant. 
A different subgroup of participants (N = 1,131) completed four other questionnaires 
instead. The Short-Term Mating Index (STMI) is based on three measures first introduced by 
Buss and Schmitt (1993): the “Time Known” measures, asking for the willingness to engage 
in sexual activity with an attractive stranger after various time intervals (6-point rating scales), 
                                                
1 PPThe reported results are based on the combined sample of men and women. Separate factor 
analyses for men and women resulted in an almost identical factor structure (Tucker’s φ = .96, .95, 
and .92 for the attachment, resources, and condition preference factors, respectively). All results 
remained virtually unchanged when based on sex-specific factor scores. 
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the “Number of Partners” measure, asking for the number of desired sexual partners across 
various future time periods (open response format), and a single item with 7-point rating 
scale asking how actively one is currently seeking a short-term mate (e.g. a brief affair). 
Schmitt (2005b) aggregated three “Time Known”-items (1 month, 1 year, 5 years), three 
“Number of Partners”-items (1 month, 1 year, 5 years), and the short-term mate seeking item 
after z-standardization to the STMI, an index of overall short-term mating tendency. The 
participants in our study responded to a slightly different selection of five items from the 
same measures, namely the “Time Known”-item with an interval of 1 evening, the “Number of 
Partners”-items with periods of 1 year, 5 years, and the rest of one’s lifetime, and the short-
term mate seeking item. We calculated an alternative STMI by summing these five items 
after log-transformation of the three (heavily-skewed) “Number of Partner”-items and sex-
specific z-standardization of all five items. Despite being based on fewer items, our 
alternative STMI tended to be more internally consistent (α = .84 for both men and women) 
than the original STMI was in Schmitt’s (2005b) study (α = .79). 
The Sensation Seeking Scale (form V by Zuckermann, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; 
German adaptation by Beaducel, Strobel & Brocke, 2003) is a 40-item questionnaire that 
assesses the individual tendency to seek out various, new, complex, and intensive 
experiences, even if this entails taking risks. Items are presented as pairs of opposing 
statements, of which participants have to choose the one they agree with more (dichotomous 
response format). In the current sample, the scale was reliable for both men (α = .78, M = 
22.92, SD = 6.05) and women (α = .77, M = 20.87, SD = 5.80). 
Trait social inhibitedness was measured with the Shyness Scale by Asendorpf and 
Wilpers (1998), which consists of five items with 5-point rating scales (exemplary item: “I feel 
shy in the presence of others”; men: α = .83, M = 13.92, SD = 4.10; women: α = .83, M = 
13.36, SD = 4.03). 
The Sex Drive Questionnaire by Ostovich and Sabini (2004) is a self-report measure 
of what Kinsey et al. (1948) termed “total sexual outlet”. It reflects the individual degree of 
sexual activity, be it with a partners or alone. It consists of four items with varying response 
formats (e.g. “How often do you orgasm in the average month?”), which are aggregated after 
z-standardization. The internal consistency for this scale was marginally acceptable (α = .68 
for men and .72 for women). 
Results 
The structure of the SOI. The SOI was originally proposed by Simpson and 
Gangestad (1991) as a one-dimensional measure of a broad construct. We tested this 
assumption in a confirmatory factor analysis of a model that had all seven SOI items (which 
were z-standardized prior to the analysis) loading on the same latent factor. As already found 
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by Webster and Bryan (in press), this model fitted the data poorly (χ² BB(14) BB = 992.18, p < .001, 
CFI = .815, NFI = .813, SRMR = .101). Next, we attempted to replicate the two-factor 
structure of the SOI advocated by Webster and Bryan, with items 1, 2 and 3 loading on a 
“behavior” factor, and items 2 and 4 to 7 loading on an “attitude” factor that is correlated with 
the behavior factor. Just as in their study, this model fitted our data well (χ² BB(12) BB = 40.53, p < 
.001, CFI = .995, NFI = .992, SRMR = .019), and significantly better, not only as the one-
factor model (∆χ² BB(2) BB = 475.83, p < .001), but also as two similar two-factor models that 
restricted item 2 (which asks for expected future sex partners) to load exclusively on either 
the behavior (∆χ² BB(1) BB = 526.23, p < .001) or the attitude factor (∆χ² BB(1) BB = 16.62, p < .001). The 
current data thus fully confirms the results reported by Webster and Bryan. 
However, we also tested an additional model, which modified the Webster-and-Bryan model 
toward a three-factor structure. The modification was that item 4 (which asks for extra-pair 
sexual fantasies) did not load on the attitude factor any more, but defined a distinct “desire” 
factor. This third factor was correlated with both the attitudinal and the behavioral factor on 
the latent level. Our alternative three-factor model showed a good fit to the data, almost 
identical to the Webster-and-Bryan model (χ² BB(12) BB = 42.11, p < .001, CFI = .994, NFI = .992, 
SRMR = .019), had the same number of degrees of freedom, and an only slightly worse AIC 
(48,431.32 vs. 48,429.74 for the Webster-and-Bryan model). On empirical grounds, these 
two models can thus be regarded equally plausible. 
We assume that there is a straightforward reason why the three-factor structure of 
sociosexuality, which we favor on theoretical grounds, did not turn out to be superior to the 
two-factor model: the affective component of sociosexuality is not well represented in the 
items of the SOI (i.e., only in item 4, which has the psychometric flaws discussed above). In 
addition, both Webster and Bryan’s (in press) and our results underlined the ambiguous 
nature of the expectancy item 2, which showed simultaneous affinities to both behavioral and 
attitudinal sociosexuality. 
Table 2 about here 
The revised Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI-R). Because of the structural and 
psychometric issues of the SOI, we added five new sociosexuality items to the questionnaire 
battery of the current study, which have been selected from a total pool of 40 items in a 
series of pilot studies (details are available from the first author.) These five items were used 
to construct a psychometrically improved revision of the SOI, the SOI-R. 
One item (“In your entire lifetime, with how many different people have you had 
sexual intercourse without having an interest in a long-term committed relationship with this 
person?”, number 3 in the Appendix) was intended as a replacement for the ambiguous item 
2 of the SOI. Together with items 1 and 3 of the SOI, these three items were chosen to 
reflect the behavioral component of sociosexuality (facet “Behavior”). To avoid the issues 
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that come with the open response format of these items in the SOI, we recoded the open 
responses to nine categories. These nine categories may be used to form a 9-point rating 
scale for these items in future studies (see Appendix). 
The attitudinal component of sociosexuality is already well reflected in items 5 to 7 of 
the SOI. However, the text of SOI item 7 is very long and complicated, which might lead to 
measurement problems with less attentive or less educated subjects. We thus replaced it 
with a shorter alternative (“I do not want to have sex with a person until I am sure that we will 
have a long-term, serious relationship.”). Together with the original items 5 and 7, it forms the 
facet “Attitude”. 
 Finally, three of the novel items (items 7 to 9 in the Appendix, e.g. “In everyday life, 
how often do you have spontaneous fantasies about having sex with someone you have just 
met?”) reflected aspects of the sociosexuality facet “Desire”. Note that all new Desire items 
avoid the requirement of an existing romantic relationship. Since this is not the case for SOI 
item 4, we dropped it in the revised version. Note also that the rating scales of the SOI-R 
items now have nine alternatives, while SOI item 4 had eight. This way, the number of 
response alternatives is the same for all nine SOI-R items. 
The SOI-R thus contains a total of nine items, four taken from the SOI and five new 
ones. The structure of the SOI-R was also evaluated with confirmatory factor analyses. As 
with the SOI, we first tested a one-dimensional model, with all nine items loading on a single 
factor. This model was not supported by the data (χ² BB(27) BB = 6582.64, p < .001, CFI = .503, NFI 
= .503, SRMR = .173). Next, we tested a model with a behavioral (SOI-R items 1 to 3) and a 
correlated “broad-sense-attitudinal” factor (SOI-R items 4 to 9), corresponding to the two-
factor Webster-and-Bryan model. Again, the fit was poor (χ² BB(26) BB = 3465.62, p < .001, CFI = 
.739, NFI = .738, SRMR = .160). In contrast, the model we theoretically expected, with three 
correlated factors (“Behavior”, “Attitude”, and “Desire”), each defined by three items (see 
Figure 1), fitted the data well (χ² BB(24) BB = 224.69, p < .001, CFI = .985, NFI = .983, SRMR = 
.035), significantly better than the one-factor (∆χ² BB(3) BB = 2119.32, p < .001) and the two-factor 
model (∆χ² BB(2) BB = 1620.47, p < .001). 
We also tested for sex differences in the SOI-R structure by fitting the three-factor model 
separately to data from men and women and then constraining all factor loadings and 
correlations to be equal across sexes. This model provided a good fit to the data (χ² BB(57) BB = 
273.43, p < .001, CFI = .983, NFI = .978, SRMR = .045), though the fit improved somewhat 
when the latent correlation between sociosexual Behavior and Attitude was allowed to differ 
between men and women (∆χ² BB(1) BB = 5.29, p < .05). Since this sex difference was also found by 
Webster and Bryan (in press) for the SOI, we report this correlation separately for both sexes 
in Figure 1. 
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The three items that correspond to each of the three SOI-R components yield very reliable 
sociosexuality facet scales (Table 2), especially when taking their briefness into account. The 
SOI total score corresponds especially well to the SOI-R Behavior facet (r = .77), even better 
than the average of the three SOI behavioral items (items 1-3, α = .67) (r = .70), which differs 
only in one item and the scale format. Not surprisingly, the SOI-R attitude facet corresponds 
almost perfectly to an aggregate of the SOI’s three attitudinal items (α = .83, r = .94), two of 
which also contribute to the SOI-R facet. More interestingly, the SOI-R Desire facet 
corresponds very well to the fantasy item 4 of the SOI (r = .64), even though there is no item 
overlap here. 
The positive intercorrelations of the SOI-R facets (Figure 1) allow for aggregating all nine 
SOI-R items to a global sociosexuality index, similar to the one provided by the SOI. This 
aggregate also shows good reliability (Table 2). The correspondence of the SOI and SOI-R 
total scores is not exceptionally high (r = .64 for men and .68 for women), likely due to the 
different emphasis both scales put on the different sociosexuality components. 
Figure 1 about here 
Sex differences. As can be seen in Table 2, the well-established sex difference for the 
SOI was replicated in this sample (Cohen’s d = .27) and was even more pronounced for the 
SOI-R total score (d = .61). However, analyses on the level of the SOI-R facets indicated that 
the Behavior facet did not contribute to the sex differences (d = .06). In contrast, the Attitude 
facet showed a sex difference comparable to the one found for global sociosexual 
orientations (d = .43), while the Desire facet showed a much larger sex difference (d = .86), 
which is large compared to conventional standards (Cohen, 1969). A two-way mixed ANOVA 
with the three facets as within-subject factor and sex as between-subject factor yielded a 
significant interaction (F BB(2, 5412) BB= 137.00, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .05), indicating that the facet 
differences in the sex differences were statistically significant. Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that this is true for all facet combinations (ps < .001). 
Effects of relationship status and duration. We first tested for effects of the current 
romantic relationship status on global sociosexuality in two 2 (sex) x 2 (relationship status) 
univariate ANOVAs, with either the SOI or the SOI-R total score as dependent variable. 
While only sex had a significant effect on the SOI (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 44.97, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .02), sex, 
relationship status, and their interaction had all significant effects on the SOI-R (all ps < .001, 
ηBBpPBPB2PP = .08, .01, and .004, respectively). Subsequent t-tests indicated that the SOI-R total score 
was significantly lower in coupled than in single women (t BB(1680) BB = 7.34, p < .001, d = .36), but 
men did not differ by relationship status (tBB(1024)BB = 1.51, p =.13, d = .09). In order to solve this 
discrepancy, we ran a 2 (sex) x 2 (relationship status) MANOVA with the three SOI-R facets 
as dependent variables. Here, the effect of sex was significant on the Attitude (FBB(1, 2704) BB= 
113.54, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .04) and the Desire facets (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 500.13, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .16), but 
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not on the Behavior facet (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 2.84, p = .09, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .001). Relationship status had no 
effect on the Attitude facet (F < 1), but it had on Desire (FBB(1, 2704) BB= 344.26, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .11) 
and slightly on Behavior (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 10.28, p = .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .004). Weak interactions between 
sex and relationship status were significant for the facets Attitude (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 7.81, p = .005, 
ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .003) and Desire (F BB(1, 2704) BB= 13.45, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .005). Subsequent t-tests indicated 
that individuals in a relationship showed a slightly more unrestricted behavior than singles 
(t BB(2706)BB = 3.00, p = .02, d = .12), and that men had a slightly more unrestricted attitude when in 
a relationship (t BB(1024) BB = 2.36, p = .02, d = .15), while relationship status had no effects on 
attitudes in women (t BB(1680) BB = 1.55, p < .12, d = -.08). More interestingly, individuals in a 
relationship had substantially more restricted desires (tBB(2706)BB = 19.10, p < .001, d = .73), 
though this effect was larger in women (t BB(1680) BB = 18.20, p < .001, d = .89) than in men (t BB(1024)BB = 
9.29, p < .001, d = .58). 
Within the subsample of individuals in a relationship, we also tested for effects of 
relationship duration on sociosexuality. Neither the SOI nor the SOI-R or any of its facets 
showed linear relationships with relationship duration (log-transformed to reduce skew) (all rs 
< |.10|, all ps > .05). However, interesting results emerged when we investigated the “four-
year-itch”-hypothesis proposed by Fisher (1987). We compared those subjects who had 
been in a relationship for four years or less (N = 1,043) with those whose relationship already 
lasted for more than four years (N = 376). Two 2 (sex) x 2 (relationship duration) ANOVAs 
with either the SOI or the SOI-R total score as dependent variable yielded main effects of sex 
(SOI: F BB(1, 1415) BB= 43.77, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03; SOI-R: F BB(1, 1415) BB= 141.80, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .09) and 
relationship duration (SOI: F BB(1, 1415) BB= 4.93, p = .03, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .003; SOI-R: F BB(1, 1415) BB= 5.39, p = .02, 
ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .004), but no interaction effects (ps > .05), with those in a relationship for four years or 
longer being slightly more unrestricted (SOI: t BB(1417)BB = 2.32, p = .02, d = .13; SOI-R: t BB(1417) BB = 
3.07, p = .002, d = .18). A 2 (sex) x 2 (relationship duration) MANOVA with the three SOI-R 
facets as dependent variables and subsequent t-tests indicated, beside the usual pattern of 
sex differences, that the two relationship duration groups differed only in their Desire (F BB(1, 1415) 
BB= 18.93, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .01), but not in their Attitude or Behavior (ps > .10). All interaction 
effects were non-significant (ps > .10). 
Both relationship status and relationship duration above or below Fisher’s four-years-
threshold thus had their most noteworthy effects on the Desire component of sociosexuality. 
These effects are illustrated in a slightly different manner in Figure 2. All sex and group 
differences in this figure are significant at p < .001. 
Figure 2 about here 
The nomological network of global sociosexuality and its components. In order to 
dissect the relations between global sociosexual orientations and its correlates, we first 
compared facet-level relationships with the SOI and SOI-R total scores. These zero-order 
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correlations are shown in the first five columns of Tables 3a and b. However, since the three 
facets also contain common variance that reflects their socio-developmental 
interdependences, the nomological network of their unique variance should give a clearer 
picture of the nature of their relationships with the correlates of global sociosexuality. We 
therefore calculated uniqueness scores for Behavior, Attitude, and Desire by simultaneously 
regressing each of the three facets on the other two facets. The regressions were run 
separately for men and women. The resulting residual scores reflect the variance of each 
facet that is not shared with the other two. The three rightmost columns of Tables 3a and b 
show the correlates of these three uniqueness scores (technically semi-partial correlations).2 
Due to the threat of error accumulation that comes with such a large number of 
significance tests, we set the alpha to a more conservative level of .01. However, the very 
large sample size already ensures a high robustness of the results. 
Tables 3a, b about here 
As expected, both the SOI and the SOI-R total scores showed substantial correlations 
in both sexes with the total number of past romantic relationships, sexual partners, and extra-
pair sexual partners, as well as, to a lesser degree, self-perceived mate value. The 
correlations of the three SOI-R facets with these variables indicate that all these relationships 
are mainly due to the Behavior facet. This conclusion is strongly supported by the 
uniqueness correlations: with the other two facets statistically controlled, only the unique 
variance of the Behavior component of sociosexuality relates to the quantity of prior 
relationships, sex partners, and sexual infidelities, and to self-perceived mate value. 
For both sexes, the SOI-R total score (and in women also the SOI) showed a small, 
but significant correlation with religiosity and the self-reported condition preference, 
suggesting that unrestricted individuals tend to be less religious and prefer attractive, vital 
mates. Both indices of global sociosexuality also correlated negatively with self-reported 
attachment preference in women. In all these cases, however, the uniqueness correlations 
revealed that the effects are mainly driven by the Attitude components (though Desire has 
also a unique effect on the female condition preference). 
                                                
2 Note that uniqueness correlations provide a less biased estimate of the unique contribution of each 
facet than either beta coefficients from multiple regressions on all three facets, or correlations with 
component scores from a principal component analysis that rotated the facets to orthogonality. While 
both multiple regressions and principal component analyses divide contributions of the communalities 
(i.e., shared variances) of the facets to the relationships with other variables equally between the 
betas or correlation coefficients, shared variance effects are completely controlled in uniqueness 
correlations. Furthermore, uniqueness correlations circumvent potential multicollinearity issues. 
However, the general pattern of results in both Study 1 and 2 remained virtually unchanged when 
either multiple regressions or orthogonal components were used. 
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The desire for sexual variety (as assessed by the STMI), an obvious correlate of 
global sociosexuality, showed strong correlations with all SOI-R facets. Therefore, it is 
interesting that only the uniquenesses of the facets Attitude and Desire correlate with the 
STMI – genuine sociosexual behavior seems not to be represented in this measure. The 
Sensation Seeking Scale, on the other hand, apparently reflects a personality dimension that 
is truly related to all aspects of sociosexuality. The same is not true for shyness, which 
relates to sociosexual Behavior and Attitude, but not to Desire. 
Sexual desire within a relationship, as indexed by the sexual intercourse frequency 
with the current partner, shows only very weak relations to sociosexuality and its 
components. In contrast, general sexual desire, as indexed by the Sex Drive Questionnaire 
and the masturbation frequency, shows substantial relationships with sociosexuality, 
especially with sociosexual Desire. The current study was thus able to simultaneously 
replicate the findings of Simpson and Gangestad (1991) and Ostovich and Sabini (2004). 
Substantial negative relations were found between unrestricted sociosexuality and 
indicators of relationship quality, commitment, and exclusivity in both men and women. What 
all these variables have in common is that they overlap with the unique sociosexual Desire 
variance. The only incremental contributions of other sociosexuality components are that 
considering being unfaithful to one’s current partner correlates with the Attitude component, 
while having already been unfaithful in the current relationship correlates with the Behavior 
component. 
In addition to sexual intercourse frequency, further evidence for the discriminant 
validity of the SOI and SOI-R is provided by the very weak relationships between aspects of 
sociosexuality and romantic attachment styles. At best, the relationships between 
unrestricted sociosexuality (especially the Desire component) and fearful and dismissive 
attachment styles, as well as a negative model of others, are noteworthy. 
Age effects. Both the SOI (men: r = .17, p < .001; women: r = .12, p < .001) and the 
SOI-R (men: r = .09, p = .006; women: r = .07, p = .003) total scores were weakly correlated 
with age. On facet level, Behavior increased with age (r = .25, p < .001 for both sexes, 
possibly reflecting the natural accumulation of partners over the lifespan or cohort effects), 
while Attitude was unaffected, and Desire showed a weak decline in women (r = -.13, p < 
.001). This pattern was replicated in the uniqueness correlations. To control for potential 
confounding effects of age, we reran all (M)ANOVAs with age as a covariate. Only the weak 
effect of relationship status on Behavior and the effects of relationship duration on the SOI 
and SOI-R total scores were not replicated. Furthermore, the reported pattern of correlations 
in the nomological network remained virtually unchanged when age was partialled out. 
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Discussion 
Study 1 strongly supported our initial contention that global sociosexuality is not a unitary 
construct, but has different components that make unique contributions to the understanding 
of sociosexual orientations. Like Webster and Bryan (in press), we were unable to confirm 
the one-dimensional structure of the SOI. Instead, we could replicate the two-factor structure 
they suggested, but also showed that a model with the three factors we expected 
theoretically (Behavior, Attitude, and Desire) fitted our data just as well. The three-factor 
structure of sociosexuality received even stronger support when tested in our revised version 
of the SOI, where the Desire component was adequately represented by more than one item. 
We were able to replicate the nomological network of the SOI with the SOI-R. 
However, an analysis of the three SOI-R facets revealed that (1) sex differences are most 
pronounced in sociosexual Desire, while absent in the Behavior component, (2) relationship 
status and duration (Fisher’s “four-year-itch”) have their strongest effects on Desire, and (3) 
many correlates of sociosexuality are specific to only one of the three components 
(especially when their shared variance is controlled). These results confirm the SOI-R as a 
valid measure of sociosexuality, and support the three distinguishable sociosexuality 
components we hypothesized on theoretical grounds. However, Study 1 is based solely on 
cross-sectional data. From these concurrently assessed self-reports, we cannot evaluate the 
usefulness of differentiating the three proposed sociosexuality facets in the prediction of 
future mating behavior and relationship outcomes. Furthermore, we cannot tell from 
individual data what dyadic effects sociosexuality has within romantic relationships, or if they 
show different developmental patterns or degrees of assortative mating. Study 2 was aimed 
to answer these additional questions. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we assessed the predictive validity of sociosexual Behavior, Attitude and 
Desire compared to the global sociosexual orientation with regard to three criteria: (1) 
flirtatious behavior during an interaction with an attractive opposite-stranger, (2) stability and 
change of romantic relationship status (single vs. in a relationship) over a one-year-period, 
and (3) the degree of sexual promiscuity over the same time interval. In order to analyze 
dyadic effects of sociosexuality, we assessed participants currently involved in a romantic 
relationship together with their partners. Finally, we utilized this data to explored assortative 
mating for and the temporal stability of sociosexuality on global and facet levels. 
Method 
Sample. Participants were recruited for a study on “Love, Sexuality, and Personality” 
by advertisements in various public places and a diverse range of media. They signed up for 
the study by answering a pre-questionnaire on the internet. An honorarium of 16 € (about 21 
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$) and personal feedback were offered as an incentive. Registration required providing 
demographic and relationship information that was used to pre-screen participants for current 
relationship-, marriage-, and parental status, age, sexual and relationship experience, sexual 
orientation, and current psychoactive medication. 
A final sample of 283 heterosexual, sexually experienced participants without 
children, aged 20-30 years (M = 23.7 years, SD = 2.7; 140 males, 143 females) completed 
all tasks. They consisted of 70 unmarried couples and 143 singles. All participants had been 
in at least one committed relationship for at least one month, with a mean of 3.5 relationships 
(SD = 2.3). The couples were together for 0.67 to 7.96 years, with a mean of 2.74 years (SD 
= 1.63). All participants were native speakers and were not on psychoactive medication in 
the three months prior to the study. Sixty percent were currently students, while 15.7% had 
left school with ten years of formal education or less (i.e., no German Abitur or Fachabitur). 
Procedure. After completing the online pre-questionnaire, suitable participants were 
scheduled for a 2-hour lab session. All participants were tested individually, guided by a 
same-sex experimenter. Couples arrived at the laboratory together, but were tested 
separately in parallel sessions. While in the lab, participants completed various assessments, 
including filling out the SOI and the SOI-R (see Table 1 for descriptives and reliabilities), as 
well as a videotaped dyadic get-acquainted interaction with an opposite-sex confederate who 
was introduced as another participant of the study (Ickes, 1983; Ickes, Bissonnette, Garcia & 
Stinson, 1990). Standardized photographs were also taken. At the end, participants were 
debriefed, asked to provide their email and phone numbers for a follow-up study, and 
received payment and a personality profile. One year after the lab session, the follow-up was 
conducted as an online study. 
Interaction with confederate. Two female and three male students served as 
conversation partners for the participants during the interaction. These confederates were 
carefully chosen for communicative skills, above-average attractiveness, heterosexual 
orientation, appropriate age, and an overall appearance comparable to the other 
confederate(s) of the same sex. Confederates were instructed to act like they were single 
and participating in the study, naïve to the situation. They were trained to be friendly and 
open at the beginning of the interaction, and to adjust their behavior to the behavior of their 
current interaction partner, such that the course of the interactions was largely determined by 
the participants. No participant had ever met his or her confederate before. 
When the participant had completed the first assessments, the experimenter guided 
the participant to another room that looked more like a living room than a typical laboratory 
space, and offered one of two chairs to the participant. The chairs were arranged next to a 
small table such that the conversation partners were sitting in a 120 degree angle to each 
other. Each conversation partner was focused by a video camera at the opposite side of the 
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room that captured a close-up view of the face from a close-to-frontal angle (only the camera 
focusing the participant was actually recording the conversation, the other served as a 
dummy to support the cover story). A third camera recorded both conversation partners from 
a 120 degree angle. 
As part of the cover story, the experimenter made recordings of the participant’s voice 
(unrelated to the present study), which were introduced as an intermission to bridge the 
waiting time for the conversation partner. Afterwards, the experimenter re-entered the room 
with one of the opposite-sex confederates, offered him or her the other seat, and briefly 
introduced him or her as another participant of the study. Subsequently, the experimenter 
explained that the purpose of the setting was to study what happens in the first minutes when 
strangers meet, asked both the participant and the confederate to get to know each other for 
ten minutes, explained that the conversation will be video-recorded, and left the room. Seven 
minutes later (not ten, as announced), the experimenter re-entered the room and separated 
the participant and the confederate for the rest of the study. No participant showed serious 
signs of doubt about the cover story, an impression that was confirmed by unobtrusive 
inquiries by the experimenters at the end of the study. After the debriefing, all subsequent 
reactions of the participants were positive towards the study, with no sign of harm due to the 
deception. 
Confederate ratings. The confederate rated the participants directly after the 
conversation on various items, including “Would you give this person your phone number?” 
and “Would you go out to the cinema with this person if he/she asked you?”, both taken from 
Grammer (1995) and rated on a scale from 1 (“no way”) to 5 (“I would love to”). Since these 
two variables were highly correlated (r = .73 for the male and .70 for the female confederates’ 
ratings, both ps < .001), they were averaged to a single score labeled “Interest of 
Confederate”. 
Follow-up. Exactly 360 days after taking part in the lab session (t1), participants 
received an email that offered them a free cinema ticket for responding to a 20-minute follow-
up online-questionnaire (t2). Non-responders received a reminder email ten days later and 
were called by one of the experimenters from the lab study after 14 days. The questionnaire 
first asked for changes in romantic relationship status over the past twelve months, with two 
response alternatives (“currently single” and “currently in a relationship”) for those who were 
single at t1, and four alternatives (“in the same relationship all the time”, “in the same 
relationship, but separated in between”, “in a different relationship”, and “currently single”) for 
individuals who were in a relationship at t1. Subsequent questions included the SOI, the SOI-
R, an open item asking for the number of partners with whom they have had sex for the first 
time during the last twelve months, and various items unrelated to the present study. 
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Video analyses: global ratings. Four independent, trained raters (two women, two 
men) rated the flirting behavior of the participants within the first three minutes of the 
videotaped interaction twice. In a first round, they rated all interactions recorded from the 
side perspective (with both interaction partners completely visible). In a second round, 
ratings were done based on the frontal facial recordings. Thereby, both gross body positions 
and movements of both conversation partners and more subtle facial expressions of the 
participant were captured in the ratings. In both rounds, videos were presented with audio. 
All ratings were done every 30 seconds (indicated by a timed acoustic signal) on a scale 
from 1 (not very much) to 7 (very much) and labeled ”How much does this person flirt with 
the confederate?”. Thus, each rater provided a total of 12 ratings for each participant. All 
raters were unacquainted with the participants and blind to their relationship status and the 
results of all other parts of the study. 
For both rating rounds, the interrater agreement was high for each of the six 30-
second-segments (side perspective: α = .84 to .88, frontal perspective: α = .85 to .90). Thus, 
ratings of all four raters were aggregated for each segment. Within each perspective, the six 
aggregated segment ratings were further aggregated to highly reliable composites (α = .98 
and .97 for the side and frontal perspective, respectively). Since these two composite flirting 
ratings were highly correlated (r = .69), they were aggregated to a final Global Flirting Rating 
composite, based on 2 (camera perspectives) x 6 (30-second-segments) x 4 (raters) = 48 
ratings per subject. Potential influences of the specific confederate a subject faced during the 
conversation were statistically controlled by regressing the Global Flirting Rating on the 
dummy-coded confederates within sexes and using the residuals in all analyses. 
Video analyses: behavior codings. The videos of the interaction were used to code 16 
objective behaviors of the participants within the first three minutes, including the duration of 
(1) gazing at the confederate’s face, (2) speaking, (3) smiling, (4) laughing, (5) illustrators 
(communicative gestures), and adaptors (non-illustrative hand movements) to the (6) body, 
(7) face, and (8) other objects (mostly the chair or table), as well as the frequency of (9) short 
glances (lasting less than one second) towards the confederate, (10) “look throughs” 
(passing looks at the confederate without fixation), (11) interactive gestures, (12) hair flips or 
tosses, (13) “coy smiles” (smiles towards the confederate, followed by an immediate 
downward gaze), (14) “head akimbos” (folding of the hand behind the head, thereby 
exposing the axillaries), (15) “backchannel responses” (affirmative nods or vocalizations), 
and (16) touching the confederate (except handshakes). In addition, the speaking time of the 
confederate was coded. The speaking time of both the participant and the confederate were 
subtracted from the total time coded (three minutes) to arrive at the duration of silence in 
each conversation. All behaviors were chosen because they showed relations to contact-
readiness, rapport and flirtation in earlier studies (Asendorpf, 1988; Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie & 
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Wade, 1992; Bernieri, Gillis, Davis & Grahe, 1996; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Grammer, 1995; 
Grammer, Kruck, Juette & Fink, 2000; Moore, 1985; Simpson, Gangestad & Biek, 1993). 
Two trained research assistants coded the behaviors using The Observer 5.0 (Noldus, 
2003). Twenty-one videos were double-coded to allow reliability determination. All behaviors 
involving hand or arm movements (e.g. illustrators, adaptors) were coded from the clips with 
full body shots from the side, while all other behaviors were coded from the frontal facial 
recordings. Head akimbos and touching the confederate did not occur in any of the 
conversations. Intercoder reliabilities (ICCs) for the other behaviors were high, ranging from 
.86 (backchannel responses) to .99 (facial gazing, short glances). 
Facial attractiveness ratings. During the lab session, participants’ faces were 
videotaped with a Cannon MV700i camcorder while they stood upright in front of a neutral 
background and maintained a neutral facial expression. Later on, video capturing software 
was used to choose the one frame with the most frontal and neutral recording of each 
participant’s face and to convert it to a digital picture. Size was standardized to identical 
interpupilar distance. These pictures were divided into four sets of equal size (N = 70-71), 
two for male and two for female participants. Each of the four sets were rated by 15 different 
heterosexual undergraduate students of the opposite sex (age M = 24.4, SD = 6.7), who 
judged the attractiveness of each picture on a scale from 1 (not attractive at all) to 7 (very 
attractive) in exchange for course credit. Interrater reliabilities were good for both male (α = 
.90 for set 1 and .91 for set 2) and female (α = .91 for set 1 and .89 for set 2) raters, so that 
ratings could be aggregated across raters after z-standardization. 
Results 
Attrition analysis. For the online follow-up study, 91.2% (N = 258) of the lab sample 
provided information on their current relationship status, while 85.5% completed the whole 
follow-up questionnaire, including the SOI and the SOI-R. Both those who responded partly 
and those who responded completely had, on average, received higher education and were 
more unrestricted on the Behavior facet of the SOI-R than those who failed to do so (ps < 
.05), but did not differ significantly with regard to their age, sex, relationship status, scores on 
the SOI-R facets Attitude and Desire, the Global Flirting Rating, or rated facial attractiveness, 
all as assessed at t1. 
Sex differences in sociosexuality. As in Study 1, sex differences were larger for the 
SOI-R than for the SOI, and largest for the Desire facet, medium for Attitude, and absent for 
Behavior (Table 2). Again, a two-way mixed ANOVA with the three facets as within-subject 
factor and sex as between-subject factor yielded a significant interaction (F BB(2, 562) BB= 8.46, p < 
.001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03), indicating significant facet differences in sex differences. However, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that only the sex differences between Behavior and the other two 
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facets were statistically significant in this sample (ps < .001; p = .28 for the Attitude-Desire 
difference in sex differences). 
Prediction of flirting behavior. We tested how sociosexuality predicted flirting behavior 
in the lab, using the Global Flirting Rating as a criterion. Flirting with strangers is a proximate 
behavioral criterion for sociosexuality, since it entails the active courtship patterns that might 
initiate sexual contacts or new romantic relationships. As can be seen in Table 4, the SOI 
and SOI-R global scores predicted flirting behavior in both men and women, as does the 
Behavior facet of the SOI-R. In contrast, the Attitude facet is unrelated to the Global Flirting 
Rating in both sexes. Finally, the Desire facet is strongly predictive of the Global Flirting 
Rating in men, but only marginally in women. An interesting pattern emerged from the 
uniqueness correlations: while they confirmed the predictive value of past sociosexual 
Behavior and male sociosexual Desire, the unique variance of sociosexual Attitude turned 
out to be a negative predictor of the Global Flirting Rating for both men and women. It 
appears that people display flirting tendency towards attractive strangers in line with their 
sociosexual desires and behavioral histories, even if this contradicts their explicit attitudes. 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
To have a closer look at how sociosexuality is communicated in get-acquainted 
situations, we analyzed the objectively coded behavior of the subjects during the 
conversation. In a first step, we reduced the 15 behaviors that actually occurred in our 
sample with sex-specific principal component factor analyses. A comparison of the 
eigenvalues with a parallel analysis of 100 random datasets with identical sample size 
suggested four factors for men and five for women, a decision that was further supported by 
an inspection of the scree plot.3 Table 5 presents the factor solutions after orthogonal 
rotation, along with descriptive statistics. The first three factors were very similar in both 
sexes (Tucker’s φ = .93, .93, and .86, respectively). Factor 1 was marked by facial gazing 
and few short glances, thereby reflecting how directly the participants looked at the 
confederates. We called this factor “Fixation”. Factor 2 showed high positive loadings by 
speaking time and amount of illustrators used, and a negative loading by the amount of 
silence that occurred. We labeled it “Expressivity”. Factor 3 was marked by the amount of 
smiling and laughing the participants showed, and was consequently called “Joyfulness”. 
Factor 4 showed low congruence between the sexes (Tucker’s φ = .24). However, for both 
sexes the highest loading behavior was the amount of body adaptors used by the subject. In 
addition, the factor was marked by coy smiles in men and by look throughs and interactive 
gestures in women. Since all these behaviors can be linked to social inhibition, we called the 
                                                
3 When a fifth factor was extracted for men, it turned out to be not interpretable, with no coded 
behavior loading .60 or higher. 
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factor “Inhibitedness” in both sexes (but marked the female factor with an apostrophe to 
indicate its sex-specific structure). Finally, the fifth factor, which we found only in women, 
was marked by hair flips/tosses and coy smiles, two prototypical female courtship behaviors, 
leading to the label “Flirting Gestures”. 
The relationships between sociosexuality, the coded behavior factors, and the Global 
Flirting Rating were analyzed in Brunswikean lens models (Brunswik, 1956). In a lens model, 
the accuracy of the assessment of a latent trait (here sociosexuality) during the social 
perception of a person’s behavior (here the Global Flirting Rating) is explained by the validity 
of objectively observable cues (here the coded behavior factors and their relationship to 
sociosexuality) and the utilization of these cues by the perceivers (here the relationship 
between the behavior factors and the flirting rating) (see left half of Figure 3). For both men 
and women, we calculated separate lens models with the SOI and SOI-R total scores, each 
of the three SOI-R facets, and each facet’s uniqueness as the latent trait. The confederates 
were dummy-coded and statistically controlled. Note that within sex, the cue utilizations stay 
the same, no matter which sociosexuality score is used; they can be found in Figure 3. In 
contrast, the accuracies and cue validities depend on which latent trait (i.e., sociosexuality 
variable) is analyzed in the lens model; these are all reported in Table 4. 
Figure 3 about here 
As Table 4 shows, none of the four objective behavior factors were valid cues to the 
SOI or SOI-R total scores of men. Only an analysis on facet level revealed that high scores 
on the Fixation factor (and marginally the Expressivity factor) predicted male sociosexual 
Desire. These findings were corroborated with the uniqueness regressions, which also 
revealed a negative relationship between the Fixation factor and Attitude. In itself, 
unrestricted sociosexual Desire apparently leads men to more strongly fixate an attractive 
woman during a conversation, while an unrestricted explicit Attitude has the opposite effect. 
In women, both the SOI and the SOI-R total scores predicted more joyful behavior during the 
interaction, indicating that the amount of female smiling and laughing is a valid cue to global 
sociosexuality. On facet level, this relationship replicated for Behavior and Desire, though the 
uniqueness regressions showed that past behavioral history, not current desire, is what is 
specifically linked to the Joyfulness factor. The cue utilizations (Figure 3) indicate that 
Fixation and Joyfulness were used by the raters to form their flirting rating for men, while only 
Joyfulness was used in the formation of this impression for women. 
Taken together, the results from the Brunswikean lens model analyses imply that 
Fixation of a potential mate is a valid cue to male sociosexual Desire, which was used by our 
raters to infer flirtation. After controlling for the other two facets, a similar, but weaker and 
negative association existed in men for the explicit sociosexual Attitude. In women, 
Joyfulness during the conversation was a valid cue to past sociosexual Behavior that the 
223 
raters utilized when judging flirtation. The left half of Figure 3 summarizes the major 
relationships we found for men and women. 
Sociosexuality effects on relationship status stability and change. To test whether 
sociosexuality predicts changes in romantic relationship status over one year, we compared 
the sociosexuality means between four groups: (1) those who were single at both t1 and t2 
(stable singles, N = 78), (2) those who were in the same relationship at t1 and t2 (in same 
relationship, N = 114), (3) those who were in a new relationship at t2, no matter if they had 
been single or in a different relationship at t1 (in new relationship, N = 52), and those who 
were single at t2 because the relationship they had at t1 had ended (single after separation, 
N = 14). Two univariate ANOVAs with 4 (group) x 2 (sex) between-subject factors and either 
the SOI or the SOI-R total scores as dependent variables indicated that relationship status 
group had a significant effect in both cases (SOI: F BB(3, 250) BB= 12.56, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .13; SOI-R: 
F BB(3, 250) BB= 21.09, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .20), while the sex effect was significant for the SOI-R (F BB(1, 250) 
BB= 6.59, p = .011, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03), but not the SOI (F BB(1, 250) BB= 1.49, p = .22) (cp. Table 2) and the 
group x sex interaction was not significant for either measure (Fs < 1). Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons of the means revealed that in both cases, those who were in the same 
relationship at t2 had lower global sociosexuality scores at t1 than those who remained 
single or who had found a new partner (ps < .001). In addition, those in a new relationship at 
t2 had marginally higher SOI total scores at t1 than those who were single after separation at 
t2 (p = .054; ps > .10 for all other pairwise comparisons). 
Next, we ran a 4 (group) x 2 (sex) MANOVA with the three SOI-R facets as 
dependent variables. Relationship status group had a significant effect on Behavior (F BB(3, 250) BB= 
13.82, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .14) and Desire (FBB(3, 250) BB= 35.91, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .30), but only a 
marginal effect on Attitude (F BB(3, 250) BB= 2.52, p = .058, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03). Sex effects were again 
significant for Attitude (F BB(1, 250) BB= 6.09, p = .014, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .02) and Desire (F BB(1, 250) BB= 11.36, p < 
.001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .04), but not for Behavior (F < 1), while group x sex interactions were insignificant 
for all three facets (Fs < 1). Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons indicated that both 
those who had remained in the same relationship and those who had changed their 
relationship status from being in a relationship to single at t2 were lower on the Behavior 
facet at t1 than both those who had stayed singles or started a new relationship at t2 (all ps < 
.03). Furthermore, those in a stable relationship that prevailed until t2 were lower in their 
sociosexual Desire at t1 than the three other groups (all ps < .005). All other pairwise 
comparisons, including all for the Attitude facet, failed to reach significance (ps > .10). Effect 
sizes for the significant group differences were generally large (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 about here 
Relationship status effects on sociosexuality stability and change. The 1-year rank-
order stability for the SOI and the SOI-R was high in both men (SOI: r = .74, p < .001; SOI-R: 
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r = .83, p < .001) and women (SOI: r = .79, p < .001; SOI-R: r = .78, p < .001). On SOI-R 
facet level, rank-order stability was high for Behavior (men: r = .83, p < .001; women: r = .86, 
p < .001) and Attitude (men: r = .73, p < .001; women: r = .79, p < .001), but somewhat lower 
for Desire, especially in women (men: r = .68, p < .001; women: r = .39, p < .001). There was 
no significant mean level change in any total or facet score over the 1-year period for either 
men or women (all ts < 1.89, all ps > .06). 
In order to test whether changes in romantic relationship status account for the 
imperfect rank-order stability of sociosexuality, we calculated change scores for the SOI, the 
SOI-R, and the three SOI-R facets by subtracting the t1 scores from the t2 scores, and 
compared mean levels in these change scores across the four relationship status groups 
(this data was available for N = 74 stable singles, N =110 in same relationship, N = 51 in new 
relationship, and N = 11 singles after separation). We first ran two 4 (group) x 2 (sex) 
ANOVAs, one with SOI total score change and one with SOI-R total score change as the 
dependent variables. In both analyses, relationship status group had a significant effect (SOI 
change: F BB(3, 237) BB= 8.14, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .10; SOI-R change: F BB(3, 237) BB= 8.53, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .10), 
while sex and the group x sex interaction had not (all Fs < 1.76, all ps > .10). Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that those who were singles after separation 
increased in their global sociosexuality compared to the other three groups (SOI: ps < .004, 
ds = .89-1.18; SOI-R: ps < .03, ds .94 to 1.46), while those in new relationships decreased in 
global sociosexuality more than the other three groups, though some of these latter 
comparisons were only marginally significant for the SOI (ps <.09, ds = .36-1.10; SOI-R: ps < 
.02, ds = .56-1.46; all other comparisons ps > .10). 
We subsequently ran a 4 (group) x 2 (sex) MANOVA with change scores for the three 
SOI-R facets as dependent variables. Relationship status group had a significant main effect 
on changes in Behavior (F BB(3, 237) BB= 7.05, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .08) and Desire (F BB(3, 237) BB= 15.80, p < 
.001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .17), but not on Attitude change (F < 1). Sex had weak main (F BB(1, 237) BB= 7.25, p = 
.008, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03) and interaction-with-group effects on Behavior change (F BB(3, 237) BB= 2.93, p = .03, 
ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .04). There was also a marginally significant group x sex interaction on Desire change 
(F BB(3, 237) BB= 2.27, p = .081, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .03), while all other effects were not significant (ps > .10). 
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons of the means indicated that men, but not women, who 
became single after separation increased in their Behavior scores between t1 and t2 
compared to the other three groups (men: ps < .001, ds = 1.19-1.40; women: all ps > .10). 
Furthermore, those who had recently started a new relationship decreased in their 
sociosexual Desire compared to all other groups (ps < .001, ds = .96-1.84), while those who 
were single after separation showed a trend towards a stronger increase in their Desire 
compared to the stable singles (p = .09, d = .76) and those in stable relationships (p = .64, d 
= .83). Plots revealed that the effects on Desire change were somewhat more pronounced in 
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women than in men, which might explain the marginally significant interaction between group 
and sex. It should be noted again that the group of singles after separation was very small, 
so all effects involving this group should be interpreted with care. 
Prediction of sexual behavior. Finally, we tested the predictive validity of the 
sociosexuality measures by examining the relation between their assessment at t1 and the 
number of sexual partners between t1 and t2. The criterion was measured by two items at t2: 
(1) SOI(-R) item 1 (asking for the total number of sexual partners in the past twelve months), 
and (2) an item asking for the number of new sexual partners in the past twelve months, with 
whom they never had intercourse before. Both items were log-transformed to reduced skew. 
They correlated .86 in men and .89 in women, and were thus aggregated after z-
standardization within sex to form an index of Future Sexual Partners. 
Future Sexual Partners was predicted by the total SOI (men: r = .53, p < .001; 
women: r = .49, p < .001) and SOI-R (men: r = .57, p < .001; women: r = .39, p < .001) 
scores at t1. The more differentiated perspective provided by the SOI-R facet-level 
correlations showed that the predictive validity was highest for the Behavior (men: r = .58, p 
< .001; women: r = .45, p < .001) and Desire (men: r = .48, p < .001; women: r = .36, p < 
.001) components, while it was lower for the Attitude component (men: r = .27, p = .003; 
women: r = .17, p = .05). The differences in effect sizes between Attitude and the other two 
facets were all significant (all ps < .03). To further corroborate these findings, we calculated 
uniqueness scores for all three facets by regressing each facet on the other two and saving 
the residuals (see Study 1). The uniqueness correlations revealed that Behavior (men: r = 
.44, p < .001; women: r = .32, p < .001) and Desire (men: r = .32, p < .001; women, r = .24, p 
= .007), but not Attitude (men: r = -.02, p = .84; women: r = -.06, p = .52), made a unique 
contribution to the prediction of Future Sexual Partners over the 1-year period. 
Predictive validity of flirting behavior. If flirting is, as we argued, a more proximate 
behavioral criterion for sociosexuality, reflecting the active courtship patterns that initiate 
subsequent sexual contacts and new romantic relationships, our measure of flirting behavior 
should predict these outcomes. This link was indeed supported by our data: first, controlling 
for the dummy-coded confederate, the Global Flirting Rating predicted the reported Interest 
of the Confederate in the participant (men: β = .30, p < .001; women: β = .44, p < .001). This 
relationship remained significant for both sexes when facial attractiveness was 
simultaneously entered into the regression (see right half of Figure 3). Furthermore, the 
Global Flirting Rating at t1 predicted Future Sexual Partners (men: β = .34, p < .001; women: 
β = .24, p < .001), again independent of facial attractiveness (see right half of Figure 3).4PP 
                                                
4 Global sociosexuality correlated significantly with facial attractiveness in men (SOI: r = .19, p = .02; 
SOI-R: r = .19, p = .02), but not in women (SOI: r = -.15, p = .07; SOI-R: r = -.02, p = .86). On facet 
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Finally, an ANOVA revealed that the Global Flirting Rating at t1 differed between relationship 
status groups at t2 (FBB(3, 250) BB= 12.57, p < .001, ηBBpPBPB2 PP= .13; sex had no main or interaction effects, 
ps > .10), with those who were single at both points or who found a new partner receiving a 
higher flirting rating in the lab than those who continued the same relationship or who stayed 
single after separation (ps < .05 for these Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons). Since 
the amount of flirtation in our lab interaction was predictive of future mating outcomes, the 
predictive relationships between sociosexuality facets and flirting behavior can be regarded 
as consequential. 
Partner effects. So far, we have analyzed the effects of global sociosexuality and its 
facets on mating success and relationship outcomes on the individual level. For those 
currently involved in a romantic relationship, this entails a simplification, since such dyadic 
relationships can be defined by the presence of effects that one partner has on the other 
(Kenny, Kashy & Cook, 2006). 
One possible partner effect is that the mere involvement in a romantic relationship 
alters the effects that the individual level of sociosexuality has on behavior in the mating 
domain. Therefore, we reran all of the above analyses, controlling for romantic relationship 
status wherever appropriate. The general pattern of results remained unchanged. 
Alternatively, it could be that not only one’s own sociosexual orientation, but also the 
sociosexuality of his or her partner affects mating behavior and relationship outcomes. For 
example, having an unrestricted partner might motivate people to behave more unrestricted 
themselves or might increase their likelihood to terminate the relationship, independent of 
their own sociosexuality. Thus, we also analyzed potential effects of the partner’s 
sociosexuality in the subsample of 70 couples. We applied Kenny et al.’s (2006) Actor-
Partner Interaction Model (APIM) to test for such effects, using the SPSS 12.0 mixed 
procedure syntax they provided. In the APIM, effects that a characteristic of the target 
individual (actor) has on an outcome are disentangled from effects that a characteristic of his 
or her partner has on this outcome, and from interaction effects stemming from the specific 
combination of characteristics both partners bring into the relationship. We ran a series of 
APIMs, with either (1) the Global Flirting Rating, (2) relationship breakup during the next 12 
months, or (3) the number of Future Sexual Partners as the dependent variable. We ran 
separate analyses for each SOI-R facet, yielding a total of nine analyses. In a first step, the 
actor’s and partner’s score on a SOI-R facet as well as their product were entered as 
predictors. In a second step, sex and its two- and three-way interactions with the other 
predictors were also entered. While several analyses indicated significant actor effects 
(which generally replicated the findings from the whole sample), partner effects and actor-
                                                                                                                                                     
level, only male Behavior showed a significant relationship to facial attractiveness (r = 23, p = .007). 
This pattern was even more obvious in the uniqueness correlations. 
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partner-interactions were significant in only three of the nine analyses. Detailed results for 
these three analyses, which also replicated when the uniqueness scores of the facet were 
used, are given in Table 6. 
Table 6 about here 
As can be seen in Table 6, the partner’s sociosexual Attitude had a negative effect on 
the amount of flirtatious behavior the participants had displayed in the lab interaction, while 
there were no effects of the actor’s Attitude, sex, or any interaction. This result could mean 
that those who are in a relationship with someone who expresses a very restrictive attitude 
are more likely to flirt with alternative mates, or (since both variable were concurrently 
assessed) that those who are more likely to flirt with strangers evoke a more restrictive 
attitude towards promiscuity in their partners. Different effects were found for sociosexual 
Desire: more unrestricted levels of Desire in either member of a couple increased the 
likelihood of a romantic breakup within the upcoming year. The significant interaction 
indicated that his effect was even more accentuated when both partners had unrestricted 
Desires, even though the weak three-way interaction suggests that the joint effect was 
somewhat stronger for men. Apparently, women are slightly more likely to terminate a 
relationship when only one partner has unrestricted desires. Similarly, both the actor’s and 
the partner’s Desire, as well as their interaction, predicted the number of sexual partners 
over the next 12 months. This might simply be a side-effect of lower relationship stability, or 
an indication that preferences for sexual (non-)exclusivity of one partner tend to have 
consequences for both. 
Assortative mating. Given the existence of some partner effects, it is also interesting 
to have a look at the degree of assortative mating that exists for global sociosexuality and its 
facets. Assortative mating refers to the fact that mate choice for some characteristics is non-
random, resulting in couples that resemble each other above chance level. Simpson and 
Gangestad (1991) reported a moderate degree of assortative mating for the SOI total score 
(r = .30). We failed to replicate this finding for the SOI (r = .13, p = .28), but found a similar 
degree of assortative mating for the SOI-R (r = .34, p = .004). An analysis on facet level 
revealed that only Attitude (r = .36, p = .002), but not Behavior (r = .10, p = .41) or Desire (r = 
.16, p = .18), showed significant within-dyad resemblances. This pattern of result was even 
more obvious in the correlations of the uniqueness scores (r = .01, .31, and .03 for Behavior, 
Attitude, and Desire, respectively). Thus, only the attitude component seems to be 
responsible for assortative mating on sociosexuality. 
Discussion 
Study 2 showed that Behavior, Attitude and Desire do not only emerge as 
components from the empirical structure of global sociosexuality measures and show distinct 
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correlational patterns with concurrently assessed self-reports, but are also predictive of 
mating behavior and romantic relationship outcomes in a highly differentiated manner. 
People with a history of unrestricted sociosexual behavior were more likely to stay single 
over the next year (when single) or to change partners (when in a relationship). Sociosexual 
desire was more restricted in those who will remain in their relationship for the next twelve 
months, while those who will separate tended to have desires almost as unrestricted as 
singles. Sociosexual attitudes, in contrast, did not predict future relationship status. Similarly, 
only past behaviors and current desires related to flirtatious behavior towards attractive 
strangers and future numbers of sex partners. After controlling for sociosexual behavior and 
desire, unrestricted attitudes had even a negative effect on flirting behavior. Within couples, a 
partner’s restricted attitude apparently elicited (or was elicited by) flirtatious advances 
towards alternative mates. A partner with restricted sociosexual desire, on the other hand, 
facilitated a monogamous and stable romantic relationship. Finally, only the behavior and 
desire (which had the lowest temporal stability, especially in women) changed when the 
relationship status changed; attitudes remained the same. Assortative mating occurred only 
on attitudes. These results further confirm that the three components of global sociosexuality 
behave quite distinctively, indicating that they should be separated in the study of 
sociosexual orientations. 
General Discussion 
It might be a historical coincidence that sociosexuality has been treated almost exclusively as 
a broad, global construct. Kinsey introduced it as a descriptive dimension in his normative 
studies, and Simpson and Gangestad (1991) seemed to be inspired by a type approach 
when establishing the construct in psychology (see Gangestad & Simpson, 1990). In the 
following years, sociosexuality was more and more equated with mating strategies and 
tactics within an evolutionary life-history framework (Simpson et al., 2004). All these 
approaches enforce a global perspective on sociosexuality. On second sight, however, 
different aspects of sociosexuality do not need to be – and sometimes cannot be – closely 
interrelated. The most obvious contrast exist between sociosexual desire, which shows large 
sex differences in line with evolutionary expectations (Schmitt et al., 2003), and behavior, 
where every act of heterosexual sexuality requires a man and a woman. In every population 
with balanced sex ratio, the overall number of committed and uncommitted sexual acts will 
be the same for men and women, so it is impossible that every member of either sex 
behaves exactly as he or she desires (Asendorpf & Penke, 2005). Neither do explicit 
attitudes, which are likely more indicative of cultural and peer socialization, need to reflect 
desires or behaviors. Our studies provided strong support for a more differentiated 
perspective on sociosexuality. The three proposed sociosexuality components Behavior, 
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Attitude, and Desire were found in the empirical structure of the established SOI and also in 
the structure of our new SOI-R, which was able to assess them reliably. Furthermore, we 
showed that their contributions to the nomological network, the predictive validity, the 
longitudinal development, and the interpersonal effects of global sociosexuality are highly 
specific. In the following, we discuss the specifics separately for each sociosexuality facet: 
Sociosexual Behavior. The Behavior facet, an index of the quantity of past short-term 
sexual encounters, shows strong and unique links to the diversity of past romantic and 
sexual relationships, as well as the occurrence of sexual infidelity. It can thus be regarded as 
a measure of the mating tactic an individual has implemented so far - or was able to 
implement. The trade-offs and difficulties that individuals face when trying to pursue their 
preferred mating tactic within competitive mating markets (Noë & Hammerstein, 1995; Penke 
et al., in press) are inferable from the facts that the correlation between sociosexual Desire 
and Behavior is rather low, and that the Behavior facet does not show the strong sex 
difference that is usually found for Desire. They are also reflected in the fact that traits that 
affect the initiation of mating interactions (like physical attractiveness, shyness, and 
sensation seeking) and self-perceptions of mate value relate to this facet (see also 
Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). Thus, the Behavior facet is as much an index of mating 
potential as it is of experiences. 
Our results also showed that men and women who had more experience with short-term 
relationships in the past (i.e., those with high Behavior scores) were more likely to have 
multiple sexual partners and unstable relationships in the future. The behaviorally expressed 
level of sociosexuality thus seems to be a fairly stable personal characteristic. This stability 
seems to stem at least partly from the active behavior of individuals, since past sociosexual 
behavior also predicted the amount of flirtatious advances they showed towards an attractive 
stranger. For women, we could trace this relationship back to the amount of smiling and 
laughing they showed during an initial encounter. Smiling has been interpreted as a signal of 
low dominance and contact-readiness (Eibl-Eibesfeld, 1989), and it is perceived as attractive 
(O’Doherty et al., 2003). Furthermore, women tend to smile more when confronted with 
attractive men (Hazlett & Hoehn-Saric, 2000). One way to interpret these results it that 
women with more short-term mating experience might have learned how to use joyfulness to 
appear attractive and approachable for men they find attractive – successfully, as our 
confederates’ ratings indicate - which in turn raises the odds for more unrestricted 
sociosexual behavior in the future. 
Sociosexual Attitude. The unique contributions of the Attitude facet to the effects of 
sociosexual orientations were surprisingly limited. Some of the strongest correlations were 
found with other self-rated personality constructs. While it is reasonable that individuals 
adopt attitudes towards promiscuity that match their levels of sensation seeking, sex drive, 
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desire for sexual variety, shyness, and preference for exciting and attractive partners, it is 
striking that Attitude was the only sociosexuality facet which related to all kinds of self-report 
questionnaires. In sharp contrast, Attitude was the only sociosexuality facet that did not 
contribute uniquely to the prediction of future sexual behavior and relationship outcomes, and 
was even negatively related to flirting behavior when past behaviors and current desires 
were statistically controlled, indicating that people act against their explicit attitude when it 
contradicts their desires or behavioral histories. Furthermore, only the Attitude facet was 
unaffected by changes in the romantic relationship status, but men and women expressed a 
more restricted Attitude when their partners responded flirtatiously towards alternative mates 
or when conforming to religious values. Finally, sociosexual attitudes were solely responsible 
for the existence of assortative mating on sociosexuality. Whether this is a result of direct 
mate choice for partners that express a similar attitude, or an indirect effect of social 
homogamy (i.e., choosing a mate from within one’s social environment – such as college, 
job, or neighbourhood – where others might share similar attitudes), remains unclear from 
the current data. 
Taken together, this pattern of findings supports our argument that the unique aspect of 
sociosexual attitudes (which is not simply an explicit reflection of one’s own behavior and 
desire) reflects social self-representation and cultural socialization – how people want to be 
seen by others, and how others have told them to be. This interpersonal-influence aspect of 
sociosexuality is important, since (1) the adaptive value of different sociosexual orientations 
differs between environments (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Schmitt, 2005a), which makes 
the cultural transmission of mating tactics valuable (Gangestad, Haselton & Buss, 2006), (2) 
men and women have to negotiate their conflicting desires when forming sexual relationships 
(Arnquist & Rowe, 2005; Buss & Schmitt, 1993), and (3) manipulating the sociosexual 
orientations of rivals can benefit one’s own outcome within a competitive mating market 
(Baumeister & Twenge, 2002; Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). However, when it comes to what 
mating tactic someone will actually pursue, this component of sociosexuality apparently lacks 
predictive validity. 
Sociosexual Desire. As expected, Desire showed the largest sex differences. It is likely 
that this facet drives the sex differences in global sociosexuality. Within sex, we could relate 
sociosexual Desire to general sex drive, desire for sexual variety, and sensation seeking. 
What was most compelling about this facet, however, were its transactions with romantic 
relationships: on the one hand, sociosexual Desire was more restricted in individuals who 
were currently in a relationship, became more restricted when a new relationship was 
started, and got more unrestricted again after about four years (consistent with Fisher, 1987) 
or when a break-up occurred. On the other hand, more unrestricted sociosexual Desires of 
both partners predicted relationship dissolution and sexual involvement with new partners. 
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Furthermore, Desire showed quite substantial negative correlations with concurrently 
assessed relationship quality, commitment, and fidelity, as well as weaker ones with 
attachment to the current partner. 
Most of these personality-relationship-transactions were somewhat stronger in women 
than in men, which might explain the considerably lower temporal stability of Desire in 
women. This pattern of sex differences makes sense from an evolutionary perspective: 
focusing desire on a single long-term mate as long as the relationship is tenable aids basic 
female reproductive demands, like securing resources and paternal support (Buss & Schmitt, 
1993; Trivers, 1972). For men, however, desiring short-term sexual encounters whenever 
they become attainable can yield high fitness payoffs. In support of this theoretical argument, 
male Desire was not only less reactive to romantic relationship status, it also predicted flirting 
behavior independent of their relationship status. The link between Desire and flirting was 
partly mediated by the amount of gazing towards a potential mate. Other studies have found 
that direct gaze, similar to smiling, indicates attraction, contact-readiness, and attention 
(Kleinke, 1986), and is perceived as attractive (Kampe, Frith, Dolan & Frith, 2001; Mason, 
Tatkow & Mccrae, 2005). However, contrary to smiling, direct gaze also signals dominance 
(Kleinke, 1986) - a trait women prefer in short-term mates (Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, 
Simpson & Cousins, 2007). This might explain why we found that sociosexuality predicts 
different flirtatious behaviors in men and women. 
Implications and Limitations 
The decomposition of global sociosexuality into three components has implications for 
future evolutionary psychological studies of individual differences in mating tactics. 
Differences in mating tactics reflect different solutions to life-history trade-offs, especially 
between investment in stable long-term relationships with high levels of parental investment 
versus less stable relationships with more or better partners. However, what is evolutionary 
relevant about mating tactics is only their behavioral implementation over the reproductive 
lifespan, since only actual behaviors affect reproductive success and ultimately fitness. Thus, 
sociosexual attitudes, desires, and also early (pre-reproductive) behavioral experiences can 
only affect fitness if they have an impact on actual reproductive behaviors. We provide the 
first evidence that sociosexual desire and past behavioral experiences indeed predict future 
mating behavior. Our study is also the first that shows that sociosexual orientations in 
general and sociosexual behavior in particular are fairly stable over a period as long as one 
year (shorter retest stabilities over six weeks and two months have already been reported by 
Ostovich & Sabini, 2004, and Simpson & Gangestad, 1991, respectively), and the first study 
that brings the developmental transactions between sociosexuality, romantic relationships, 
and flirting behavior into perspective. However, longitudinal studies over more extended time 
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periods are needed to shed light on how sociosexual orientations affect life-history decisions 
and trade-offs over the whole reproductive lifespan. This is especially important because 
most studies on sociosexuality have been conducted with about twenty year old 
undergraduate students (our participants had a more heterogeneous background, but those 
in Study 2 were only slightly older on average and all childless). At this age, mating behavior 
seldom leads to reproduction, but has a more exploratory character that is distinctive from 
the mating behavior with reproductive goals that occurs later in life (Arnett, 2000; Furman, 
2002; Penke et al., in press). Indeed, Locke and Bogin (2006) argued that humans evolved 
an extended adolescent life phase to provide a “training period” for mating skills. Future 
studies should aim to understand how trade-offs in actual reproductive behaviors emerge 
from the interplay of sociosexual desires, attitudes, and past behavioral experiences. 
The most central implication of our results is that studying sociosexuality as one unitary 
construct masks important effects that are specific to its components. It is also insufficient to 
separate only sociosexual behavior and attitude (as suggested by Webster & Bryan, in press, 
and Jackson & Kirkpatrick, 2007), since some of the most substantial effects were unique to 
sociosexual desire, while attitude itself lacked predictive validity for future behavior. This is 
especially critical since some studies rely exclusively on attitudinal items when assessing 
sociosexuality (e.g. Kurzban & Weeden, 2005; Rhodes, Simmons & Peters, 2005) or use 
sociosexuality measures that are heavily biased towards the attitude component (Bailey, 
Kirk, Zhu, Dunne & Martin, 2000). 
While the three components of sociosexuality we propose may help to analyze mating 
tactics, they are ultimately not differentiated enough. Various motives can lead to similar 
levels of sociosexual behavior, attitude, and desire (Cooper, Shapiro & Powers, 1998; 
Greilling & Buss, 2000; Hill & Preston, 1996; Jones, 1998), and in the end they are the result 
of interacting systems of evolved psychological mating adaptations (e.g. Fisher, 2004; 
Gangestad, Thornhill & Garver-Apgar, 2005; Gangestad et al., 2007; Maner, Gailiot & 
DeWall, 2007; Penke et al., in press), genetic variance within these systems (Penke, 
Denissen & Miller, in press) and within general condition (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000), and 
social, cultural and ecological factors that evoke conditional responses (Gangestad & 
Simpson, 2000; Gangestad et al., 2006; Schmitt, 2005a). Our more differentiated perspective 
on sociosexuality provides one of the levels we need to explore in order to understand how 
evolution prepared the functional design of our species to exhibit complex adaptive mating 
behaviors. 
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Appendix 
The revised Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI-R) 
Please respond honestly to the following questions: 
1. With how many different partners have you had sex within the past 12 months? 
□ 0  
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5-6 
□ 7-9 
□ 10-19 
□ 20 or more 
 
2. With how many different partners have you had sexual intercourse on one and only one occasion? 
□ 0  
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5-6 
□ 7-9 
□ 10-19 
□ 20 or more 
 
3. With how many different partners have you had sexual intercourse without having an interest in a 
long-term committed relationship with this person? 
□ 0  
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5-6 
□ 7-9 
□ 10-19 
□ 20 or more 
241 
 
4. Sex without love is OK. 
□ 1 – Strongly disagree 
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5 
□ 6 
□ 7 
□ 8 
□ 9 – Strongly agree 
 
5.  I can imagine myself being comfortable and enjoying "casual" sex with different partners. 
□ 1 – Strongly disagree 
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5 
□ 6 
□ 7 
□ 8 
□ 9 – Strongly agree 
 
6. I do not want to have sex with a person until I am sure that we will have a long-term, serious 
relationship. 
□ 1 – Strongly disagree 
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 
□ 5 
□ 6 
□ 7 
□ 8 
□ 9 – Strongly agree 
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7. How often do you have fantasies about having sex with someone you are not in a committed 
romantic relationship with? 
□ 1 – never 
□ 2 – very seldom 
□ 3 – about once every two or three months 
□ 4 – about once a month 
□ 5 – about once every two weeks 
□ 6 – about once a week 
□ 7 – several times per week 
□ 8 – nearly every day 
□ 9 – at least once a day 
 
8. How often do you experience sexual arousal when you are in contact with someone you are not in 
a committed romantic relationship with? 
□ 1 – never 
□ 2 – very seldom 
□ 3 – about once every two or three months 
□ 4 – about once a month 
□ 5 – about once every two weeks 
□ 6 – about once a week 
□ 7 – several times per week 
□ 8 – nearly every day 
□ 9 – at least once a day 
 
9. In everyday life, how often do you have spontaneous fantasies about having sex with someone 
you have just met? 
□ 1 – never 
□ 2 – very seldom 
□ 3 – about once every two or three months 
□ 4 – about once a month 
□ 5 – about once every two weeks 
□ 6 – about once a week 
□ 7 – several times per week 
□ 8 – nearly every day 
□ 9 – at least once a day 
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Items 1-3 should be coded as 0 = 1, 1 = 2, ..., 10-19 = 8, 20 or more = 9; they can 
then be aggregated to form the Behavior facet. After reverse-coding item 6, items 4-6 can be 
aggregated to form the Attitude facet. Aggregating items 7-9 results in the Desire facet. 
Finally, all nine items can be aggregated as the total score of global sociosexual orientation. 
When items 1-3 are presented with open response format instead of the rating scales, 
items 2, 4, and 7 of the original SOI (Table 1) can be added to the SOI-R to allow for 
calculating the SOI total score in addition to the SOI-R scores. In this case, the open 
responses should be recoded to the rating scale format (i.e., 0 = 1, 1 = 2, ..., 20 to max = 9) 
before the SOI-R scores are determined. 
Alternatively, we also developed a version of the SOI-R with 5-point rating scales, 
which might be more appropriate for samples with less educated or less test-experienced 
subjects. In this version, the scale alternatives are “0”, “1”, “2-3”, “4-7”, and “8 or more” for 
the Behavior items, 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for the Attitude items, and 
“never”, “very seldom”, “about once a month”, “about once a week”, and “nearly every day” 
for the Desire item. In a large, heterogeneous online sample (N = 8,549), the SOI-R with five 
response alternatives per item achieved good internal consistencies (α = .83, .81, .82, and 
.85 for the total score and the facets Behavior, Attitude, and Desire, respectively). 
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Table 1: The Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI). 
Item Text 
1 With how many different partners have you had sex (sexual intercourse) within the past year? PPaPP 
2 How many different partners do you foresee yourself having sex with during the next five years 
(Please give a specific, realistic estimate)? PPa, bPP 
3 With how many partners have you had sex on one and only one occasion? PPaPP 
4 How often do you fantasize about having sex with someone other than your current dating partner? PPcPP 
5 Sex without love is OK. PPdPP 
6 I can imagine myself being comfortable and enjoying "casual" sex with different partners. PPdPP 
7 I would have to be closely attached to someone (both emotionally and psychologically) before I could 
feel comfortable and fully enjoy having sex with him or her. PPd, ePP 
Notes: PPaPP: open response format, PPbPP: usually trimmed at 30, PPcPP: Rating scale from 1 (never) to 8 (at least 
once a day), PPdPP: rating scale from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 9 (I strongly agree), PPePP: reverse coded. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and sex differences of the sociosexuality measures in both studies. 
Men Women  Sex difference  No. 
items
 
α M SD α M SD  t Cohen’s d 
Study 1            
SOI-R Behavior 3  .85 2.76 1.83 .84 2.65 1.73  1.62 .06 
SOI-R Attitude 3  .87 6.42 2.33 .83 5.41 2.37  1.81*** .43 
SOI-R Desire 3  .86 5.62 1.91 .85 3.96 1.94  21.72*** .86 
SOI-R total score 9  .83 4.93 1.50 .83 4.01 1.52  15.49*** .61 
SOI 7  .76 57.03 49.78 .75 45.23 39.10  6.46*** .27 
            
Study 2            
SOI-R Behavior 3  .85 3.09 1.88 .79 3.10 1.64  .04 .00 
SOI-R Attitude 3  .76 6.99 1.79 .88 6.26 2.36  2.92** .35 
SOI-R Desire 3  .86 4.98 1.88 .83 3.97 1.82  4.61*** .55 
SOI-R total score 9  .83 5.02 1.40 .84 4.44 1.49  3.36*** .40 
SOI 7  .75 59.23 40.56 .76 51.37 40.32  1.63 .19 
Notes: **: p < .01, ***: p < .001. 
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Table 3a: Correlates of sociosexuality and its components for the men in Study 1 
Notes: N = 1,026; men in a romantic relationship: N = 528; PPaPP: N = 316; PPbPP: N = 709. 
B: Behavior facet, A: Attitude facet, D: Desire facet, RQ: Relationship Questionnaire 
**: p < .01, ***: p < .001. p-levels ≥ .01 are not reported. 
Zero-order correlations  
Uniqueness 
correlations 
 
SOI SOI-R SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D 
 SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D 
No. prior romantic relationships .39*** .35*** .46*** .25*** .07  .40*** .08 -.03 
No. prior sexual partners .68*** .59*** .86*** .38*** .09**  .77*** .07 -.07 
No. prior extra-pair sexual partners .53*** .43*** .61*** .26*** .12***  .55*** .02 .01 
Self-Perceived Mate Value Scale .24*** .23*** .34*** .16*** .03  .27*** .07 -.01 
Religiosity -.07 -.17*** -.07 -.21*** -.08  .01 -.19*** .00 
Attachment preference factor PPaPP -.03 -.08 -.02 -.10 -.05  .01 -.09 -.01 
Resources preference factorPP aPP .09 -.01 .09 -.08 .00  .11 -.11 .03 
Condition preference factorPP aPP .02 .19*** .08 .21*** .10  .02 .17** .01 
Short-Term Mating IndexPP bPP .33*** .70*** .34*** .67*** .52***  .06 .45*** .30***
Sensation Seeking ScalePP bPP .32*** .53*** .35*** .49*** .32***  .15*** .31*** .15***
Shyness ScalePP bPP -.25*** -.27*** -.30*** -.23*** -.07  -.22*** -.12** .02 
Sex Drive QuestionnairePP bPP .22*** .42*** .15*** .32*** .46***  .01 .15*** .37***
Masturbation frequency .07 .22*** -.01 .13*** .38***  -.07 .01 .36***
Only men in a romantic relationship          
Personal Relationship Quality Components -.06 -.23*** -.03 -.16*** -.32***  .04 -.05 -.29***
Current partner is “Mrs. Right” -.12** -.23*** -.05 -.20*** -.26***  .03 -.11 -.21***
could imagine to be unfaithful .26*** .54*** .29*** .45*** .48***  .12 .23*** .36***
been unfaithful in this relationship .24*** .32*** .35*** .18*** .23***  .30*** -.02 .18***
Sexual intercourse frequency .10 .12** .16*** .16*** -.03  .10 .14** -.10 
Secure attachment style (RQ) .07 -.03 .05 -.02 -.08  .06 -.02 -.09 
Fearful attachment style (RQ) .06 .16*** .08 .09 .21***  .04 -.01 .20***
Preoccupied attachment style (RQ) -.04 .00 -.03 -.06 .08  .00 -.09 .11 
Dismissive attachment style (RQ) .04 .17*** .04 .18*** .15***  -.03 .12** .11 
RQ - Model of self .03 -.01 .01 .05 -.09  .00 .09 -.12***
RQ - Model of other -.04 -.18*** -.05 -.17*** -.17***  .02 -.11 -.13***
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Table 3b: Correlates of sociosexuality and its components for the women in Study 1 
Notes: N = 1,682; women in a romantic relationship: N = 919; a: N = 551; PPbPP: N = 1,131. 
B: Behavior facet, A: Attitude facet, D: Desire facet, RQ: Relationship Questionnaire. 
**: p < .01, ***: p < .001. p-levels ≥ .01 are not reported. 
Zero-order correlations  
Uniqueness 
correlations 
 
SOI SOI-R SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D 
 SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D 
No. prior romantic relationships .26*** .23*** .38*** .20*** -.05  .33*** .05 -.13***
No. prior sexual partners .62*** .56*** .83*** .42*** .05  .72*** .04 -.10***
No. prior extra-pair sexual partners .49*** .41*** .57*** .31*** .07  .48*** .04 -.04 
Self-Perceived Mate Value Scale .16*** .19*** .23*** .15*** .06  .15*** .03 .04 
Religiosity -.15*** -.18*** -.16*** -.18*** -.05  -.08 -.12*** .01 
Attachment preference factor PPaPP -.15*** -.23*** -.16*** -.23*** -.13**  -.05 -.15*** -.05 
Resources preference factorPP aPP .01 -.05 .01 -.07 -.03  .06 -.09 .00 
Condition preference factorPP aPP .16*** .25*** .11** .23*** .20***  .00 .15*** .13** 
Short-Term Mating IndexPP bPP .41*** .68*** .30*** .65*** .52***  -.03 .46*** .33***
Sensation Seeking ScalePP bPP .31*** .46*** .31*** .43*** .28***  .11*** .27*** .14***
Shyness ScalePP bPP -.15*** -.21*** -.21*** -.19*** -.08  -.14*** -.09** -.01 
Sex Drive QuestionnairePP bPP  .26*** .33*** .22*** .24*** .29***  .11*** .09** .22***
Masturbation frequency .18*** .24*** .11*** .14*** .30***  .04 .01 .28***
Only women in a romantic relationship          
Personal Relationship Quality Components  -.21*** -.28*** -.14*** -.13*** -.40***  -.08 .03 -.37***
Current partner is “Mr. Right” -.21*** -.27*** -.11** -.16*** -.36***  -.02 -.03 -.32***
could imagine to be unfaithful .32*** .45*** .21*** .32*** .51***  .04 .14*** .41***
been unfaithful in this relationship .31*** .39*** .30*** .24*** .37***  .19*** .04 .30***
Sexual intercourse frequency .09** .05 .12*** .07 -.07  .09** .05 -.10** 
Secure attachment style (RQ) -.08 -.08 -.03 -.05 -.10**  .00 -.02 -.09** 
Fearful attachment style (RQ) .11** .11*** .07 .06 .13***  .04 -.01 .12***
Preoccupied attachment style (RQ) .06 .04 .03 .00 .08  .03 -.03 .08 
Dismissive attachment style (RQ) .19*** .27*** .16*** .22*** .24***  .05 .12*** .17***
RQ - Model of self -.02 .02 .01 .05 -.02  -.02 .06 -.05 
RQ - Model of other -.16*** -.21*** -.11*** -.16*** -.20***  -.03 -.08 -.15***
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Table 4: Accuracies and cue validities for all Brunswickean lens model analyses in Study 2. 
Betas for scales scores   Betas for uniquenesses 
  SOI SOI-R 
SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D  
SOI-R 
B 
SOI-R 
A 
SOI-R 
D 
Men          
Global Flirting Rating .27** .33*** .28** .06 .41***  .20* -.18* .38*** 
Behavior coding: Fixation .09 .14 .05 -.04 .28***  .01 -.18* .33*** 
Behavior coding: Expressivity .10 .10 .07 -.02 .16†  .05 -.11 .18* 
Behavior coding: Joyfulness -.02 .06 -.05 .07 .11  -.09 .04 .10 
Behavior coding: Inhibitedness .01 .02 -.04 .05 .03  -.07 .05 .03 
Women          
Global Flirting Rating .26** .17* .28*** .02 .14†  .28*** -.14† .07 
Behavior coding: Fixation .10 .11 .12 .16 -.01  .06 .13 -.08 
Behavior coding: Expressivity -.04 -.14 -.11 -.10 -.13  -.05 -.04 -.09 
Behavior coding: Joyfulness .27** .17* .26** .02 .21*  .24** -.14 .15 
Behavior coding: Inhibitedness' -.07 -.05 -.08 .01 -.04  -.09 .05 -.02 
Behavior coding: Flirting gestures .08 -.02 .06 -.03 -.02  .09 -.06 -.03 
Notes: All beta weights are controlled for the confederate during the conversation (dummy-coded). 
†: p < .10, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001.
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Table 6: Hierarchical modeling of actor, partner, sex and interaction effects of sociosexuality facets 
on outcome variables in Study 2 
Notes: Breakup is dummy coded (0 = no breakup, 1 = breakup). Sex is dummy coded (1 = male, -1 = 
female). All predictors are centered on dyad level. Only models with significant partner effects are 
shown. 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001. 
Model 1 Model 2  
b SE b SE 
Flirting behavior rating     
Intercept -.355 .086 -.337 .089 
Actor SOI-R Attitude -.009 .035 -.004 .035 
Partner SOI-R Attitude -.080* .033 -.084* .037 
Actor X Partner .006 .015 .004 .015 
Sex   -.097 .072 
Actor X Sex   .008 .038 
Partner X Sex   -.002 .039 
Actor X Partner X Sex    .008 .012 
Relationship breakup     
Intercept .135*** .037 .139*** .041 
Actor SOI-R Desire .061*** .016 .062*** .017 
Partner SOI-R Desire .048** .016 .046** .017 
Actor X Partner .030* .013 .031* .013 
Sex   -.008 .011 
Actor X Sex   -.014 .018 
Partner X Sex   -.004 .018 
Actor X Partner X Sex   .008* .004 
Number of future sex partners     
Intercept -.416*** .070 -.403*** .079 
Actor SOI-R Desire .142*** .037 .136*** .039 
Partner SOI-R Desire .107** .038 .112** .041 
Actor X Partner .065* .026 .065* .026 
Sex   .028 .057 
Actor X Sex   -.010 .041 
Partner X Sex   .018 .042 
Actor X Partner X Sex   .015 .019 
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SO
I-R
 D
es
ire
Men
Womend = .68 d = .25 
d = 1.00 d = .28 
 
Figure 2: Effects of relationship status and duration on sociosexual desire in Study 1. 
Notes: All sex and group differences p < .001. 
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Figure 3: Mean differences in the SOI-R facets between relationship status groups in Study 2. 
Notes. Groups refer to the relationship status 12 months after the assessment of the SOI-R. 
Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) are given for all significant (p < .05) group differences. 
